{"items":[{"id":12274,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"[New release] openwrt/openwrt v25.12.6","summary":"(no release notes)","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/releases/tag/v25.12.6","published_at":"2026-10-19T09:43:09Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544627Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"openwrt","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12274","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12274"}},{"id":12275,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"[New release] openwrt/openwrt v24.10.8","summary":"(no release notes)","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/releases/tag/v24.10.8","published_at":"2026-07-26T18:06:04Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544627Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"openwrt","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12275","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12275"}},{"id":12276,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"[New release] openwrt/openwrt v25.12.5","summary":"(no release notes)","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/releases/tag/v25.12.5","published_at":"2026-07-01T23:58:59Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544628Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"openwrt","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12276","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12276"}},{"id":12267,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-9558-77jp-g3fw / CVE-2026-55490: EAD Integer Underflow → Pre-Auth Denial of Service","summary":"EAD Integer Underflow → Pre-Auth Denial of Service ### Summary An integer underflow in `handle_send_a()` of the Emergency Access Daemon (EAD) allows any unauthenticated attacker on the local network to crash the daemon by sending a single crafted UDP packet. No credentials are required — only a valid username (e.g. `root`) present in `/etc/passwd`. --- ### Details In `handle_send_a()` (lines 426–447 of `ead.c`), the message length is computed as: ```c // len is declared as int len = ntohl(msg->len) - sizeof(struct ead_msg_number); ``` `sizeof(struct ead_msg_number)` is `1` (one `uint8_t` field + flexible array). The subtraction is performed in **unsigned arithmetic** (C usual arithmetic conversions): if `msg->len == 0`, then `0u - 1u = 0xFFFFFFFF`. This value is then assigned to the `int len`, yielding `-1` on every two's-complement architecture (ARM, MIPS, x86, RISC-V — the full set of OpenWrt targets). The bounds check that follows is: ```c if (len > MAXPARAMLEN + 1) // -1 > 257 → FALSE → check bypassed return false; ``` `memcpy` is then called with `len` implicitly cast to `size_t`, producing `SIZE_MAX`: ```c A.len = len; // -1 A.data = abuf; memcpy(A.data, number->data, len); // memcpy(..., SIZE_MAX) → crash ``` **Why the packet passes all prior validation:** The dispatcher in `parse_message()` only checks that the *captured packet length* is `≥ sizeof(struct ead_packet) + 1`. It does **not** validate `msg->len`. `handle_packet()` (line 670) additionally requires: ```c if (h->len < sizeof(struct ead_packet) + ntohl(pkt->msg.len)) return; ``` When `msg->len == 0`, this reduces to `h->len >= sizeof(struct ead_packet)`. A packet with `h->len = sizeof(struct ead_packet) + 1` and `msg->len = 0` therefore **passes every check** and reaches the vulnerable `memcpy`. --- ### Proof of Concept **Prerequisites:** attacker on the same Layer-2/3 segment as the EAD daemon (UDP/56026). **Step 1 — Establish session with a valid username:** ``` # EAD_TYPE_SET_USERNAME → username = \"root\" # EAD_TYPE_GET_PRIME → retrieve SRP prime (no auth required) ``` **Step 2 — Send the malformed EAD_TYPE_SEND_A packet:** ``` h->len = sizeof(struct ead_packet) + 1 # passes handle_packet() check msg->len = 0x00000000 # triggers underflow in handle_send_a() ``` **Result:** `memcpy(abuf, number->data, SIZE_MAX)` is invoked, causing an immediate out-of-bounds read and daemon crash (SIGSEGV / SIGBUS). **No password knowledge is required.