{"items":[{"id":12064,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.37.5","summary":"Security keywords: security, GHSA-X9CQ-F669-VRR4, GHSA-9PJJ-F9G5-3X4C\n\nSecurity Fixes\n\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advise updating as soon as possible.\n\nWebsite icons [GHSA-x9cq-f669-vrr4] (Medium, 5.3)\n\nEmergency access [GHSA-9pjj-f9g5-3x4c] (Medium, 4.3)\n\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment and publishing at a later date.\n\nNote\n\nThis update is required for web vault 2026.7.1+ to turn two-step login methods on or off, and for 2026.9.0+ to take over an account through emergency access. Please update before reporting any issues with them.\n\nUpgrade notes\n\nWeb vault: the bundled web vault is now v2026.10.1. If you serve your own web vault older than v2026.7.1, you might have compatibility issues.\n\nConfiguration: invalid values now stop startup with an error. Numeric options have tighter types, so negative or too large values are rejected, for example above 65535 for LOGIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST, TRASH_AUTO_DELETE_DAYS, EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN or SMTP_TIMEOUT, or above 255 for EMAIL_ATTEMPTS_LIMIT. The rate limit *_SECONDS and *_MAX_BURST options, DATABASE_TIMEOUT and DATABASE_IDLE_TIMEOUT must be at least 1, DATABASE_MIN_CONNS can't be larger than DATABASE_MAX_CONNS, and DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE and PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH must be empty or a valid cron expression.\n\nWhat's Changed\n\nClose WebSocket connections that stop responding by @Cassian433 in #7807\n\nValidate the Duo and SSO purge schedules on startup by @NotAFlightRisk in #7819\n\ndocs: fix \"runnning\" typo in playwright README by @ump45nose in #7787\n\ndocs: fix Playwright test env link by @dajiaohuang in #7739\n\nFix group import to update groups on data change by @Jogius in #7671\n\n[Web 2026.9.0] Support new Emergency Access password payload by @tom27052006 in #7746\n\n[Web 2026.9.0] Support new account recovery password payload by @tom27052006 in #7747\n\n[web-v2026.7.1] 2FA userVerificationToken for Authenticator, Email and Duo by @Timshel in #7563\n\nFix email 2FA for SSO logins on iOS and Android by @dani-garcia in #7827\n\nUpdate web-vault to v2026.8.0 by @dani-garcia in #7828\n\nAdd revision_date to org policies by @will-lottkowitz-prism in #7571\n\nAdd Windows desktop Autotype feature flags and policy support by @tom27052006 in #7808\n\nAdd biometrics-sdk-ipc feature flag (closes #7812) by @cad0p in #7813\n\nDelete auth requests when deleting a user by @Cassian433 in #7837\n\nAdd unsupported riscv64 architecture by @BlackDex in #7859\n\napi/icons: fix typos in the minimum PNG size comment by @ump45nose in #7867\n\ndocs: fix connect-src description grammar by @ump45nose in #7866\n\nUpdate dependencies by @BlackDex in #7882\n\nMisc fixes regarding jobs and config by @BlackDex in #7858\n\nSend null org key for unconfirmed members in sync by @minchinweb in #7850\n\nReturn stored manage flag for groups in collections/details by @deltatree in #7795\n\nFix bulk cipher share response for SDK clients by @tom27052006 in #7831\n\nUpgrade to Rocket v0.5.2 by @BlackDex in #7890\n\nFix typo in vaultwarden.env by @Arthurmeade12 in #7864\n\nRemove expired cookies from the icon cookie jar by @dani-garcia in #7905\n\nfix(attachments): enforce quota at v2 metadata reservation by @lucavb in #7450\n\nAlign cipher org checks & attachment notification with upstream by @dani-garcia in #7906\n\nDocument two feature flags in .env.template by @MichaelMuClaude in #7841\n\nFix push device unregistration endpoint by @xkmttc in #7891\n\nDon't return internal error details in bulk member responses; gate SSO token logging by @tauanbinato in #7777\n\n[Web 2026.9.0] Add Fill Assist + Policy support by @tom27052006 in #7791\n\nAdd registration email verification clicked endpoint by @tom27052006 in #7790\n\nMake 2FA remember duration configurable by @tom27052006 in #7421\n\nBump user revision once for bulk cipher move by @MichaelMuClaude in #7840\n\nSend logout notification when deleting a user by @Cassian433 in #7839\n\nTwo small fixes for upstream parity by @dani-garcia in #7918\n\nAdd missing HTTP auth and policy revocation audit events by @tom27052006 in #7919\n\nClippy fixes, c","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.37.5","published_at":"2026-11-01T22:16:50Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224740Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-x9cq-f669-vrr4","vuln_ids":["GHSA-9PJJ-F9G5-3X4C","GHSA-X9CQ-F669-VRR4"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security"],"cluster_id":11386,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12064","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12064"}},{"id":12034,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-7ccc-c43j-4p36: Organization member can move personal items into an organization without collection access","summary":"Organization member can move personal items into an organization without collection access\n\n### Summary\r\n\r\nAn authorization bypass vulnerability in the cipher sharing logic allows non-admin organization members to transfer personal ciphers to an organization without assigning them to a collection. This bypasses collection restrictions and results in \"orphan\" ciphers being injected directly into the organization's root.\r\n\r\n### Details\r\n\r\nIn `src/api/core/ciphers.rs`, the `update_cipher_from_data` function validates whether a user has permission to transfer a cipher to an organization. The authorization check relies on the following condition:\r\n\r\n```rust\r\nif shared_to_collections.as_ref().is_some_and(|cols| !cols.is_empty())\r\n    || member.has_full_access()\r\n    || cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, conn).await\r\n\r\n```\r\n\r\nWhen a user shares a personal cipher, `is_write_accessible_to_user` evaluates to `true` because the user is the original owner. This creates a boolean short-circuit, bypassing the requirements that the user must either be an organization admin (`has_full_access`) or specify at least one valid collection (`!cols.is_empty()`).\r\n\r\nAs a result, the backend accepts the transfer payload even if `collectionIds` is empty, converting the cipher into an unassigned/orphan item within the organization.\r\n\r\n### PoC\r\n\r\n1. Log in to the Web Vault as **User A** (a standard, non-admin member of **Organization B**).\r\n2. Create a personal cipher (let's call it **Cipher A1**) and note its ID.\r\n3. Open the browser's Developer Tools (F12) Console and execute the following API request, deliberately leaving the `collectionIds` array empty:\r\n\r\n```\r\n// 1. Target Configuration & JWT\r\nconst JWT_TOKEN = \"Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.eyJuY...[Truncated]\"; \r\nconst PERSONAL_CIPHER_ID = \"2004fb9e-8180-4909-91fb-c5a23feb20f3\"; \r\nconst TARGET_ORG_ID = \"2004fb9e-1b95-4fab-9604-b9324033b580\"; \r\n\r\n// 2. Audit Payload Construction\r\nconst payload = {\r\n    cipher: {\r\n        type: 1,\r\n        name: \"Audit_Test_Item\",\r\n        organizationId: TARGET_ORG_ID,\r\n        folderId: null,\r\n        login: {\r\n            username: \"audit_test_user\",\r\n            password: \"audit_test_password\"\r\n        }\r\n    },\r\n    // Boundary test: Empty array to verify if backend forces collection association\r\n    collectionIds: [] \r\n};\r\n\r\n// 3. API Execution\r\nfetch(`/api/ciphers/${PERSONAL_CIPHER_ID}/share`, {\r\n    method: 'PUT',\r\n    headers: {\r\n        'Authorization': JWT_TOKEN,\r\n        'Content-Type': 'application/json'\r\n    },\r\n    body: JSON.stringify(payload)\r\n})\r\n.then(async res => {\r\n    if (res.ok) {\r\n        console.warn(\"[Audit Flag] Request succeeded (200 OK). Potential logic flaw:\", await res.json());\r\n    } else {\r\n        console.log(`[Control Active] Request blocked (Status: ${res.status})`);\r\n    }\r\n})\r\n.catch(err => console.error(\"[Audit Error] Execution failed:\", err));\r\n\r\n```\r\n\r\n4. Observe that the API returns `200 OK`. Cipher A1 disappears from User A's personal vault.\r\n5. Log in as **User B** (Owner of Organization B) and navi\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.37.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-7ccc-c43j-4p36","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:01:28Z","updated_at":"2026-10-28T18:01:28Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224686Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-7ccc-c43j-4p36","vuln_ids":["GHSA-7CCC-C43J-4P36"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-862","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11343,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12034","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12034"}},{"id":12035,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3: Revoked or unconfirmed organization member retains read and delete access to organization ciphers","summary":"Revoked or unconfirmed organization member retains read and delete access to organization ciphers\n\n## Summary\r\n\r\nRevoking an organization member suspends them in the UI and hides organization items from their\r\nsync, but does not remove the collection and group grants that the per-item authorization checks\r\nrely on. A revoked member who keeps their own account can continue to read organization ciphers\r\none at a time, and can soft-delete and permanently delete them, indefinitely. The item-level checks\r\nnever consult membership status, while the listing queries do.\r\n\r\n## Severity / CVSS\r\n\r\nCVSS 3.1 vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N`\r\nBase score: 8.1\r\nSeverity: High\r\n\r\n`PR:L` because the attacker authenticates with their own surviving account, which revocation does\r\nnot disable. `C:H` for continued read access to organization secrets, including secrets rotated in\r\nplace after the revocation. `I:H` for permanent destruction of organization items; editing item\r\ncontents is blocked by a separate check, so this metric covers deletion only. `A:N` because the\r\nservice itself is unaffected.\r\n\r\n## Affected component\r\n\r\n- `src/db/models/cipher.rs`, `Cipher::get_access_restrictions`,\r\n  `get_user_collections_access_flags`, `get_group_collections_access_flags`\r\n- `src/db/models/group.rs`, `Group::is_in_full_access_group`\r\n- `src/api/core/organizations.rs`, `revoke_member_impl`\r\n- `src/api/core/ciphers.rs`, `get_cipher`, `delete_cipher_by_uuid`, `restore_cipher_by_uuid`,\r\n  `delete_cipher_attachment_by_id`\r\n\r\nTested at commit `46ae59eaf444f0ae0a799070cf2bd6c415284a51`, default configuration, sqlite,\r\nmail disabled.\r\n\r\n## Root cause\r\n\r\nRevocation adjusts the status field and saves the row:\r\n\r\n```rust\r\n// organizations.rs:2338, revoke_member_impl\r\nmember.revoke();          // status -= 128\r\nmember.save(conn).await?;\r\n```\r\n\r\n`Membership::save` (`organization.rs:752`) writes the membership row and nothing else. The removal\r\npath, `Membership::delete` (`organization.rs:785`), does tear down the derived grants:\r\n\r\n```rust\r\nCollectionUser::delete_all_by_user_and_org(&self.user_uuid, &self.org_uuid, conn).await?;\r\nGroupUser::delete_all_by_member(&self.uuid, conn).await?;\r\n```\r\n\r\nRevocation performs neither, so the `users_collections` and `groups_users` rows survive.\r\n\r\nThe listing queries compensate by filtering on membership status. `Cipher::find_by_user` joins\r\n`users_organizations` under `status = Confirmed` and then constrains the collection join to that\r\nmembership:\r\n\r\n```rust\r\n// cipher.rs:814-825\r\n.left_join(\r\n    users_organizations::table.on(ciphers::organization_uuid\r\n        .eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable())\r\n        .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))\r\n        .and(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))),\r\n)\r\n.left_join(\r\n    users_collections::table.on(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid\r\n        .eq(users_collections::collection_uuid)\r\n        // Ensure that users_collections::user_uuid is NULL for unconfirmed users.\r\n        .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(users_collect\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.37.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:01:21Z","updated_at":"2026-10-28T18:01:21Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224693Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.1,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3","vuln_ids":["GHSA-69Q9-V8P6-XVX3"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11344,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12035","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12035"}},{"id":12036,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-q5x6-grh5-fqgc: Unbounded client-declared attachment fileSize causes an out-of-bounds panic that permanently breaks vault sync for every user who can see the cipher","summary":"Unbounded client-declared attachment fileSize causes an out-of-bounds panic that permanently breaks vault sync for every user who can see the cipher ### Summary `POST /api/ciphers/{id}/attachment/v2` accepts a client-declared `fileSize` and validates only that it is not negative. A value above `1024^6` (~1.15e18, well within `i64`) makes `get_display_size()` index a fixed 6-element array out of bounds and panic. The attachment row is committed to the database **before** the panic, and the operation is not wrapped in a transaction, so the poisoned row persists. Afterwards every endpoint that serialises that cipher — `GET /api/sync`, `GET /api/ciphers`, `GET /api/ciphers/{id}` — panics and returns `500` **permanently**. No file is ever uploaded; the request body is a few hundred bytes. If the poisoned cipher is shared with an organization collection, **every member who can see it — including owners and admins — permanently loses vault sync**. That is a cross-user denial of service triggered by an ordinary member with edit rights. Confirmed at runtime against a stock `vaultwarden/server:1.37.1` container. ### Details `src/util.rs:334` — `get_display_size()`: ```rust pub fn get_display_size(size: i64) -> String { const UNITS: [&str; 6] = [\"bytes\", \"KB\", \"MB\", \"GB\", \"TB\", \"PB\"]; // valid indices 0..=5 ... let mut unit_counter = 0; loop { if size > 1024. { size /= 1024.; unit_counter += 1; } else { break; } } format!(\"{size:.2} {}\", UNITS[unit_counter]) // src/util.rs:353 — unchecked index } ``` Any value that survives six divisions by 1024 yields `unit_counter == 6` and panics at `src/util.rs:353` (`core::panicking::panic_bounds_check`). `src/api/core/ciphers.rs` — the v2 attachment endpoint (guard: plain `Headers`, i.e. any logged-in user): ```rust let file_size = data.file_size.into_i64()?; // src/api/core/ciphers.rs:1150 if file_size < 0 { ... } // :1152 — only a lower bound is checked ... Attachment::new(attachment_id, cipher.uuid, data.file_name, file_size, Some(data.key)); // :1157 — persisted ``` `file_size` is a `NumberOrString`, so the full `i64` range is accepted. The storage-quota checks live in the separate upload step, which the attacker simply never performs. The row is saved at `:1157`; the panic then occurs while building the response, so the write is never rolled back. `Attachment::to_json` (`src/db/models/attachment.rs:74`) calls `get_display_size(self.file_size)`, and is reached from `Cipher::to_json`, which backs `/api/sync`, `/api/ciphers` and `/api/ciphers/{id}`. Because every listing endpoint panics, the victim cannot discover the attachment id through the API in order to delete it — recovery requires direct database access. ### PoC Verified against a clean `vaultwarden/server:1.37.1` instance: ``` docker run -d --name vw -p 127.0.0.1:8089:80 -e SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=true vaultwarden/server:1.37.1 ``` **Variant 1 — single account:** ``` GET /api/sync -> 200 (baseline) POST /a Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-q5x6-grh5-fqgc","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:01:14Z","updated_at":"2026-10-28T18:01:14Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224695Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.5,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-q5x6-grh5-fqgc","vuln_ids":["GHSA-Q5X6-GRH5-FQGC"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-129","CWE-1284","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11345,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12036","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12036"}},{"id":12037,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-v576-3wvq-xh3c: Loop-carried user_created flag in send_invite deletes a pre-existing user's account and entire vault when an invite e-mail fails","summary":"Loop-carried user_created flag in send_invite deletes a pre-existing user's account and entire vault when an invite e-mail fails\n\n### Summary\r\n\r\nIn `send_invite`, the `user_created` flag is declared **outside** the per-e-mail loop and is never reset. Once any iteration creates a shell account for a new address, the flag stays `true` for every later iteration.\r\n\r\nIf a later iteration resolves to a **pre-existing account** and that invite e-mail fails to send, the error handler takes the `user_created` branch and calls `user.delete()` on **that pre-existing user** — destroying their entire account: all ciphers, folders, attachments, Sends, devices, 2FA registrations, emergency-access grants and organization memberships. There is no transaction, so the deletion persists even though the request returns `500`/`400`.\r\n\r\nAn authenticated attacker can trigger this deliberately (organization creation is open by default, so any registered user can become an Owner of their own organization and invite arbitrary addresses). It also fires **accidentally**: an administrator inviting `[new user, existing user]` whose second message is rejected by the mail relay — greylisting, rate limiting, a full mailbox, a size limit — silently destroys the existing user's vault.\r\n\r\nVerified end-to-end against a stock `vaultwarden/server:1.37.1` container.\r\n\r\n### Details\r\n\r\n`src/api/core/organizations.rs`:\r\n\r\n```rust\r\nlet mut user_created: bool = false;                       // :1078 — OUTSIDE the loop\r\nfor email in &data.emails {                               // :1079\r\n    let user = match User::find_by_mail(email, &conn).await {\r\n        None => {                                         // address has no account\r\n            ...\r\n            let mut new_user = User::new(email, None);\r\n            new_user.save(&conn).await?;\r\n            user_created = true;                          // :1097 — set, never reset\r\n            new_user\r\n        }\r\n        Some(user) => {                                   // :1100 — a PRE-EXISTING account\r\n            if Membership::find_by_user_and_org(...).is_some() {\r\n                err!(format!(\"User already in organization: {email}\"))\r\n            }\r\n            ...\r\n            user\r\n        }\r\n    };\r\n    ...\r\n    if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {\r\n        ...\r\n        if let Err(e) = mail::send_invite(&user, ...).await {\r\n            // Upon error delete the user, invite and org member records when needed\r\n            if user_created {                             // :1140 — still true from an earlier iteration\r\n                user.delete(&conn).await?;                // :1141 — deletes THIS iteration's user\r\n            } else {\r\n                new_member.delete(&conn).await?;          // the correct action\r\n            }\r\n            err!(format!(\"Error sending invite: {e:?} \"));\r\n        }\r\n    }\r\n```\r\n\r\nThe intent of `:1140-1144` is clearly \"if I just created this shell account, roll it back; otherwise only remove the membership\". Because the flag is loop-carried rather than per-iteration, the rollback is applied to a user the handler did **not** create.\r\n\r\n`User::de\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.37.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-v576-3wvq-xh3c","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:01:07Z","updated_at":"2026-10-28T18:01:07Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224697Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.8,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-v576-3wvq-xh3c","vuln_ids":["GHSA-V576-3WVQ-XH3C"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-459","CWE-670","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11346,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12037","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12037"}},{"id":12038,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-64mc-4p6f-r7x9: Revoked or unconfirmed organization Admin can read cipher audit logs","summary":"Revoked or unconfirmed organization Admin can read cipher audit logs ## Summary `GET /api/ciphers//events` returns an organization cipher's audit log to any authenticated user whose membership row carries `atype` Owner or Admin, **regardless of membership status**. A member who was invited but never confirmed, or who was confirmed and later revoked, keeps indefinite read access to that cipher's access history: who viewed, edited, copied or autofilled the credential, when, from which IP and device type. The two sibling event endpoints in the same file are guarded correctly. This one is not. Requires `ORG_EVENTS_ENABLED=true`, which is not the default. ## Affected 1.37.3 (current release) and `main` at commit `25dfedaf` (2026-09-09). Verified on both. ## Root cause `src/api/core/events.rs` has three event endpoints. Two require `AdminHeaders`: ```rust :34 async fn get_org_events(..., headers: AdminHeaders, ...) // organization events :92 async fn get_user_events(..., headers: AdminHeaders, ...) // per member events :66 async fn get_cipher_events(..., headers: Headers, ...) // per cipher events ``` `AdminHeaders` resolves through `is_confirmed_and_admin()` at `src/auth.rs:725`: ```rust fn is_confirmed_and_admin(&self) -> bool { self.membership_status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed && self.membership_type >= MembershipType::Admin } ``` `get_cipher_events` instead takes the generic `Headers` guard, which only proves a valid user JWT, and hand rolls its own check via `Membership::user_has_ge_admin_access_to_cipher` at `src/db/models/organization.rs:1105`: ```rust users_organizations::table .inner_join(ciphers::table.on(ciphers::uuid.eq(cipher_uuid) .and(ciphers::organization_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable())))) .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)) .filter(users_organizations::atype.eq_any(vec![MembershipType::Owner as i32, MembershipType::Admin as i32])) ``` That reproduces the `membership_type >= Admin` half of `is_confirmed_and_admin` and drops the `membership_status == Confirmed` half. Every other membership query in `organization.rs` states the invariant in its own name and enforces it: `find_confirmed_by_user`, `find_confirmed_by_user_and_org`, `find_confirmed_by_org`, `find_confirmed_and_manage_all_by_org`, `count_confirmed_by_org_and_type`, `find_by_user_and_policy`. The one function that deliberately omits it is named `find_any_state_by_user`. `user_has_ge_admin_access_to_cipher` omits it without saying so. Upstream Bitwarden gates the equivalent endpoint with the same check it uses for organization events (`src/Api/Dirt/Controllers/EventsController.cs`, `AccessEventLogs`). The comment at `src/api/core/events.rs:32` cites that controller as the reference implementation. ## Steps to Reproduce ``` docker run -d --name vw-repro \\ -e ORG_EVENTS_ENABLED=true -e SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=true \\ -e I_REALLY_W Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-64mc-4p6f-r7x9","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:44Z","updated_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:44Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224699Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-64mc-4p6f-r7x9","vuln_ids":["GHSA-64MC-4P6F-R7X9"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11347,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12038","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12038"}},{"id":12039,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv: Organization Admin can revoke and delete Owners through an Admin-mintable organization API key","summary":"Organization Admin can revoke and delete Owners through an Admin-mintable organization API key ### Summary A confirmed organization Admin can revoke and permanently delete Owners and fellow Admins. The ordinary member removal route refuses exactly this, by name, with \"Only Owners can delete Admins or Owners\". The Admin instead creates the organization API key, which is guarded at Admin level where upstream requires Owner, and drives the public import endpoint, which applies no caller role check and does not exclude Owners. ### Details Two independent divergences from upstream combine. Either one alone is defensible design. `api_key()` in `src/api/core/organizations.rs` is guarded by `AdminHeaders`. Upstream gates the equivalent default key type on Owner in `HasApiKeyAccessAsync`, and `OrganizationClientProvider` accepts only that key type for the `client_credentials` grant. `ldap_import` in `src/api/core/public.rs` protects only the last confirmed Owner, via `count_confirmed_by_org_and_type(&org_id, MembershipType::Owner, &conn) <= 1`. Upstream excludes Owners from removal entirely, in both removal branches of `ImportOrganizationUsersAndGroupsCommand.cs`. The minted token carries scope `api.organization` and no user identity, so the import endpoint cannot tell which member created the key. ### PoC Organization with confirmed Owners A and C, and confirmed Admins B and D. Step 1. As Admin B, `POST /api/organizations//api-key` with B's master password. Returns 200 with the key. A plain User and a Manager both receive 401. Step 2. As Admin B, remove Owner C through the ordinary member route. Returns 400, \"Only Owners can delete Admins or Owners\". Step 3. Exchange the key at `POST /identity/connect/token` with `grant_type=client_credentials` and `scope=api.organization`. Step 4. `POST /api/public/organization/import` marking C deleted. Returns 200 and C is revoked. Step 5. The same call with `overwriteExisting` set true, omitting C and D from the member list, deletes both from the organization. Reproduced against a local instance on 1.37.3. The affected code is byte identical on current `main`. ### Impact CWE-863. A confirmed organization Admin gains destructive control over Owners and fellow Admins. The credential is scoped to the organization rather than to the member, so it keeps working after the Admin who created it is removed, and the creation route writes no event log entry. There is no confidentiality impact, because an Admin already exports every organization cipher through a route at the same guard level. The last confirmed Owner is protected, so an organization cannot be fully decapitated. The Admin cannot elevate their own role, and the import creates only ordinary members. A surviving Owner can reverse the removals by re-inviting, and can rotate the key. Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:28Z","updated_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:28Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224702Z","severity":"low","cvss_score":3.8,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv","vuln_ids":["GHSA-QWX4-WCV4-MPCV"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11348,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12039","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12039"}},{"id":12040,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-7jg8-8m5x-6j9r: vaultwarden: device-level 2FA \"remember\" tokens survive admin-initiated 2FA removal, allowing 2FA bypass for up to 30 days (residual gap in fix f1ff613)","summary":"vaultwarden: device-level 2FA \"remember\" tokens survive admin-initiated 2FA removal, allowing 2FA bypass for up to 30 days (residual gap in fix f1ff613) ## Summary Commit `f1ff613` (\"revoke 2FA remember tokens when credentials or 2FA change\", released in 1.37.3) established that whenever a user's second factors change, every device's 30-day `twofactor_remember` token must be revoked. The fix covered the user self-service paths, the recovery-code path, and the security-stamp rotation chain - but missed the two administrative remediation paths that strip a user's second factor: - the admin panel endpoint `POST /admin/users//remove-2fa` (`src/api/admin.rs:508-514`), and - organization account recovery with `resetTwoFactor=true` but `resetMasterPassword=false` (`src/api/core/organizations.rs:3072-3077`) - the standard \"the attacker enabled their own 2FA on the victim's account, remove it\" response flow. After either remediation runs and the victim re-enrolls a brand-new second factor, a device holding a stale remember token still skips 2FA entirely: we reproduce at runtime against the official `vaultwarden/server:latest` image (1.37.3) that the same device which captured a remember token before the remediation logs in with HTTP 200 and receives an `access_token` while the new TOTP is active - and that the identical token is rejected (400) once a *covered* path (password change) fires, isolating the residual exactly. All released versions, including 1.37.3, and current main are affected. ## Details Code locations (master `061694d0`; identical at tag 1.37.3 unless noted): - Background - the audited fix: `f1ff613` (2026-09-08, released 1.37.3) added `Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user` calls to: user self-disable of a 2FA provider (`src/api/core/two_factor/mod.rs:154`), recovery-code login that deletes all 2FA (`src/api/identity.rs:907-912`), and the security-stamp rotation chain (`src/db/models/device.rs:266-273`, `rotate_refresh_tokens_by_user`). - Residual gap A: `src/api/admin.rs:507-514` - `remove_2fa` calls `TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(...)