** --- ### Impact - **Type:** Denial of Service (daemon crash) - **Vector:** Adjacent Network, no authentication required - **Who is impacted:** Any OpenWrt device with EAD enabled and reachable on UDP/56026. EAD is used as an emergency remote-access mechanism; crashing it eliminates the emergency recovery capability and may be a precursor to a broader attack. - **Potential escalation:** The same `len = -1` path passes a `size_t` Affected packages: openwrt:openwrt","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-9558-77jp-g3fw","published_at":"2026-06-29T22:56:21Z","updated_at":"2026-06-29T22:56:21Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544623Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.5,"epss":0.00682,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"openwrt","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-55490","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-55490","GHSA-9558-77JP-G3FW"],"tags":["repo-advisory","openwrt","CWE-191","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11486,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12267","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12267"}},{"id":12265,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-hhmc-92hw-535f / CVE-2026-62948: odhcpd/LuCI: unauthenticated DHCPv6 client can inject lease-file lines via FQDN hostname → stored XSS in the LuCI admin UI","summary":"odhcpd/LuCI: unauthenticated DHCPv6 client can inject lease-file lines via FQDN hostname → stored XSS in the LuCI admin UI ## Summary `odhcpd` writes a DHCPv6 client's requested hostname (its FQDN option, opt 39) into the lease state file `/tmp/odhcpd.leases` via `fprintf(\"…%s…\", lease->hostname)` with **no escaping**. The hostname is decoded by `dn_expand()`, which copies DNS-label bytes **verbatim** — including `0x0a` (newline). A single newline **injects an arbitrary additional line** into the lease file. That file is parsed by LuCI's `rpcd-mod-luci` `getDHCPLeases` (`fgets`+`strtok`, lines beginning `# `) and shown in the **\"Active DHCPv6 Leases\"** admin status page. LuCI renders the host cell through `dom.append` → `node.innerHTML` **without HTML-escaping**, so an attacker-controlled hostname becomes **live markup in the privileged admin DOM** — an unauthenticated, pre-association **stored XSS** in the device management UI. One unauthenticated DHCPv6 REQUEST forges a lease record: ```jsonc // what getDHCPLeases returns after the injection (the forged record): { \"interface\": \"br-lan\", \"hostname\": \"\", \"duid\": \"dd\", \"iaid\": \"1\", \"ip6addr\": \"fd1a:bf1c:9075::1ed\" } ``` ## Environment / affected range - **Component (injection):** `odhcpd` — `src/statefiles.c` `statefiles_write_state6()` (DHCPv6, line ~498) and `statefiles_write_state4()` (DHCPv4, ~533, identical pattern). - **Component (render sink):** LuCI — `luci-mod-status` (`htdocs/luci-static/resources/view/status/include/40_dhcp.js`) + `luci-base` (`htdocs/luci-static/resources/luci.js`, `dom.append`); back-end `rpcd-mod-luci` `getDHCPLeases` (`/usr/lib/rpcd/luci.so`). - **Hunt corpus:** odhcpd `main` @ `1782f3f` (`PKG_SOURCE_DATE=2026-06-04`), zero downstream patches. - **Live-validated build:** OpenWrt **25.12.4** (`r32933-4ccb782af7`, x86/64), kernel 6.12.87, musl; `odhcpd-ipv6only-2026.03.16~edf2e523-r1`; `rpcd-mod-luci-20240305`; `luci-base 26.133`. odhcpd runs on `br-lan`, `dhcp.lan.dhcpv6='server'`, `leasefile=/tmp/odhcpd.leases` — **all defaults**. - **Affected range:** `statefiles.c` is **byte-identical at upstream HEAD `03dacc2`** — present and **unfixed**. The deployed 25.12.4 binary `/usr/sbin/odhcpd` carries the exact format strings (`# %s %s %x %s%s …` and the `broken\\x20` marker). - **CWE-117** (improper output neutralization for logs) / **CWE-150** (improper neutralization of escape sequences) in odhcpd → **CWE-79** (stored XSS) in LuCI. ## Topology The attack rides the LAN as an ordinary unauthenticated DHCPv6 client; the XSS fires when an admin later opens the leases status page. ``` LAN segment br-lan (fw4 zone lan: input ACCEPT) +-------------------------+ +----------------------------------+ | Attacker (on-link) | DHCPv6 SOLICIT/REQUEST | OpenWrt DUT 25.12.4 10.0.2.2 | | fe80::a0a4:d5ff:... | with OPTION_FQDN(39) = | odhcpd [::]:547 (br-lan) | | unauth DHCPv6 client | \"x\\n# br-lan dd 1 Affected packages: :odhcpd/luci","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-hhmc-92hw-535f","published_at":"2026-06-29T22:56:13Z","updated_at":"2026-07-14T22:51:15Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544620Z","severity":"critical","cvss_score":9.6,"epss":0.0058,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"odhcpd/luci","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-62948","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-62948","GHSA-HHMC-92HW-535F"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-79","CWE-117","CWE-150","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11482,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12265","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12265"}},{"id":12266,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-jw5r-xhf5-2xcq / CVE-2026-62947: ACL bypass and arbitrary root file read via cgi-io cgi-download","summary":"ACL bypass and arbitrary root file read via cgi-io cgi-download ## Summary The `cgi-download` handler in cgi-io authorizes the requested `path` against the caller's ubus session `file` ACL and then opens it without canonicalizing the path first (`main.c:540`, `main.c:557`). rpcd's ACL matcher uses `fnmatch()` without `FNM_PATHNAME` (`session.c:146`), so a wildcard in an allowed ACL glob spans `/`. A request path of the form `/../../../` matches the literal allowed prefix during the ACL check, while the subsequent `open()` lets the kernel resolve the embedded `..` and reach a file outside that prefix. cgi-io runs as root, so the resolved target is any file readable by uid 0. The sibling upload handler and rpcd-mod-file both canonicalize before their ACL check and reject the same input. Result: a session holding the `cgi-io download` permission and any wildcard `file` read grant reads any root-readable file, including `/etc/shadow`, which the rpcd file API denies to that same session. ## Affected OpenWrt cgi-io, git HEAD `658b14b`, as shipped in OpenWrt 25.12.4 (r32933-4ccb782af7). `/www/cgi-bin/cgi-download` is a symlink to `/usr/libexec/cgi-io`. Requires an authenticated ubus session holding `cgi-io download` (access group `luci-mod-system-flash`) plus one wildcard `file` read grant: `luci-mod-system-repokeys` (`/etc/apk/keys/*`), `luci-mod-network-config` (`/proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/conf/*`), or `luci-mod-system-flash` itself (`/dev/mtdblock[0-9]*`). On a default single-root install the root LuCI session holds these grants. Deployments that delegate a restricted rpcd `config login` operator the flash access group are affected at a lower privilege tier. Unauthenticated requests are rejected at `main.c:537`; the read is not anonymously reachable. ## Root cause `main_download` reads the `path` POST field and passes it unmodified to `session_access(sid, \"file\", fields[3], \"read\")` (`main.c:540`) and then to `open(fields[3], O_RDONLY)` (`main.c:557`). rpcd evaluates the ACL with `fnmatch(acl->object, path, FNM_NOESCAPE)` (`session.c:146`), and the missing `FNM_PATHNAME` lets a `*` in an allowed glob match `/` and therefore an entire `../` traversal suffix. Because the ACL string and the `open()` string are the same raw bytes, the check passes against the allowed prefix while the kernel resolves the `..` to a file outside it. The upload handler canonicalizes with `canonicalize_path()` before its ACL check (`main.c:372`, `main.c:348`), and rpcd-mod-file canonicalizes at `file.c:264` before `rpc_file_access` at `file.c:272`, so both reject the identical traversal. cgi-io runs as root, so the missing canonicalization on the download path turns a path-scoped read grant into a read of any uid-0-readable file. ## Reproduction `openwrt/rootfs:x86_64-25.12.4` in Docker running uhttpd, ubusd, rpcd, rpcd-mod-file and LuCI, with a root password set and stock ACLs. The session below is a restricted operator holding only `luci-mod-system-flash` and `luci-mod-system-repokeys`. Affected packages: :cgi-io (OpenWrt)","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-jw5r-xhf5-2xcq","published_at":"2026-06-29T22:56:04Z","updated_at":"2026-07-14T22:50:30Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544622Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.9,"epss":0.00524,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"cgi-io (OpenWrt)","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-62947","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-62947","GHSA-JW5R-XHF5-2XCQ"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-22","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11484,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12266","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12266"}},{"id":12277,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"[New release] openwrt/openwrt v24.10.7","summary":"(no release