` and clears `user.totp_recover`, but never calls `Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user`: ```rust async fn remove_2fa(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult { let mut user = get_user_or_404(&user_id, &conn).await?; TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?; two_factor::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &ACTING_ADMIN_USER.into(), 14, &token.ip.ip, &conn).await?; user.totp_recover = None; user.save(&conn).await } ``` - Residual gap B: `src/api/core/organizations.rs` `recover_account` (function starts at line 3009): with `resetMasterPassword=false, resetTwoFactor=true` - the \"strip the attacker's 2FA only\" option - `TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user` runs at line 3073, but the security-stamp rotation chain (which does clear remember tokens) lives inside the `reset_master_password` branch (around line 3060) and is not entered. - Full sweep: of the five `TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user` call sites in `src/`, exactly these two do not clear `twofa Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-7jg8-8m5x-6j9r","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:11Z","updated_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:11Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224704Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.8,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-7jg8-8m5x-6j9r","vuln_ids":["GHSA-7JG8-8M5X-6J9R"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-287","CWE-613","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11349,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12040","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12040"}},{"id":12065,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.37.4","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-7ccc-c43j-4p36, GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3, GHSA-q5x6-grh5-fqgc, GHSA-v576-3wvq-xh3c, GHSA-64mc-4p6f-r7x9, GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv, GHSA-7jg8-8m5x-6j9r\n\nSecurity keywords: security, GHSA-69Q9-V8P6-XVX3, GHSA-7JG8-8M5X-6J9R, GHSA-V576-3WVQ-XH3C, GHSA-Q5X6-GRH5-FQGC, GHSA-64MC-4P6F-R7X9, GHSA-7CCC-C43J-4P36, GHSA-QWX4-WCV4-MPCV\n\nSecurity Fixes\n\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advise updating as soon as possible.\n\nOrganization member revocation [GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3] (High, 8.1)\n\nTwo-factor authentication [GHSA-7jg8-8m5x-6j9r] (Medium, 6.8)\n\nOrganization invitations [GHSA-v576-3wvq-xh3c] (Medium, 6.8)\n\nAttachments [GHSA-q5x6-grh5-fqgc] (Medium, 6.5)\n\nOrganization event logs [GHSA-64mc-4p6f-r7x9] (Medium, 4.3)\n\nCipher sharing [GHSA-7ccc-c43j-4p36] (Medium, 4.3)\n\nOrganization API key [GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv] (Low, 3.8)\n\nAdditional dependency updates and minor security enhancements\n\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment and publishing at a later date.\n\nNote\n\nIf an organization has Admins you don't fully trust, consider rotating its API key after updating (Admin Console → Settings → Rotate API key). Before this release, Admins could also view the key.\n\nUpgrade notes\n\nReverse proxies: with IP_HEADER=X-Forwarded-For, the client IP is now the rightmost address that isn't in IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES (it used to be the leftmost). If you have several proxies in a row, for example a CDN in front of nginx, add all of them to IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES. Otherwise the address of the proxy in front is used for rate limiting and logs.\n\nSends: bw send receive on CLI 2026.4.2 and older no longer works, the same as against Bitwarden's own servers since v2026.8.0. Creating and managing Sends works on all clients.\n\nFeature flags: these flags were removed because no client reads them anymore: ssh-agent, ssh-key-vault-item, mutual-tls, anon-addy-self-host-alias, simple-login-self-host-alias, pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2, pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2, desktop-ui-migration-milestone-1 to -4, cxp-import-mobile and cxp-export-mobile. If EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS still lists one of them, startup logs a warning and saving settings in the admin panel fails until it's removed.\n\nDuo: DUO_USE_IFRAME (the deprecated Traditional Prompt) is removed and ignored if set.\n\nCustom templates: there's a new email template, email/recover_twofactor, sent after a login with a two-step recovery code.\n\nThe legacy POST /identity/accounts/register and POST /api/accounts/prelogin endpoints are removed. No current client uses them.\n\nWhen using a MariaDB or MySQL server which does not support native TLS/SSL encrypted connections, using the Alpine image of Vaultwarden might fail to connect. Add MARIADB_TLS_DISABLE_PEER_VERIFICATION=1 as an environment variable to your Vaultwarden server environment, and it will start running again.\n\nWhat's Changed\n\n[Web 2026.9.0] Support the vault banner policy by @tom27052006 in #7748\n\nAdd support for basic auth response client feature flag by @tom27052006 in #7745\n\n[web-v2026.8.1] store the user key ID by @Timshel in #7693\n\nAdd organizationsNew and policiesNew to sync response by @tom27052006 in #7666\n\nAdd pm-32009-new-item-types feature flag by @bdd in #7478\n\nUpdate Crates, GHA and JS by @BlackDex in #7751\n\nAdd pm-34171-card-scanner feature flag by @bdd in #7477\n\nset user_created bool for each separate invitation by @stefan0xC in #7753\n\nFix revoked org members retaining access to org ciphers by @abhiShandy in #7554\n\nEnsure all user checked routes are confirmed by @dani-garcia in #7763\n\nFix cortex-a53 build issues when using xx-cargo by @BlackDex in #7774\n\nAdd undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic feature flag (closes #7801) by @cad0p in #7802\n\nAdd Windows native credential sync to supported feature flags by @KingIronMan2011 in #7798\n\nHide the whole change-email section when EMAIL_CHANGE_ALLOWED is false by @tom27052006 in #7759\n\nFix Clippy warnings across all targets by @tom27052006 in #7782\n\nAdmin reset: 2fa email fallback need a verified email by @Timshel in #7770\n\nSends cleanup: remove legacy endpoints and align with upstream by @dani-garcia in #7806\n\nRemove legacy API endpoints and compatibility code by @dani-garcia in #7809\n\nAlign API with upstream and remove unwraps by @dani-garcia in #7810\n\nUpdate cra","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.37.4","published_at":"2026-10-06T11:30:54Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224741Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.1,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3","vuln_ids":["GHSA-64MC-4P6F-R7X9","GHSA-69Q9-V8P6-XVX3","GHSA-7CCC-C43J-4P36","GHSA-7JG8-8M5X-6J9R","GHSA-Q5X6-GRH5-FQGC","GHSA-QWX4-WCV4-MPCV","GHSA-V576-3WVQ-XH3C"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security"],"cluster_id":11344,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12065","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12065"}},{"id":12044,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-wc45-m6pv-rrf9: Send access limits not enforced on the new Send access endpoints","summary":"Send access limits not enforced on the new Send access endpoints ### Summary > **Pre-release only.** The affected code was only on the development branch (and the `:testing` image) between commits `5c5e8e1a` (#7346) and `46ae59ea` (#7472). It was never part of a tagged release: 1.36.0 predates it and 1.37.0 shipped with the fix. The anonymous Send access endpoints introduced by the 2026.6.0 rewrite do not enforce a Send's access limits. Anyone holding a Send link can read a \"one-time\" (or `max_access_count=N`) Send many more times than allowed, and can keep reading it after the creator disables it or it expires. Meanwhile the creator's access counter under-reports the real number of reads. The `max_access_count`, `expiration_date`, `deletion_date`, and `disabled` guarantees of Send are effectively defeated. ### Details The rewrite split anonymous access into two steps: get a 2-minute `send_access` token (`POST /identity/connect/token`, `grant_type=send_access`), then read the Send with it (`POST /api/sends/access` for text, `POST /api/sends/access/file/` for files). All limit enforcement was moved into token **issuance**. `SendTokens::generate_tokens` (`src/auth/send.rs:82-117`) checks `max_access_count`/`expiration_date`/`deletion_date`/`disabled`/password and does `access_count += 1` **once** (`:116`). The access handlers `process_access` (`src/api/core/sends.rs:516`) and `process_access_file` (`:592`) then re-check **nothing** and **never** increment `access_count`: ```rust // src/api/core/sends.rs:592 (no checks, no increment) async fn process_access_file(send: Send, file_id: SendFileId, host: Host, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult { nt.send_send_update(...).await; Ok(Json(json!({ \"url\": download_url(&host, &send.uuid, &file_id).await? }))) } // The legacy handlers, retained in the same file (sends.rs:557-585), still check // expiration/deletion/disabled/password and do `send.access_count += 1` on every access. ``` The `send_access` JWT (`BasicJwtClaims`) has no `jti`/nonce, so it is a replayable bearer for its full 2-minute lifetime. Consequences: - `access_count` counts **tokens issued, not reads**, so a `max_access_count=N` Send yields N tokens, each granting unlimited reads in its window, and the creator's `accessCount` shows only N. - A Send **disabled or expired mid-window stays readable** through an already-issued token. ### PoC Create a **File Send** with **Maximum Access Count = 1** in your vault. Set `SEND_ID` (its UUID, from the share link), `FILE_ID` (from `GET /api/sends`), and `VW` (your server), then run: ```python import json, os, base64, uuid, urllib.request, urllib.error, urllib.parse BASE, SEND_ID, FILE_ID = os.environ[\"VW\"], os.environ[\"SEND_ID\"], os.environ[\"FILE_ID\"] def http(method, path, hdr=None, form=None): body = urllib.parse.urlencode(form).encode() if form else None h = {\"User-Agent\": \"vw1\"} | (hdr or {}) if form: h[\"Content-Type\"] = \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\" try: r = urlli Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-wc45-m6pv-rrf9","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:58:42Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T21:02:33Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224711Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-wc45-m6pv-rrf9","vuln_ids":["GHSA-WC45-M6PV-RRF9"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11356,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12044","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12044"}},{"id":12042,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-rxhg-2pw9-vf25: Send max_access_count can be exceeded by concurrent access requests","summary":"Send max_access_count can be exceeded by concurrent access requests\n\n### Summary\r\n\r\nVaultwarden does not enforce a Send's `max_access_count` atomically. The access-count check and the increment are separate operations, so concurrent requests can all pass the check before any of them writes, allowing more accesses than the sender configured.\r\n\r\n### Details\r\n\r\n**File:** `src/api/core/sends.rs`\r\n\r\nBoth Send access endpoints read `access_count`, compare it against `max_access_count`, then write `access_count + 1` as a separate operation, with no database-level locking:\r\n\r\n```rust\r\n// Read (check):\r\nif let Some(max_access_count) = send.max_access_count\r\n    && send.access_count >= max_access_count { ... }\r\n// Write (increment — separate DB operation):\r\nsend.access_count += 1;\r\nsend.save(&conn).await?;\r\n```\r\n\r\nTwo concurrent requests against a Send at `access_count = 0, max_access_count = 1`: both read `0`, both pass the check, and both write `access_count = 1`. Both return the secret — the text content for a text Send, or a signed download token for a file Send.\r\n\r\nThe write compounds the problem. `save()` persists the whole row from memory, so one request's stale in-memory value overwrites another's increment rather than adding to it. The stored counter can therefore under-report the number of accesses that actually succeeded.\r\n\r\n### Reproduction\r\n\r\nCreate a Send with `maxAccessCount: 1`, then issue many concurrent access requests for it. Before the fix, more than one request returns 200 while the stored `access_count` advances only once — the whole-row save overwriting the concurrent increment. After the fix, exactly one request succeeds and the rest return 404.\r\n\r\n### Impact\r\n\r\n- A Send capped at a given number of accesses can be accessed more times than configured, by anyone holding the Send link.\r\n- For text Sends, two parties can simultaneously claim the \"last\" access and both receive the content.\r\n- The sender's intent in setting `maxAccessCount` is not reliably enforced.\r\n\r\n### Fix\r\n\r\nFixed in 1.37.0 (`46ae59ea`, #7472). `Send::register_access` (`src/db/models/send.rs`) performs the check and the increment as a single conditional statement:\r\n\r\n```rust\r\ndiesel::update(sends::table)\r\n    .filter(sends::uuid.eq(uuid))\r\n    .filter(\r\n        sends::max_access_count\r\n            .is_null()\r\n            .or(sends::access_count.nullable().lt(sends::max_access_count)),\r\n    )\r\n    .set((sends::access_count.eq(sends::access_count + 1), sends::revision_date.eq(revision_date)))\r\n    .execute(conn)\r\n```\r\n\r\nZero affected rows means the limit was already reached, which every access path turns into the existing 404. In 1.37.0 one path still wrote the whole row: the legacy access route (`post_access_legacy`) called `save()` for file Sends, which could overwrite a concurrent increment.\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-rxhg-2pw9-vf25","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:58:17Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T21:03:42Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224709Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-rxhg-2pw9-vf25","vuln_ids":["GHSA-RXHG-2PW9-VF25"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-362","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11354,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12042","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12042"}},{"id":12043,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-455c-vgg9-jxw8: Failed cipher share leaves a cross-organization collection link that grants access to the cipher","summary":"Failed cipher share leaves a cross-organization collection link that grants access to the cipher ### Summary A Broken Access Control vulnerability in the share_cipher_by_uuid endpoint allows a user who belongs to multiple organizations to bypass strict cross-organization data isolation. By intentionally triggering a validation error during the cipher sharing process, an attacker can create an orphaned database link (CollectionCipher) that binds a cipher owned by Organization A to a collection located in Organization B. This bypasses tenant isolation: the link grants access to the Org A cipher through the Org B collection. ### Details The vulnerability is located in src/api/core/ciphers.rs within the share_cipher_by_uuid function. When a user submits a PUT /api/ciphers//share request to share a cipher to an organization, the backend processes the request in two phases: 1. Link Creation: It iterates through the provided collectionIds, verifies write access, and immediately persists the mappings to the database via CollectionCipher::save(&cipher.uuid, &collection.uuid, conn).await?. 2. Cipher Update: It then calls update_cipher_from_data(...) to update the cipher's metadata and transfer its organization_uuid to the target organization. The issue arises because these two steps are not wrapped in a database transaction. If update_cipher_from_data encounters a validation error—for example, if the cipher already belongs to a different organization, causing the cipher.organization_uuid.is_some() && cipher.organization_uuid != data.organization_id check to fail—the function returns an error (HTTP 400). However, the CollectionCipher records saved in step 1 are not rolled back. This leaves the database in an inconsistent state: a cipher belonging to Org A is permanently linked to a collection in Org B. The item is not listed in the sync of Org B members, but the per-cipher endpoints (for example `GET`/`PUT`/`DELETE /api/ciphers/`) authorized access through collection membership without checking the cipher's organization. Anyone with access to that Org B collection who knew the cipher id could read, modify or delete it, including the attacker after being removed from Org A. The attacker needs write access to the cipher in Org A and to the target collection in Org B. ### PoC ``` const CIPHER_ID = \"aa1b4c10-99f9-47e2-8a86-8a1c9a8b7a73\"; const ORG_B_ID = \"9ca8dbb7-8e66-442a-a977-16523b876c52\"; const COL_ID_IN_ORG_B = \"c0e886da-1be5-4c6d-9221-0722eb3cea8a\"; fetch(`https://localhost/api/ciphers/${CIPHER_ID}/share`, { \"headers\": { \"accept\": \"application/json\", \"content-type\": \"application/json\", \"authorization\": \"Bearer ....\", \"device-type\": \"10\", \"is-prerelease\": \"1\", \"Cache-Control\": \"no-store\", \"Pragma\": \"no-cache\", \"Bitwarden-Client-Name\": \"web\", \"Bitwarden-Client-Version\": \"2026.4.1\", \"Sec-GPC\": \"1\", \"Sec-Fetch-Dest\": \"empty\", \"Sec-Fetch-Mode\": \"cors\", \"Sec-Fetch-Site\": \"same-origin\", \"Priority\": \"u=4\" }, \"method\": \"PUT\", \"body\": Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-455c-vgg9-jxw8","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:57:49Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T21:03:26Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224710Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-455c-vgg9-jxw8","vuln_ids":["GHSA-455C-VGG9-JXW8"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-284","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11355,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12043","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12043"}},{"id":12041,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-hw4g-2v3f-74x5 / CVE-2026-116678: Icon endpoint SSRF fix bypass via second-stage favicon IP literal URLs","summary":"Icon endpoint SSRF fix bypass via second-stage favicon IP literal URLs # Vaultwarden icon endpoint SSRF fix bypass via second-stage icon URL IP literals ## Summary The Vaultwarden icon downloader in 1.36.0 and earlier validates the user-supplied icon host before fetching the target page and revalidates DNS answers through a custom `reqwest` DNS resolver. However, after parsing a controlled HTML page, it fetches discovered favicon URLs with `get_page_with_referer(&icon.href, ...)` without first applying `should_block_host()` to the favicon URL host. For IP-literal favicon URLs such as `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/favicon.ico`, `reqwest` does not call the configured DNS resolver, so the resolver-level `post_resolve()` IP allowlist is bypassed and Vaultwarden connects directly to loopback. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-47160 / GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g (patched in 1.36.0). The original decimal, hex, octal, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 host normalizations are covered, but the second-stage favicon fetch could still reach non-global IP literals. ## Root cause Line numbers refer to the code as tested, shortly after 1.36.0. Initial icon route validation: - `src/api/icons.rs:115-131` parses the route host with `get_valid_host()` and applies `should_block_host(&host)`. - `src/http_client.rs:137-160` blocks IP literal hosts that are not global. - `src/http_client.rs:241-282` uses the custom DNS resolver to run `post_resolve()` against DNS answers for domain names. Second-stage favicon fetch: - `src/api/icons.rs:249-295` parses attacker-controlled `` and joins it against the page URL. - `src/api/icons.rs:492-532` iterates discovered icon URLs and passes each `icon.href` to `get_page_with_referer()`. - `src/api/icons.rs:407-414` builds `CLIENT.get(url)` and sends it without parsing the URL host or calling `should_block_host()`. The custom DNS resolver only sees names that require DNS. A direct IP literal URL can be connected by `reqwest` without resolver invocation, so the resolver's `post_resolve()` check does not run. ## Reproduction evidence The reporter confirmed with a regression test that a loopback canary was reached through `get_page_with_referer()`. A separate reqwest probe with a custom DNS resolver that denies every lookup showed that IP-literal URLs bypass the resolver entirely: ```text url=http://127.0.0.1:40417/favicon.ico body=SSRFHIT! resolver_calls=0 canary_hits=1 ``` ## Attack flow 1. An attacker hosts an ordinary public web page on a globally routable domain that passes the initial icon host validation. 2. The HTML contains a favicon link such as: ```html ``` 3. A request to Vaultwarden's internal icon endpoint for the attacker domain causes Vaultwarden to fetch and parse that page. 4. Vaultwarden attempts to fetch the discovered favicon URL directly. 5. Because the favicon URL host is an IP literal and `get_page_with_referer()` does not prevalidate the URL, the DNS Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-hw4g-2v3f-74x5","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:05:28Z","updated_at":"2026-10-27T17:26:13Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224706Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.8,"epss":0.0033,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-116678","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-116678","CVE-2026-47160","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G","GHSA-HW4G-2V3F-74X5"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-918","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11350,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12041","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12041"}},{"id":12045,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-rqf8-2568-r7mc: Manager-with-no-collections can enumerate org user/group → collection mappings (incomplete fix of GHSA-jjxg-p3v6-52ww)","summary":"Manager-with-no-collections can enumerate org user/group → collection mappings (incomplete fix of GHSA-jjxg-p3v6-52ww) ### Summary GHSA-jjxg-p3v6-52ww / CVE-2026-33420 added a per-collection assignment filter to `get_org_collections_details` (and a `has_full_access()` short-circuit to `get_org_collections`) so that a Manager-role member with no collection assignments cannot enumerate the organization's user→collection mapping. The advisory text noted the fix is \"consistent with how `get_org_collections` behaves.\" Two structurally-identical sibling handlers in the same file did NOT receive the equivalent guard. A Manager with `accessAll=false` and no collection assignments can still enumerate: - **BUG #1 — `get_members`** (`src/api/core/organizations.rs:936-963` in 1.36.0): `GET /api/organizations//users?includeCollections=true&includeGroups=true` returns the org-wide per-member collection assignments + per-member group memberships. - **BUG #2 — `get_groups_details`** (`src/api/core/organizations.rs:2445-2448` in 1.36.0): `GET /api/organizations//groups/details` returns each group's collection-permission mapping (group → collection ID + `readOnly` / `hidePasswords` / `manage` flags). Together the pair lets the caller reconstruct the entire org-wide RBAC matrix (who → which collection, via direct grant or group inheritance) — exactly the information the parent CVE was assigned to protect. I'm reporting both as one advisory because they share root cause, remediation pattern, and threat actor. ### Details **PATCHED reference — parent CVE pattern (`get_org_collections` line 386-401):** ```rust #[get(\"/organizations//collections\")] async fn get_org_collections(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: ManagerHeadersLoose, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult { if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid { err!(\"Organization not found\", \"Organization id's do not match\"); } if !headers.membership.has_full_access() { // ← the patch err_code!(\"Resource not found.\", \"User does not have full access\", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code); } ... } ``` **UNPATCHED in 1.36.0 — `get_members` (line 936-963):** ```rust #[get(\"/organizations//users?\")] async fn get_members(data: GetOrgUserData, org_id: OrganizationId, headers: ManagerHeadersLoose, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult { if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid { err!(\"Organization not found\", \"Organization id's do not match\"); } let mut users_json = Vec::new(); for u in Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await { users_json.push( u.to_json_user_details( data.include_collections.unwrap_or(false), data.include_groups.unwrap_or(false), &conn, ) .await, ); } Ok(Json(json!({\"data\": users_json, \"object\": \"list\", \"continuationToken\": null}))) } ``` `to_json_user_details(include_collections=true, include_groups=true, ...)` emits per-me Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-rqf8-2568-r7mc","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:05:15Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T20:05:15Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224712Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":0.0017,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-33420","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-33420","GHSA-JJXG-P3V6-52WW","GHSA-RQF8-2568-R7MC"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11357,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12045","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12045"}},{"id":12046,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-88qc-6ch9-mc3j: Directory-connector member import (ldap_import) skips org-policy enforcement (check_user_allowed), bypassing the Single-Organization and required-2FA policies","summary":"Directory-connector member import (ldap_import) skips org-policy enforcement (check_user_allowed), bypassing the Single-Organization and required-2FA policies\n\n## Summary\r\nThe directory-connector / bulk member-import endpoint `POST /api/public/organization/import`\r\n(`src/api/core/public.rs`, `ldap_import`) activates and re-activates organization members **without\r\ncalling `OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed`** — the policy gate that every interactive\r\nmembership-activation path applies. A member admitted or re-admitted through directory sync is\r\ntherefore never checked against the organization's **Single-Organization** or **required-2FA**\r\npolicies. This is the one activation path missed by the fix for #1849.\r\n\r\n## Relationship to prior art (a precise incomplete-fix residual, not a rediscovery)\r\n- **#1849** (\"org two-step-login policy enforcement doesn't work\", CLOSED) is the fix this residual\r\n  belongs to: it added `OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed` to the interactive membership-activation\r\n  paths. **This report is the one activation path that fix missed** — the directory-connector import.\r\n- A separate report of mine is the **sibling instance of\r\n  the same pattern** — \"a check present on the primary path, absent on an alternate path.\" The two\r\n  together motivate a systemic audit of alternate entrypoints (see last section).\r\n- **#6780** (\"SSO user bypasses org 2FA\", OPEN) is an acknowledged **same-class** bypass on a\r\n  **different** path, confirming the maintainer treats this enforcement area as live.\r\n- A refresh-token / security-stamp advisory is **distinct** — a membership revoke does not rotate the\r\n  security stamp, so it does not cover this scenario (confirmed empirically on 1.36.0).\r\n\r\n## Affected versions\r\n- `1.36.0` and earlier — confirmed on 1.36.0.\r\n- Fixed in `1.37.0`: `ldap_import` now calls `OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed` after `restore()` and re-revokes members the policy disallows.\r\n- The `check_user_allowed` enforcement (added for #1849) covers the interactive activation paths but\r\n  was never added to the public-import path.\r\n\r\n## Root cause\r\nIssue #1849 was fixed by adding `OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed` to the membership-activation paths —\r\n`_confirm_invite` (`organizations.rs:1427`), `restore_member_impl` (`organizations.rs:2402`),\r\n`accept_org_invite`, `edit_member`, and the admin path. `check_user_allowed`\r\n(`src/db/models/org_policy.rs:283`) enforces **both** the Single-Organization policy and the\r\nrequired-2FA policy.\r\n\r\nThe directory-connector import endpoint `POST /api/public/organization/import`\r\n(`src/api/core/public.rs`, `ldap_import`) was missed: it re-Confirms a revoked member via\r\n`member.restore()` (~`public.rs:87`) **without calling `check_user_allowed`**. (New members are\r\ncreated as `Accepted` (~`public.rs:107-110`) and would still be checked at the admin `confirm` step;\r\nthe airtight bypass is the `restore()` → `Confirmed` path, which skips `confirm` entirely.)\r\n\r\n## Impact\r\n\r\n### Primary — Single-Organization policy bypass (needs no 2FA at all)\r\nA member who should be blocked/removed by the Single-Org policy is silently re-Confirmed via directory-connector\r\nimport, b\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-88qc-6ch9-mc3j","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:05:00Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T20:05:00Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224714Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.5,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-88qc-6ch9-mc3j","vuln_ids":["GHSA-88QC-6CH9-MC3J"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-862","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11360,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12046","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12046"}},{"id":12047,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-xwf8-pjh7-h589: Cross-organization full cipher access via unguarded full-access-group query","summary":"Cross-organization full cipher access via unguarded full-access-group query\n\n# GitHub Security Advisory (vaultwarden)\r\n\r\nSplit out from the original report, which grouped two primary issues plus a supporting set. The\r\nSSRF and the `post_org_import` gate are tracked separately, see the note at the end.\r\n\r\n- **Ecosystem / package:** Rust / self-hosted server - `dani-garcia/vaultwarden`.\r\n- **Affected versions:** 1.27.0 through 1.36.0.\r\n- **Patched versions:** 1.37.0.\r\n\r\n## Title\r\nCross-org full-access authorization gap in vaultwarden\r\n\r\n## Severity\r\n**AUTHZ (cross-org full access) - Medium.** Reporter's suggested CVSS v3.1\r\n`AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N` (~7.0, but gated on the non-default `org_groups_enabled` +\r\nknowing target UUIDs -> Medium in practice). Assigned as\r\n`AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N` (5.9), matching the reporter's own \"Medium in practice\"\r\nassessment; `S:U` because both orgs sit under the same authorization component, and `C:L` because\r\nthe attacker obtains ciphertext they cannot decrypt without the org key.\r\n\r\n## CWEs\r\nCWE-863 / CWE-639 (incorrect authorization / IDOR), CWE-862 (missing authorization).