notes)","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/releases/tag/v24.10.7","published_at":"2026-05-31T23:20:18Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544628Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"openwrt","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12277","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12277"}},{"id":12278,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"[New release] openwrt/openwrt v25.12.4","summary":"(no release notes)","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/releases/tag/v25.12.4","published_at":"2026-05-14T21:57:01Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544629Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"openwrt","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12278","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12278"}},{"id":12268,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-7c3j-f7w2-p8f6 / CVE-2026-30871: mdnsd: Stack buffer overflow in DNS PTR query","summary":"mdnsd: Stack buffer overflow in DNS PTR query\n\nThe mdns daemon contains a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in the parse_question\r\nfunction when processing PTR queries for reverse DNS domains (.in-addr.arpa and\r\n.ip6.arpa). The vulnerability is reachable through normal DNS packet processing when\r\nthe daemon receives multicast DNS queries on UDP port 5353.\r\nDNS packets are first processed by dns_handle_packet, which validates and processes\r\nthe packets in dns_consume_name. This function calls dn_expand to expand the queried\r\ndomain into the fixed-sized global buffer, name_buffer, which holds 8096 bytes\r\n(MAX_NAME_LEN).\r\nThe same global buffer is then processed in the parse_question function, where\r\ndifferent types of DNS queries are handled. For TYPE_PTR queries, the function checks if\r\nname_buffer ends with a reverse DNS suffix. When a match is found, it performs an\r\nunbounded strcpy from the potentially large expanded name in name_buffer into fixed\r\n256-byte stack buffers.\r\nThe issue is that when dn_expand encounters non-printable ASCII bytes (0x01, 0x02, …), it\r\nwill convert the bytes to their octal representations. For example, the byte 0x01 would be\r\nconverted to its octal counterpart, \\001, which is 0x5C 0x30 0x30 0x31.\r\nAs such, it is possible to forge a maliciously crafted DNS packet such that when it is\r\nexpanded, it is much greater than the intended 256-byte stack buffer.\n\nAffected packages: :OpenWrt\nPatched: OpenWrt 24.10.6, OpenWrt 25.12.1","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-7c3j-f7w2-p8f6","published_at":"2026-03-19T16:29:33Z","updated_at":"2026-03-19T17:30:08Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544623Z","severity":"critical","cvss_score":9.5,"epss":0.01363,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"OpenWrt","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-30871","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-30871","GHSA-7C3J-F7W2-P8F6"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11488,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12268","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12268"}},{"id":12269,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-mpgh-v658-jqv5 / CVE-2026-30872: mdnsd: Stack buffer overflow in IPv6 reverse DNS lookup","summary":"mdnsd: Stack buffer overflow in IPv6 reverse DNS lookup\n\nThe mdns daemon contains a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in the\r\nmatch_ipv6_addresses function when processing PTR queries for IPv6 reverse DNS\r\ndomains (.ip6.arpa). The vulnerability is reachable through normal DNS packet\r\nprocessing when the daemon receives multicast DNS queries on UDP port 5353.\r\nThe global buffer name_buffer, which holds the expanded domain after the call to\r\ndns_consume_name, is processed in the parse_question function, where different DNS\r\nquery types are handled. For TYPE_PTR queries, dns_consume_name checks if\r\nname_buffer ends with a reverse DNS suffix. If a match is found, the strcpy operation is\r\nperformed from name_buffer into a fixed 256-byte stack buffer with the IPv6 reverse DNS\r\nsuffix being excluded. The resultant buffer is then processed by\r\ndns_reply_reverse_ip6_mapping, which calls match_ipv6_addresses.