\r\n\r\n## Summary\r\nvaultwarden is an internet-exposed, multi-tenant server. An authenticated user who is Admin/Owner of any organization (any user can create one unless `ORG_CREATION_USERS` restricts it) can:\r\n\r\n**Cross-organization full cipher access.** `edit_member` / `send_invite`\r\n(`src/api/core/organizations.rs:1606` / `:1162` in 1.36.0) bind body-supplied group UUIDs to a member with no\r\n`Group::find_by_uuid_and_org` check (unlike the collections loop and `put_group_members`), planting a\r\ncross-org `groups_users` row. Then `Group::is_in_full_access_group` (`src/db/models/group.rs:261`) - the\r\nquery behind `Cipher::get_access_restrictions` - lacks the `groups.organizations_uuid ==\r\nusers_organizations.org_uuid` guard its sibling `get_orgs_by_user_with_full_access` (`group.rs:243`) has,\r\nso that stray row grants full read/write/manage on a foreign org's ciphers to a non-member. Requires\r\n`org_groups_enabled=true` (non-default) and knowing target group + cipher UUIDs (no enumeration).\r\n\r\n## Proof of concept\r\nSource-only, offline, provided privately:\r\n- `poc/poc_authz_cross_org_full_access.py` - SQLite repro of the two Diesel queries: the unguarded\r\n`is_in_full_access_group` grants a non-member cross-org full access, the guarded sibling denies it on\r\nidentical data. (`RESULT_authz_cross_org.txt`)\r\n\r\n## Impact\r\nAn authenticated user who is Admin/Owner of any organization (with the groups feature enabled) can gain full read/write/manage on specific\r\nciphers of an organization they are not a member of. Vault contents remain client-side encrypted\r\nthroughout.\r\n\r\n## Remediation\r\nAdd the org-match join guard to `Group::is_in_full_access_group` (matching\r\n`get_orgs_by_user_with_full_access`) and validate group-org in `edit_member`/`send_invite`.\r\n\r\nBoth were applied in 1.37.0.\r\n\r\n## Split-out issues\r\nThe original report also covered, and the reporter is credited as a finder on both:\r\n- Unauthenticated f\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-xwf8-pjh7-h589","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:47Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:47Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224715Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.9,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-xwf8-pjh7-h589","vuln_ids":["GHSA-XWF8-PJH7-H589"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11361,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12047","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12047"}},{"id":12048,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-vh5m-fc9v-m84g: SSRF filter bypass (regex not applied post-resolution)","summary":"SSRF filter bypass (regex not applied post-resolution) ### Summary The internal-IP SSRF filter can be bypassed in specific non-default configuration. When an operator disables non-global-IP block (`HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_NON_GLOBAL_IPS=false`) and instead relies on `HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_REGEX` to keep the server's outbound HTTP client (icon fetching, etc.) away from internal ranges, the regex is **never applied to resolved IP addresses**. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore reach a regex-blocked internal IP by supplying a hostname that resolves to that IP but does not textually match the regex,via unauthenticated `/icons//icon.png` endpoint. Default installs are **not** affected. This is a residual gap in the same fixes implemented for CVE-2026-47160 / GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g (fixed in 1.36.0). That fix closed decimal/hex/octal IP-format bypass which affected the _default_ config. This report is a distinct gap, the regex is not applied post-resolution, that affects _regex-reliance_ config and is present in 1.36.0 and earlier. It is fixed in 1.37.0. ### Details The pre-connect and post-resolution filters are asymmetric. `should_block_host()` (src/http_client.rs:135) applies **both** checks to an IP host — `should_block_ip()` and `should_block_address_regex()`. But `post_resolve()` (src/http_client.rs:273) applies **only** `should_block_ip()`: // src/http_client.rs:273 @ tag 1.36.0 fn post_resolve(name: &str, ip: IpAddr) -> Result<(), CustomHttpClientError> { if should_block_ip(ip) { Err(CustomHttpClientError::NonGlobalIp { domain: Some(name.to_string()), ip }) } else { Ok(()) } } `should_block_ip()` (src/http_client.rs:61) short-circuits to `false` for every IP when the non-global-IP block is disabled: fn should_block_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> bool { if !CONFIG.http_request_block_non_global_ips() { // default: true return false; } !is_global(ip) } So with `http_request_block_non_global_ips=false`, the regex (`http_request_block_regex`, src/config.rs:703) is the *only* protection for internal ranges — yet `resolve_domain()` (src/http_client.rs:241) only runs it against the domain string in `pre_resolve()` (src/http_client.rs:257), never against the resolved IP in `post_resolve()`. For a URL whose host is a domain name, the flow is: 1. pre_resolve() -> should_block_host(Host::Domain(name)) -> regex tested against the **domain string** only. A hostname that does not textually contain the target IP does not match an IP-pattern regex -> pass. 2. DNS resolves the name to an internal IP. 3. post_resolve(name, ip) -> should_block_ip(ip) -> false (flag disabled) -> regex is never applied to the IP -> allowed. The request then proceeds to the internal IP. In contrast, the same IP supplied as a literal is caught, because should_block_host() (used for IP-literal hosts at src/api/icons.rs:123) does apply the regex. Entry point: Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-vh5m-fc9v-m84g","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:31Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:31Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224718Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.8,"epss":0.00291,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47160","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47160","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G","GHSA-VH5M-FC9V-M84G"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-918","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11362,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12048","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12048"}},{"id":12049,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-f3qw-qg77-hmm4: IDOR in Organization Import Allows Unauthorized Data Injection","summary":"IDOR in Organization Import Allows Unauthorized Data Injection Summary An Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the organization import endpoint allows an authenticated member with \"Read-Only\" permissions to bypass authorization checks and inject unauthorized cipher entries into a restricted collection. Details The vulnerability originates from an incorrect authorization check during the organization import process. When the system verifies whether a user can assign imported ciphers to an existing collection, it evaluates the user's visibility (read access) of the collection rather than their writability (manage/write access). Consequently, a user with strictly read-only access successfully passes this validation boundary. Furthermore, because the import payload explicitly supplies a list of target collections, a subsequent authorization check intended to verify cipher-level write access is short-circuited. This logical misalignment allows the read-only user's payload to be fully processed, establishing unauthorized relations in the database and mounting new cipher entries into the restricted collection. PoC General replication steps: Authenticate as a standard organization member who is granted strictly \"Read-Only\" access to a specific collection. Submit an HTTP POST request to the /api/ciphers/import-organization?organizationId= endpoint. Provide a structured JSON payload containing the target read-only collection's UUID in the collections array, and map a newly defined cipher entry to this collection using the relationships array. Observe that the server accepts the payload with an HTTP 200 OK status, successfully mounting the unauthorized cipher into the read-only collection. Impact This is an Improper Privilege Management flaw affecting multi-user organization vaults. No existing vault data is exposed. However, because every confirmed member holds the organization key, the injected entries can be valid, readable items (for example a login item pointing to an attacker-controlled URL) that other members with access to the collection will see and may trust. This flaw allows low-privileged accounts to inject unauthorized items into shared restricted collections. While these entries can be manually deleted by Organization Admins or Owners, the vulnerability leads to data pollution, UI clutter, and an unnecessary administrative burden to clean up the affected collections. Patches Fixed in 1.37.0. Assigning imported items to an existing collection now requires write access to that collection, and the collection list supplied in the import no longer short-circuits the cipher-level write check. ## Credits Reported independently by the following researchers, in order of first report: 1. @gigioneggiando (Luigi Colluto), 2026-07-08, as one item within a broader report, and again by email 2. @GN998, 2026-07-19, the complete standalone analysis this advisory tracks 3. @cipher-creator, Causal Security (https://causalsecurity.com/), by email Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-f3qw-qg77-hmm4","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:17Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:17Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224720Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-f3qw-qg77-hmm4","vuln_ids":["GHSA-F3QW-QG77-HMM4"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11363,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12049","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12049"}},{"id":12050,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-96f7-78q5-j345: Unauthenticated WebSocket connection flooding on /notifications/anonymous-hub (resource-exhaustion DoS)","summary":"Unauthenticated WebSocket connection flooding on /notifications/anonymous-hub (resource-exhaustion DoS) # Unauthenticated WebSocket connection flooding on `/notifications/anonymous-hub` (resource-exhaustion DoS) ## Summary The anonymous notifications WebSocket endpoint `GET /notifications/anonymous-hub?token=<...>` accepts and upgrades WebSocket connections **without any authentication and without any connection/rate limit**. Each accepted connection allocates a long-lived async task, an mpsc channel, a global-map entry, a periodic timer and a socket/file descriptor, and stays open indefinitely. A single unauthenticated client can therefore open an unbounded number of persistent connections and exhaust server resources (tasks, memory, file descriptors), degrading or denying the notifications/live-sync service — including the passwordless-login notification channel — for all users. A secondary issue: the global subscription map is keyed by the **client-supplied `token`** and uses last-writer-wins `insert`, allowing a client to overwrite (evict) another subscriber that used the same token. ## Affected version - **Vaultwarden 1.36.0 and earlier** (confirmed on 1.36.0, git `f21a3ada`); the endpoint dates back to login-with-device support. - Fixed in **1.37.0**. ## Details Source: `src/api/notifications.rs` (1.36.0) ```rust #[get(\"/anonymous-hub?\")] // line 190 — NO auth guard fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> Result { ... let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::(100); // per-conn channel (buffer 100) subscriptions.map.insert(token.clone(), tx); // global DashMap, attacker-chosen key ... // rocket_ws::Stream! { ... interval(Duration::from_secs(15)) ... } // per-conn task + 15s keep-alive timer } ``` Contrast with the **authenticated** hub `websockets_hub` (line 107), which validates the token via `crate::auth::decode_login(&token)` before accepting. `anonymous_websockets_hub` performs no such validation — `token` is an arbitrary attacker-controlled string that is never checked and is used directly as the subscription-map key. Per accepted connection the server allocates: - one Tokio task running the stream loop, - one `tokio::sync::mpsc` channel (capacity 100 `Message`s), - one entry in the process-global `WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS` `DashMap`, - one 15-second `tokio::time::interval` timer (keep-alive ping → no idle timeout closes the socket), - one TCP/TLS socket + file descriptor. There is **no authentication, no per-IP connection cap, and no global cap** on these connections. ## Proof of Concept Tested against a stock `vaultwarden/server:1.36.0` container (default config), no credentials used. **1. A single unauthenticated connection is upgraded (arbitrary token, no `Authorization`):** ```bash curl -sk -i --http1.1 \\ -H \"Connection: Upgrade\" -H \"Upgrade: websocket\" \\ -H \"Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\" -H \"S Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-96f7-78q5-j345","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:00Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:00Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224723Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-96f7-78q5-j345","vuln_ids":["GHSA-96F7-78Q5-J345"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-400","CWE-770","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11364,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12050","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12050"}},{"id":12051,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-jq2g-h4xr-4mcr: Cipher Ownership Confusion in Organization Import","summary":"Cipher Ownership Confusion in Organization Import ### Summary An improper authorization issue exists in the organization import endpoint (/api/ciphers/import-organization). While the endpoint validates the target organization specified in the URL query, it fails to enforce that each imported cipher is bound to that organization. A user with organization import permissions can set organizationId at the cipher level to null in the request payload. This causes the imported cipher to be saved to their personal vault while remaining linked to the organization's collection, resulting in inconsistent data ownership and collection mappings between organization and personal vaults. ### Details In `src/api/core/organizations.rs`, the `post_org_import` function overly trusts external input: 1. Although the route validates the user's permissions for the target organization via the URL parameter (`query.organization_id`), when iterating through `data.ciphers`, it **does not force `cipher_data.organization_id` to be overwritten with the authenticated `org_id`**. As a result, the system blindly trusts the organization ID provided in the JSON payload. 2. When invoking `update_cipher_from_data(...).await.ok()`, `.ok()` silently suppresses potential business validation errors. 3. Subsequently, the code unconditionally executes `CollectionCipher::save`, forcefully mapping the generated `cipher.uuid` to the target organization's `collection_uuid`. When an attacker sets `organizationId` to `null`, the cipher item is incorrectly saved to the personal vault while simultaneously being mapped to the organization's collection, breaking physical data isolation. ### PoC **Reproduction Steps:** 1. Log in with an account that has import permissions for the target organization (e.g., Org B). 2. Initiate an import request to Org B and intercept the HTTP request: `POST /api/ciphers/import-organization?organizationId=`. 3. Modify the `organizationId` field in the request payload to `null` ``` \"body\": JSON.stringify({ \"ciphers\": [ { \"type\": 1, \"encryptedFor\": \"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\", \"folderId\": null, \"organizationId\": null, ``` 4. **Triggered Result**: * If the payload defines a new collection (only possible for admins and owners), it is created in the target organization. * A new cipher item appears in the user's **personal vault**. Because the cipher item was encrypted by the client using the organization key prior to upload but erroneously assigned to the personal vault server-side, client-side decryption using the personal key fails, resulting in a ghost entry displaying `[error: cannot decrypt]` in the personal account. ### Impact Affected Scope: Vaultwarden instances with organization features enabled. Impact: This can create inconsistent ownership between imported ciphers and organization collections. The same missing binding also allowed setting the per-cipher `organizationId` to a different organization in Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-jq2g-h4xr-4mcr","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:03:37Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T20:03:37Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224725Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-jq2g-h4xr-4mcr","vuln_ids":["GHSA-JQ2G-H4XR-4MCR"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11365,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12051","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12051"}},{"id":12066,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.37.3","summary":"Security keywords: security\n\nWhat's Changed\n\nFix password change with newer web-vault by @BlackDex in #7634\n\nchore: remove duplicate \"the\" in ciphers.rs comment by @mvanhorn in #7254\n\nIgnore reset-password auto-enroll when mail is disabled by @xhon-pelushi in #7585\n\nFix migration for MariaDB 12.2.2 by @Timshel in #7265\n\nAdd SSO_SIGNUPS_ALLOWED by @Timshel in #7272\n\nlog_event take enum parameter not i32 by @Timshel in #7656\n\nMisc Updates by @BlackDex in #7676\n\nUpdate rust docker version by @dani-garcia in #7689\n\nFix organization import failing with missing field groups by @tom27052006 in #7699\n\nAdd pm-32413-multi-client-password-management feature flag by @tom27052006 in #7677\n\nLog IP/username on two-factor email-login credential failures by @crahn in #7654\n\nSupport admin reset 2fa by @Timshel in #7435\n\nfix(security): revoke 2FA remember tokens when credentials or 2FA change by @BryanFRD in #7682\n\nfix(security): rate limit prelogin and auth request endpoints by @BryanFRD in #7681\n\nfix: Correct invalid comment syntax in .dockerignore by @niniconi in #7274\n\nUpdate Rust and adjust DockerSettings by @BlackDex in #7690\n\nRoute service clients through shared HTTP setup by @txase in #7639\n\nFix iOS registration token response by @tom27052006 in #7714\n\nUse insert_into when possible by @Timshel in #6437\n\nFix archiveDate update by @BlackDex in #7722\n\nNew Contributors\n\n@mvanhorn made their first contribution in #7254\n\n@xhon-pelushi made their first contribution in #7585\n\n@crahn made their first contribution in #7654\n\n@BryanFRD made their first contribution in #7682\n\n@niniconi made their first contribution in #7274\n\nFull Changelog: 1.37.2...1.37.3","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.37.3","published_at":"2026-09-13T15:03:37Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224742Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12066","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12066"}},{"id":12067,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[New release] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.37.2","summary":"Note\n\nThis update is required for support with clients with version 2026.8.0+, please update before reporting any issues with them.\n\nImportant\n\nAlso read #7615 for more details if you still have client issues!\n\nWhat's Changed\n\nFix Debian cross-linking with xx-cargo by @alexliluz in #7524\n\nFix playwright test by @Timshel in #7548\n\nMisc fixes and updates by @BlackDex in #7558\n\nInclude user email in successful login logs by @lmogthb in #7496\n\nFix sendmail executable permission check by @p-boenisch in #7483\n\nadd dummy revisionDate by @stefan0xC in #7608\n\nNew Contributors\n\n@alexliluz made their first contribution in #7524\n\n@lmogthb made their first contribution in #7496\n\n@p-boenisch made their first contribution in #7483\n\nFull Changelog: 1.37.1...1.37.2","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.37.2","published_at":"2026-08-24T09:42:38Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224743Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12067","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12067"}},{"id":12068,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[New release] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.37.1","summary":"Note\n\nThis patch release resolves the issues with invites.\n\nIf you have applied any workaround to fix this locally, please revert those fixes to prevent possible other issues.\n\nI'm sorry that it took some time to check and validate this fix.\n\nAlso, this release fixes an issue (#7475) with all the Alpine based images which are build using https://github.com/BlackDex/rust-musl/.\n\nAn issue with the build image OpenSSL compilation is resolved and those are used to build the new alpine tagged containers.\n\nWhat's Changed\n\nAlways send initOrganization and orgUserHasExistingUser in invite URL by @vikfox in #7482\n\nIndirectly resolved #7475 by using newer rust-musl build images which had a compilation issue with OpenSSL.\n\nNew Contributors\n\n@vikfox made their first contribution in #7482\n\nFull Changelog: 1.37.0...1.37.1","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.37.1","published_at":"2026-07-29T13:40:10Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224744Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12068","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12068"}},{"id":12710,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.37.0","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-hw4g-2v3f-74x5, GHSA-rxhg-2pw9-vf25, GHSA-455c-vgg9-jxw8, GHSA-wc45-m6pv-rrf9, GHSA-rqf8-2568-r7mc, GHSA-88qc-6ch9-mc3j, GHSA-xwf8-pjh7-h589, GHSA-vh5m-fc9v-m84g, GHSA-f3qw-qg77-hmm4, GHSA-96f7-78q5-j345, GHSA-jq2g-h4xr-4mcr\n\nSecurity keywords: security, ssrf, GHSA-HW4G-2V3F-74X5, GHSA-VH5M-FC9V-M84G, GHSA-XWF8-PJH7-H589, GHSA-88QC-6CH9-MC3J, GHSA-RXHG-2PW9-VF25, GHSA-96F7-78Q5-J345, GHSA-455C-VGG9-JXW8, GHSA-F3QW-QG77-HMM4, GHSA-JQ2G-H4XR-4MCR, GHSA-RQF8-2568-R7MC\n\n## Note\r\nThis update is required for support with clients with version 2026.7.0+, please update before reporting any issues with them.\r\n\r\n## Security Fixes\r\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advice to update as soon as possible.\r\n- SSRF via the icon endpoint [[GHSA-hw4g-2v3f-74x5]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-hw4g-2v3f-74x5) [[GHSA-vh5m-fc9v-m84g]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-vh5m-fc9v-m84g) (**Medium**, 5.8 / 6.3)\r\n- Cross-Organization Cipher Access [[GHSA-xwf8-pjh7-h589]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-xwf8-pjh7-h589) (**Medium**, 5.9)\r\n- Organization Policy Bypass on Directory Import [[GHSA-88qc-6ch9-mc3j]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-88qc-6ch9-mc3j) (**Medium**, 5.5)\r\n- Send Access-Count Bypass [[GHSA-rxhg-2pw9-vf25]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-rxhg-2pw9-vf25) (**Medium**, 5.3)\r\n- Unauthenticated WebSocket Flooding DDOS [[GHSA-96f7-78q5-j345]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-96f7-78q5-j345) (**Medium**, 5.3)\r\n- Cross-Organization Secret Sharing [[GHSA-455c-vgg9-jxw8]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-455c-vgg9-jxw8) (**Medium**, 4.3)\r\n- Organization Import Authorization [[GHSA-f3qw-qg77-hmm4]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-f3qw-qg77-hmm4)[[GHSA-jq2g-h4xr-4mcr]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-jq2g-h4xr-4mcr) (**Medium**, 4.3)\r\n- Organization Data Enumeration via the Manager role [[GHSA-rqf8-2568-r7mc]](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-rqf8-2568-r7mc) (**Medium**, 4.3)\r\n\r\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment and publishing at a later date.\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* OpenDAL S3 parameter support by @txase in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6127\r\n* Fix SSO Cookie path by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7187\r\n* fix email 2fa for bw cli by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7225\r\n* sso_auth improvements by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7197\r\n* Reject unrecognised DATABASE_URL instead of silent SQLite fallback by @mfw78 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7061\r\n* Switch to `xx-cargo` by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6640\r\n* Updates and fixes by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7235\r\n* Switch to Edition 2024, more clippy lints, and less macro calls by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7200\r\n* Serve Apple app site association file by @user71424q in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7191\r\n* Update Rust, Crates and GHA by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7307\r\n* Fix enforce blocked by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7246\r\n* Admin password recovery endpoint change by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7270\r\n* fix(sends): emit hideEmail as non-null boolean in sync response by @kvdb in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7283\r\n* Org membership delete remove Invitation by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7284\r\n* [v2026.5.0] Registration request update by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7295\r\n* [v2026.5.0] PutPolicy now using vnext format by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7296\r\n* 2026.6.0 send support by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7346\r\n* Add SSO_AUTHORIZE_BODY by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7357\r\n* Add `pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2` feature flag by @pilotstew in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7358\r\n* improve CI by @TriplEight in https://github.com","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.37.0","published_at":"2026-07-24T17:04:39Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135281Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.9,"epss":0.0033,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-116678","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-116678","CVE-2026-33420","CVE-2026-47160","GHSA-455C-VGG9-JXW8","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G","GHSA-88QC-6CH9-MC3J","GHSA-96F7-78Q5-J345","GHSA-F3QW-QG77-HMM4","GHSA-HW4G-2V3F-74X5","GHSA-JJXG-P3V6-52WW","GHSA-JQ2G-H4XR-4MCR","GHSA-RQF8-2568-R7MC","GHSA-RXHG-2PW9-VF25","GHSA-VH5M-FC9V-M84G","GHSA-WC45-M6PV-RRF9","GHSA-XWF8-PJH7-H589"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11350,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12710","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12710"}},{"id":12052,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-pfp2-jhgq-6hg5 / CVE-2026-47158: CSRF in SSO Authorization Flow","summary":"CSRF in SSO Authorization Flow\n\n## Summary\r\n\r\nA cross-site request forgery / session fixation vulnerability in Vaultwarden's SSO authorization flow allowed an unauthenticated attacker to hijack any SSO user's login and obtain a fully authenticated session, leading to account takeover.\r\n\r\nThe OAuth `state` parameter accepted by the authorize endpoint was not bound to the initiating browser session. Combined with a PKCE flow under attacker-controlled parameters and a cleanup gap on failed token exchange, an attacker could pre-create an authorization context, induce a victim to complete IdP authentication against it, and then redeem the resulting tokens themselves.\r\n\r\n## Affected versions\r\n\r\nAll Vaultwarden versions with SSO support up to and including 1.35.8. Versions 1.36.0 and up are not vulnerable.\r\n\r\n## Root cause\r\n\r\nThree design decisions combined to produce the vulnerability:\r\n\r\n1. **No session binding at `/connect/authorize`.** The endpoint accepted arbitrary client-supplied `state` and `code_challenge` values without authentication, cookies, or any other browser-session anchor.\r\n2. **`SsoAuth` keyed by the client-supplied `state`.** The server-side record holding the OIDC flow context was primary-keyed on a value the caller controls, allowing an attacker to fixate a row and have a subsequent IdP callback bearing that `state` populate it.\r\n3. **No cleanup of `SsoAuth` on failed token exchange.** When `exchange_code` propagated an IdP error (e.g. from a mismatched PKCE verifier), the row was left intact, preserving the victim's authorization code for later redemption.\r\n\r\n## Attack chain\r\n\r\n1. The attacker generates a PKCE `code_challenge`/`code_verifier` pair and a `state` value, then calls `/connect/authorize` with these. An `SsoAuth` row is stored keyed by the attacker's `state`, and the IdP authorization URL is returned.\r\n2. The attacker sends the IdP URL to the victim. The victim authenticates with the IdP — if an IdP session is already active, no interaction beyond the click is required.\r\n3. The IdP redirects the victim's browser to `/connect/oidc-signin` with their real authorization code. The server stores this code in the attacker-fixated `SsoAuth` row without verifying that the callback originated from the same browser that initiated the flow.\r\n4. The victim's browser is redirected to `sso-connector.html`, where the Bitwarden client automatically attempts token exchange. Because the client does not hold the attacker's verifier, the exchange fails at the IdP. The `SsoAuth` row is not deleted.\r\n5. The attacker calls `/connect/token` with the fixated `state` (which doubles as `code` in this implementation) and their own `code_verifier`. The exchange succeeds, the IdP returns the victim's identity, and access and refresh tokens for the victim's account are issued to the attacker.\r\n\r\n## Impact\r\n\r\n- Full account takeover of any SSO user without two-factor authentication.\r\n- Access to the victim's encrypted vault material (`PrivateKey`, `Key`, ciphers), enabling offline b\n\nAffected packages: :vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.36.