\r\nIn the match_ipv6_addresses function, the reverse IPv6 request is extracted into a\r\nbuffer of length INET6_ADDRSTRLEN (46). Since the length of the data in the 256-byte\r\nbuffer is not checked before extracting the IPv6 address, it is possible for the data to be\r\nlarger than 46 bytes, leading to an out-of-bounds (OOB) write\n\nAffected packages: :OpenWrt\nPatched: OpenWrt 24.10.6, OpenWrt 25.12.1","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-mpgh-v658-jqv5","published_at":"2026-03-19T16:29:27Z","updated_at":"2026-03-19T17:29:49Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544624Z","severity":"critical","cvss_score":9.5,"epss":0.025,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"OpenWrt","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-30872","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-30872","GHSA-MPGH-V658-JQV5"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11490,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12269","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12269"}},{"id":12270,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-rcc6-v4r6-gj4m / CVE-2026-30873: jsonpath: Memory leak when processing strings, labels, and regexp tokens","summary":"jsonpath: Memory leak when processing strings, labels, and regexp tokens\n\nThe jp_get_token function is part of the lexical analysis phase, which breaks input\r\nexpressions into individual tokens for subsequent parsing. During tokenization, the library\r\nextracts and stores string literals, field labels, and regular expressions, which involves\r\ndynamic memory allocation to handle variable-length text content. The extraction results\r\nare stored in the jp_opcode struct, which is later transferred to a new jp_opcode object\r\nin the jp_alloc_op function. If a string was previously extracted to an initial jp_opcode\r\nobject, the string will be copied to the new allocation, without freeing the previous one,\r\nleading to a memory leak.\n\nAffected packages: :OpenWrt\nPatched: OpenWrt 24.10.6, OpenWrt 25.12.1","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-rcc6-v4r6-gj4m","published_at":"2026-03-19T16:29:19Z","updated_at":"2026-03-19T17:29:32Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544625Z","severity":"low","cvss_score":2.4,"epss":0.00554,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"OpenWrt","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-30873","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-30873","GHSA-RCC6-V4R6-GJ4M"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11492,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12270","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12270"}},{"id":12271,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-jw28-hxcm-j934 / CVE-2026-30874: procd: Command execution via PATH environment variable filter bypass","summary":"procd: Command execution via PATH environment variable filter bypass\n\nprocd executes scripts located in /etc/hotplug.d when certain events happen on a\r\nsystem, and can be invoked via the call ubus method. The hotplug_call function is\r\nresponsible for handling these invocations and will perform environment variable filtering\r\nand processing during execution. One of the environment variables that is filtered out is\r\nthe PATH variable, but because of the use of strcmp rather than strncmp, the variable is\r\nnot excluded. Instead of comparing the first four characters of the environment variable to\r\nPATH, the full string is compared, and the variable is therefore not skipped. As such, it may\r\nbe possible to specify an arbitrary PATH variable in order to perform privilege escalation.\r\n\r\n### References\r\nFix: http://github.com/openwrt/procd/commit/e08cdc8562f55b9ac228a21f3f7605a18c522b81\n\nAffected packages: :OpenWrt\nPatched: OpenWrt 24.10.6","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-jw28-hxcm-j934","published_at":"2026-03-19T16:29:14Z","updated_at":"2026-03-19T16:36:55Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544625Z","severity":"low","cvss_score":1.8,"epss":0.00334,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"OpenWrt","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-30874","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-30874","GHSA-JW28-HXCM-J934"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11494,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12271","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12271"}},{"id":12272,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-h427-frpr-7cqr / CVE-2025-62525: ltq-ptm: local privilege escalation","summary":"ltq-ptm: local privilege escalation\n\n### Impact\r\nLocal users could read and write arbitrary kernel memory using the ioctls of the ltq-ptm driver which is used to drive the datapath of the DSL line.\r\nThis only effects the lantiq target supporting xrx200, danube and amazon SoCs from Lantiq/Intel/MaxLinear with the DSL in PTM mode. The DSL driver for the VRX518 is not affected. ATM mode is also not affected. Most VDSL lines use PTM mode and most ADSL lines use ATM mode.\r\n\r\nOpenWrt is normally running as a single user system, but some services are sandboxed. This vulnerability could allow attackers to escape a ujail sandbox or other contains.\r\n\r\n### Patches\r\nThis is fixed in OpenWrt 24.10.4 and later, including snapshots builds since October 15th 2025.\r\nOlder OpenWrt versions like 23.05 and 22.03 might be affected too, but they are end of life and do not receive any security support any more. \r\n\r\n\r\n### Workarounds\r\nNo\r\n\r\n### References\r\nFix main branch: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/commit/2a76abc5442e3f74d95b4caa9bb57e5488fc132e\r\nFix OpenWrt 24.10: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/commit/e001b31163a77683ee741d169f794cfa50926f37\r\n\r\nOpenWrt security advisory: https://openwrt.org/advisory/2025-10-22-2\r\n\r\n### Credit\r\nThank you Stanislav Fort from Aisle Research for reporting this to us.\n\nAffected packages: :OpenWrt\nPatched: OpenWrt 24.10.4","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-h427-frpr-7cqr","published_at":"2025-10-21T22:40:22Z","updated_at":"2025-10-22T09:34:35Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544626Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.9,"epss":0.00194,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"OpenWrt","vuln_id":"CVE-2025-62525","vuln_ids":["CVE-2024-54143","CVE-2025-14282","CVE-2025-62525","CVE-2025-62526","GHSA-H427-FRPR-7CQR"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-20","CWE-125","CWE-787","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11496,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12272","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12272"}},{"id":12273,"source":{"id":"gh-openwrt","name":"OpenWrt releases + advisories (GitHub openwrt/openwrt tags)"},"title":"GHSA-cp32-65v4-cp73 / CVE-2025-62526: ubusd: heap buffer overflow","summary":"ubusd: heap buffer overflow\n\n### Impact\r\nubusd contains a heap buffer overflow in the event registration parsing code. This allows an attacker to modify the head and potentially execute arbitrary code in the context of the ubus daemon.\r\nThe affected code is executed before running the ACL checks, all ubus clients are able to send such messages.\r\nIn addition to the heap corruption, the crafted subscription also results in a bypass of the listen ACL.\r\n\r\n### Patches\r\nThis is fixed in OpenWrt 24.10.4 and later, including snapshots builds since October 18th 2025.\r\nOlder OpenWrt versions like 23.05 and 22.03 might be affected too, but they are end of life and do not receive any security support any more. \r\n\r\n### Workarounds\r\nNo\r\n\r\n### References\r\nubus fix: https://github.com/openwrt/ubus/commit/d31effb4277bd557f5ccf16d909422718c1e49d0\r\nfix similar code pattern: https://github.com/openwrt/ubus/commit/aa4a7ee1d3417bc11207ad0a78d579ece7fe0c13\r\nfix ACL bypass: https://github.com/openwrt/ubus/commit/60e04048a0e2f3e33651c19e62861b41be4c290f\r\n\r\nOpenWrt main branch: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/commit/4b907e69ea58fc0ba35fd1755dc4ba22262af3a4\r\nOpenWrt 24.10: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/commit/a7901969932a175cded3c93bdeb65f32ed3705e6\r\n\r\nOpenWrt security advisory: https://openwrt.org/advisory/2025-10-22-1\r\n\r\n### Credit\r\nThank you Karsten Sperling from Apple for the report and the PoC.\n\nAffected packages: :OpenWrt\nPatched: OpenWrt 24.10.4","url":"https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/security/advisories/GHSA-cp32-65v4-cp73","published_at":"2025-10-21T22:40:17Z","updated_at":"2025-10-22T09:34:32Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:33.544626Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.9,"epss":0.00263,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"openwrt","product":"OpenWrt","vuln_id":"CVE-2025-62526","vuln_ids":["CVE-2024-54143","CVE-2025-14282","CVE-2025-62525","CVE-2025-62526","GHSA-CP32-65V4-CP73"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","security","repo:openwrt/openwrt"],"cluster_id":11498,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12273","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12273"}}],"total":14,"has_more":false,"next_cursor":null,"limit":50,"page":1,"grouped":false,"filter":{"builds":"exclude","source":"gh-openwrt"}}