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-pfp2-jhgq-6hg5","published_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:43Z","updated_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:43Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224728Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.3,"epss":0.00252,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47158","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47158","GHSA-PFP2-JHGQ-6HG5"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-352","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11366,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12052","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12052"}},{"id":12053,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-hxqh-ff5p-wfr3 / CVE-2026-47159: Authentication Flow Information Disclosure in SSO Discovery Allows Organization Enumeration and Pre-Validation Token Exposure","summary":"Authentication Flow Information Disclosure in SSO Discovery Allows Organization Enumeration and Pre-Validation Token Exposure ### Summary I identified an issue in Vaultwarden’s SSO discovery / pre-validation flow that may allow an attacker to enumerate SSO-enabled organizations for an arbitrary email address and then obtain a valid pre-validation JWT using only the returned organizationIdentifier, without proving ownership of the supplied email address first. ### Details In the tested flow, the application first accepts an arbitrary email address and returns organization-related SSO metadata, including organizationIdentifier values. Then, using one of these identifiers in the pre-validation request, the server returns a JWT token that appears to be used to continue the SSO process. This behavior may introduce two security problems: 1. Information disclosure / user-org enumeration An attacker can submit arbitrary email addresses and learn whether they are associated with one or more SSO-enabled organizations. 2. Improper access control in SSO pre-validation An attacker can request a pre-validation token using only the discovered organizationIdentifier, before any proof that they control the email identity involved in the first step. Depending on the intended design, this may enable SSO flow abuse, tenant discovery, targeted phishing facilitation, and possible authentication workflow bypass primitives ### PoC **1: Submit arbitrary email to SSO verification endpoint** **Observed response**: The server returns a 200 OK response containing organization data associated with the supplied email, for example: **This discloses:** 1. whether the email is recognized in the SSO/org flow 2. organization names 3. organization identifiers 4. relationship between a target email and one or more organizations This can expose internal organization metadata tied to arbitrary users and may provide an attacker with a trusted token used in the SSO initiation flow without first verifying identity ownership. **Step 2: Use returned organizationIdentifier in pre-validation** **Expected Result** The application should not disclose organization membership / SSO association details for arbitrary email addresses before verifying the requester is authorized to learn that information. Additionally, the pre-validation endpoint should not issue a token solely based on a user-controlled organizationIdentifier that was previously disclosed through a public-facing discovery endpoint. **Actual Result** The system: accepts any supplied email address, returns organization-related SSO metadata, allows the caller to use the returned organizationIdentifier to obtain a pre-validation JWT ### Security Impact **Information Disclosure** An attacker can enumerate whether arbitrary Affected packages: :vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.36.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-hxqh-ff5p-wfr3","published_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:39Z","updated_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:39Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224730Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.9,"epss":0.00468,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47159","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47159","GHSA-HXQH-FF5P-WFR3"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11368,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12053","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12053"}},{"id":12054,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-6x5c-84vm-5j56 / CVE-2026-47164: SSO Email Auto-Link Can Bind an Existing Local Account to an Attacker-Controlled IdP Identity","summary":"SSO Email Auto-Link Can Bind an Existing Local Account to an Attacker-Controlled IdP Identity\n\n## Summary\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in Vaultwarden's SSO login flow allowed an attacker who controlled an IdP identity asserting the victim's email address to bind that identity to the victim's existing Vaultwarden account and authenticate as the victim.\r\n\r\nThe IdP's `email_verified` claim was checked in the new-user creation branch but not in the existing-user binding branch of the SSO login handler. Combined with the default `SSO_SIGNUPS_MATCH_EMAIL=true`, this allowed an email match alone to be treated as sufficient authority for linking a new SSO identity to a pre-existing Vaultwarden account.\r\n\r\n## Affected versions\r\n\r\nAll Vaultwarden versions with SSO support up to and including 1.35.8. Versions 1.36.0 and up are fixed.\r\n\r\n## Root cause\r\n\r\nThe SSO login handler resolves the incoming IdP identity in three steps:\r\n\r\n1. Look up an existing `SsoUser` by stable identifier (issuer + subject).\r\n2. If none, fall back to looking up a local user by the IdP-supplied email.\r\n3. If a local user is found, complete the login and persist a new SSO binding.\r\n\r\nThe `email_verified` gate was applied only on the new-user branch (step 3 with no local match). On the existing-user branch, the IdP-supplied email was trusted as proof of ownership without consulting the `email_verified` claim. An IdP identity could therefore claim a victim's email — verified or not — and the resulting login flow would proceed against the victim's account.\r\n\r\n## Attack chain\r\n\r\n1. The attacker registers an identity at the configured IdP whose `email` claim equals the victim's Vaultwarden email. The IdP may set `email_verified` to `false` or omit it.\r\n2. The attacker initiates SSO login at Vaultwarden and authenticates at the IdP as the attacker's identity.\r\n3. `sso_login` finds no `SsoUser` by identifier, falls back to lookup by email, and matches the victim's existing local account.\r\n4. With no `email_verified` check on this branch, the flow proceeds to the 2FA gate. If the victim has no Vaultwarden 2FA configured, a session for the victim's account is issued to the attacker.\r\n5. A new SSO binding linking the attacker's IdP subject to the victim's user UUID is persisted, providing repeat access.\r\n\r\n## Impact\r\n\r\n- Account takeover of SSO-eligible victims without Vaultwarden 2FA whose email matches an IdP identity the attacker can obtain.\r\n- Full read of the victim's encrypted vault material (`Key`, `PrivateKey`, ciphers), enabling offline brute-force of the master password.\r\n- Authenticated session actions: device registration, emergency-access grant creation, cipher modification and deletion.\r\n- Potential org-level privilege escalation if the victim holds Owner privileges in any organization.\r\n- Persistent SSO binding remains attached to the victim's account after the session expires.\r\n\r\n## Preconditions\r\n\r\n- SSO is enabled on the Vaultwarden instance.\r\n- `SSO_SIGNUPS_MATCH_EMAIL=true` (default).\r\n- The victim has an existing Vaultwarden account whose email matches an IdP identity the att\n\nAffected packages: :vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.36.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-6x5c-84vm-5j56","published_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:33Z","updated_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:33Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224731Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.7,"epss":0.00448,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47164","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47164","GHSA-6X5C-84VM-5J56"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-284","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11370,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12054","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12054"}},{"id":12055,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g / CVE-2026-47160: Server-side request forgery (SSRF) via Icon Endpoint Decimal/Hex/Octal IP Bypass","summary":"Server-side request forgery (SSRF) via Icon Endpoint Decimal/Hex/Octal IP Bypass ### Summary The IP validation for the icon fetching endpoint `/icons/{domain}/icon.png` can be bypassed, resulting in a basic Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The `http_request_block_non_global_ips` protection checks IPs using Rust's `IpAddr::from_str()`, which does not parse decimal, hex, or octal IP representations. However, the underlying DNS/HTTP resolver (glibc/Hickory) resolves them. This SSRF allows an attacker to perform HTTP/HTTPS requests from the Vaultwarden server to arbitrary (internal) IPs, but only responds with parsed favicon images (not raw response bodies), limiting this to a blind internal network/port discovery via timing and response-size differences. ### Details Vaultwarden runs as two Docker containers: - vaultwarden, port 80 (internal only), using SQLite for storage - nginx reverse proxy TLS port 8443 externally, proxies to the vaultwarden container Root cause (two-stage bypass): 1. Pre-connect filter bypass (`src/http_client.rs:62-69`): `should_block_address()` uses Rust's `IpAddr::from_str()` which only recognizes dotted-decimal notation. Decimal/hex/octal representations are not parsed as IPs and pass through unchecked. 2. Post-resolve check bypass (`src/http_client.rs:229`): The `post_resolve()` function checks resolved IPs, but it is only called from the custom DNS resolver (`CustomDnsResolver::resolve_domain`). When the URL host is a numeric literal, the Rust `url` crate (WHATWG URL Standard compliant) parses it directly as an IPv4 address. Reqwest then connects to the IP without invoking the custom DNS resolver at all, `post_resolve()` is never called. Bypass payloads that successfully fetched from internal IPs: - `2130706433` → `127.0.0.1` (decimal integer) - `0x7f000001` → `127.0.0.1` (hexadecimal) - `0177.0.0.1` → `127.0.0.1` (octal-dotted) ### PoC Basic PoC: - https://localhost:8443/icons/127.0.0.1/icon.png -> Response is generic icon.png (Blocked IP) - https://localhost:8443/icons/2130706433/icon.png -> Response is vaulwarden favicon, bypassing the IP filter From the logs: ``` [2026-04-02 09:28:04.648][request][INFO] GET /icons/2130706433/icon.png [2026-04-02 09:28:04.651][response][INFO] (icon_internal) GET /icons//icon.png => 200 OK [2026-04-02 09:28:08.371][request][INFO] GET /icons/127.0.0.1/icon.png [2026-04-02 09:28:08.371][vaultwarden::api::icons][WARN] Blocked address: 127.0.0.1 [2026-04-02 09:28:08.371][response][INFO] (icon_internal) GET /icons//icon.png => 200 OK ``` The same applies to other resources, that are only internally available. An exemplary, additional nginx container on a Docker internal: true network, serving a favicon with no published ports, only reachable from the vaultwarden container, not from nginx or the outside, yet the decimal IP bypass (2886991875 for 172.20.0.3) successfully fetches the favicon through the Affected packages: :vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.36.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g","published_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:25Z","updated_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:25Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224732Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.8,"epss":0.00291,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47160","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47160","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-918","CWE-1389","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11353,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12055","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12055"}},{"id":12711,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.36.0","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-pfp2-jhgq-6hg5, GHSA-hxqh-ff5p-wfr3, GHSA-6x5c-84vm-5j56, GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g\n\nSecurity keywords: security, csrf, GHSA-PFP2-JHGQ-6HG5, GHSA-W6H6-8R66-HCV7, GHSA-HXQH-FF5P-WFR3, GHSA-J4J8-GPVJ-7FQR, GHSA-6X5C-84VM-5J56, ssrf, GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G\n\n## Security Fixes\r\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advice to update as soon as possible.\r\n- SSO Login CSRF\r\n  [GHSA-pfp2-jhgq-6hg5](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-pfp2-jhgq-6hg5)\r\n  [GHSA-w6h6-8r66-hcv7](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-w6h6-8r66-hcv7)\r\n- User/Organization Enumeration\r\n  [GHSA-hxqh-ff5p-wfr3](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-hxqh-ff5p-wfr3)\r\n- SSO existing-user binding\r\n  [GHSA-j4j8-gpvj-7fqr](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-j4j8-gpvj-7fqr)\r\n  [GHSA-6x5c-84vm-5j56](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-6x5c-84vm-5j56)\r\n- SSRF via Icon Endpoint\r\n  [GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g)\r\n- Some crate's updated and other minor security enhancements\r\n\r\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment.\r\n\r\n\r\n## Notes\r\n- Archiving of items is available\r\n  https://bitwarden.com/blog/keep-your-vault-tidy-with-item-archiving/\r\n  https://bitwarden.com/nl-nl/help/managing-items/#archive\r\n- Web Vault updated to v2026.4.1\r\n\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* SSO fallback to UserInfo preferred_username by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7128\r\n* Dummy identifier need to pass for a guid by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7154\r\n* add new /identity/accounts/prelogin/password by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7156\r\n* Add DuckDuckGo browser device type by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7147\r\n* Apply `duration_suboptimal_units` lint findings by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7144\r\n* Apply `ref_option` lint findings by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7143\r\n* Fix hardcoded sso identifier by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7157\r\n* Update crates and fix a nightly lint by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7161\r\n* Fix Host/IP resolving by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7162\r\n* Several SSO Fixes by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7163\r\n* Add support for archiving items by @matt-aaron in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6916\r\n* Fix favicon fetching to check all icon links instead of just the first one by @Shocker in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6880\r\n* Fix merge conflict by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7164\r\n* Replace organization_uuid unwrap with proper error handling by @xjohnyknox in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6936\r\n* fix: return Err instead of panic on unknown cipher atype in to_json() by @mango766 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7068\r\n* Allow SQLite to be linked against dynamically by @ISSOtm in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7057\r\n* Update crates and web-vault by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7171\r\n* Update hickory by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7175\r\n\r\n## New Contributors\r\n* @matt-aaron made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6916\r\n* @Shocker made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6880\r\n* @xjohnyknox made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6936\r\n* @mango766 made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7068\r\n* @ISSOtm made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7057\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.8...1.36.0\r\n\r\nYou can discuss this release here https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/discussions/7177","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.36.0","published_at":"2026-05-03T12:54:52Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135282Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.3,"epss":0.00468,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47158","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47158","CVE-2026-47159","CVE-2026-47160","CVE-2026-47164","GHSA-6X5C-84VM-5J56","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G","GHSA-HXQH-FF5P-WFR3","GHSA-J4J8-GPVJ-7FQR","GHSA-PFP2-JHGQ-6HG5","GHSA-W6H6-8R66-HCV7"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11366,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12711","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12711"}},{"id":12060,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-jjxg-p3v6-52ww / CVE-2026-33420: Missing authorization check in /organizations/{org_id}/collections/details allows Manager-role users to enumerate all collections","summary":"Missing authorization check in /organizations/{org_id}/collections/details allows Manager-role users to enumerate all collections\n\n## Summary\r\n\r\nThe `get_org_collections_details` endpoint (`GET /api/organizations/{org_id}/collections/details`) in `src/api/core/organizations.rs` is missing the `has_full_access()` authorization check that exists on the sibling `get_org_collections` endpoint. This allows any Manager-role user with `accessAll=False` and no collection assignments to retrieve the names, UUIDs, user-to-collection mappings, and group-to-collection mappings for **all** collections in the organization.\r\n\r\n## Affected Component\r\n\r\n- **File:** `src/api/core/organizations.rs`\r\n- **Function:** `get_org_collections_details` (line ~380)\r\n- **CWE:** CWE-862 (Missing Authorization)\r\n\r\n## Details\r\n\r\n`get_org_collections` correctly gates access:\r\n```rust\r\nif !headers.membership.has_full_access() {\r\n    err_code!(\"Resource not found.\", \"User does not have full access\", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code);\r\n}\r\n```\r\n\r\n`get_org_collections_details` omits this check and instead only requires `ManagerHeadersLoose` (any Manager/Admin/Owner). It then calls `Collection::find_by_organization()`, returning all collections unconditionally. The per-collection `assigned` boolean is computed but not used to filter the response.\r\n\r\n## Impact\r\n\r\nA Manager with restricted collection access can:\r\n- Enumerate all collection names (potentially revealing sensitive organizational structure, e.g. \"Executive Passwords\", \"Financial Systems\")\r\n- Discover which users have access to which collections\r\n- Map group-to-collection assignments\r\n\r\nThis violates the principle of least privilege and can be used for reconnaissance prior to further attacks.\r\n\r\n## Remediation\r\n\r\nAdd the `has_full_access()` check to `get_org_collections_details`, or filter the returned collections to only those the Manager is assigned to — consistent with how `get_org_collections` behaves.\n\nAffected packages: :vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.35.5","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-jjxg-p3v6-52ww","published_at":"2026-04-26T12:23:40Z","updated_at":"2026-04-26T12:23:40Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224737Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":0.0017,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-33420","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-33420","GHSA-JJXG-P3V6-52WW"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-862","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11358,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12060","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12060"}},{"id":12056,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-c5rv-q295-7w4g / CVE-2026-43914: Brute-force protection bypass vulnerability","summary":"Brute-force protection bypass vulnerability\n\n### Summary\r\nThere is a brute-force protection bypass vulnerability in Vaultwarden before version 1.35.4 if email 2fa is enabled.\r\n\r\n### Details\r\nThere is a security vulnerability in Vaultwarden before version 1.35.4 that allows bypassing the login brute-force protection if email 2fa is enabled.\r\n\r\nYou implement the function `check_limit_login` to rate-limit failed logins. This function protects `_sso_login`, `_password_login` and `_api_key_login`. \r\nHowever, if email 2fa is enabled, the unprotected 2fa-function `send_email_login` (email.rs, api endpoint `/api/two-factor/send-email-login`) also acts as an oracle determining whether a username-password combination is correct. An attacker can abuse that endpoint to brute-force passwords without rate-limiting. This works even for users who don't have email 2fa configured.\r\n\r\nIf the username-password combination is correct, this endpoint returns a status_code 200 (and sends a 2fa code via email to the victim) or returns the message \"Two factor not found\". \r\nIf the username-password combination is wrong, it returns \"Username or password is incorrect\".\r\nThis method doesn't work if email 2FA isn't enabled.\r\n\r\nI've attached a small Python PoC script (as txt file due to mail filtering) that demonstrates this brute-force attack. It's hard-coded with the default sha256-pbkdf using 600k iterations. A better PoC would dynamically retrieve the pbkdf and the iteration count from /identity/accounts/prelogin for each target user individually.\r\n\r\nMy recommendation would be to include the `check_limit_login` in the function `send_email_login`. \r\nThis vulnerability was fixed in [PR 6867](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6867) resp. [Version 1.35.4](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.4).\r\n\r\n### PoC\r\n```\r\nimport base64\r\nimport hashlib\r\nimport requests\r\nimport random\r\nimport string\r\n\r\ndef vw_hash_pbkdf2(email: str, password: str, iterations: int) -> str:\r\n    salt = email.strip().lower().encode(\"utf-8\")\r\n    master_key = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(\"sha256\", password.encode(\"utf-8\"), salt, iterations, dklen=32)\r\n    master_password_hash = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(\"sha256\", master_key, password.encode(\"utf-8\"), 1, dklen=32)\r\n    return base64.b64encode(master_password_hash).decode(\"ascii\")\r\n\r\ndef bruteforce_passwords(target_url, target_user, bruteforce_candidates, iterations):\r\n    for candidate in bruteforce_candidates:\r\n        candidate_hash = vw_hash_pbkdf2(target_user, candidate, iterations)\r\n        data = dict()\r\n        data[\"email\"] = target_user\r\n        data[\"masterPasswordHash\"] = candidate_hash\r\n        data[\"deviceIdentifier\"] = \"x\" # dummy value is fine        \r\n        result = requests.post(f\"{target_url}/api/two-factor/send-email-login\", json=data)    \r\n        if result.status_code == 400 and \"Username or password is incorrect\" in result.text:\r\n            print(\"[-] Password wrong. Trying next...\")\r\n        elif result.status_code == 400 and \"Email 2FA is disabled\"  in res\n\nAffected packages: :vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.35.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-c5rv-q295-7w4g","published_at":"2026-04-25T21:05:10Z","updated_at":"2026-05-04T17:50:32Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224733Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.3,"epss":0.00288,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-43914","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-43914","GHSA-C5RV-Q295-7W4G"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-307","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11372,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12056","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12056"}},{"id":12057,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-937x-3j8m-7w7p / CVE-2026-43913: Unconfirmed Owner Can Purge Entire Organization Vault","summary":"Unconfirmed Owner Can Purge Entire Organization Vault ## Summary An invited organization owner can purge the entire organization vault after reaching `Accepted` state, before any existing owner confirms them. This is a server-side authorization bypass in the org-invite confirmation flow: 1. accepting an invite moves the membership from `Invited` to `Accepted` 2. confirmation is a separate step that later upgrades `Accepted` to `Confirmed` 3. most privileged org routes correctly require `Confirmed` 4. `POST /api/ciphers/purge?organizationId=` does not; it only checks `member.atype == Owner` As a result, a not-yet-confirmed owner can hard-delete every cipher and attachment in the organization. ## Impact This is a destructive authorization bypass on organization-wide ownership privileges. A user who is intentionally still pending confirmation can: - purge the entire organization vault - hard-delete all organization ciphers - delete all attachments linked to those ciphers - cause immediate organization-wide data loss before the invite is confirmed This breaks the security boundary that the `Accepted -> Confirmed` step is supposed to enforce. ## Exploit Scenario Assume: - attacker controls an email address invited as an `Owner` into `Org A` - attacker is not yet confirmed by an existing owner - attacker has a normal authenticated session on their own account Steps: 1. Attacker accepts the org invite. Result: membership becomes `Accepted`, not `Confirmed`. 2. Before any owner confirms them, attacker calls: ```http POST /api/ciphers/purge?organizationId= Authorization: Bearer Content-Type: application/json { \"masterPasswordHash\": \"\", \"otp\": null } ``` Expected behavior: - request should be rejected because org-wide destructive owner actions should require a `Confirmed` owner Actual behavior: - server looks up the membership - server only checks `member.atype == Owner` - server deletes every cipher in the organization - each cipher delete also removes attachments, collection links, favorites, and related records ## Root Cause Invite acceptance is intentionally separate from confirmation: - `accept_org_invite()` transitions `Invited -> Accepted` - `_confirm_invite()` transitions `Accepted -> Confirmed` Privileged org guards reflect this design: - `OwnerHeaders` only accepts `is_confirmed_and_owner()` But the org purge endpoint bypasses those guards entirely: - it uses plain `Headers` - it loads the membership with `Membership::find_by_user_and_org()` - it authorizes solely on `member.atype == MembershipType::Owner` - it never checks `member.status == Confirmed` That means a pending owner receives full destructive owner power earlier than intended. ## Code References - Invite acceptance sets `Accepted`: - `src/api/core/mod.rs:263-279` - New-account setup also auto-runs invite acceptance: - `src/api/core/accounts.rs:375-3 Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.35.5","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-937x-3j8m-7w7p","published_at":"2026-04-25T20:49:36Z","updated_at":"2026-05-04T17:50:16Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224734Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.1,"epss":0.00267,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-43913","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-43913","GHSA-937X-3J8M-7W7P"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11374,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12057","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12057"}},{"id":12058,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-569v-845w-g82p / CVE-2026-43912: Cross-Org Group Binding Enables Unauthorized Read And Write Access Into Another Organization","summary":"Cross-Org Group Binding Enables Unauthorized Read And Write Access Into Another Organization\n\n## Summary\r\n\r\nVaultwarden does not enforce that:\r\n\r\n- a `groups_users.users_organizations_uuid` entry belongs to the same organization as `groups.groups_uuid`, or\r\n- a `collections_groups.collections_uuid` entry belongs to the same organization as `collections_groups.groups_uuid`.\r\n\r\nMultiple organization group-management endpoints accept arbitrary `MembershipId` and `CollectionId` values and persist them directly without verifying org consistency.\r\n\r\nSeparately, core collection/cipher access queries treat group relationships as authoritative based only on:\r\n\r\n- the current user's `users_organizations.uuid`, and\r\n- the linked `groups_users` / `collections_groups` rows,\r\n\r\nbut do not require the linked `groups.organizations_uuid` to match the organization currently being accessed.\r\n\r\nThis lets an attacker who is:\r\n\r\n- `Admin` in **Organization A**, and\r\n- only a low-privileged member in **Organization B**\r\n\r\nbind their **Org B membership UUID** into an **Org A group**, then use that foreign group relationship to gain unauthorized access to **Org B** vault data.\r\n\r\nWith an `accessAll=true` Org A group, the attacker can make `/api/sync` and `/api/ciphers` enumerate Org B ciphers. Once those unauthorized sync results reveal Org B collection IDs, the attacker can also bind those foreign collection IDs to the Org A group and turn the same flaw into write access over Org B items.\r\n\r\nThis is a real cross-org authorization flaw, not a config issue and not just an audit/UI integrity bug.\r\n\r\n\r\n## Affected Code\r\n\r\n### 1. Group management endpoints accept foreign member IDs and collection IDs without org validation\r\n\r\nGroup create/update forwards attacker-controlled `collections` and `users` directly into `add_update_group()`:\r\n\r\n- `src/api/core/organizations.rs:2458-2487`\r\n- `src/api/core/organizations.rs:2489-2525`\r\n\r\nInside `add_update_group()`:\r\n\r\n- each supplied `CollectionId` is persisted as `CollectionGroup` with no `find_by_uuid_and_org()` check\r\n- each supplied `MembershipId` is persisted as `GroupUser` with no `find_by_uuid_and_org()` check\r\n\r\nRelevant lines:\r\n\r\n- `src/api/core/organizations.rs:2528-2545`\r\n\r\nThe standalone member-replacement endpoint has the same problem:\r\n\r\n- `src/api/core/organizations.rs:2701-2738`\r\n\r\n### 2. The DB schema only enforces foreign keys, not same-org consistency\r\n\r\nThe group support migrations only require that:\r\n\r\n- `groups_users.groups_uuid` references some group\r\n- `groups_users.users_organizations_uuid` references some membership\r\n- `collections_groups.collections_uuid` references some collection\r\n- `collections_groups.groups_uuid` references some group\r\n\r\nBut there is no composite constraint enforcing that those rows belong to the same organization.\r\n\r\nExamples:\r\n\r\n- `migrations/postgresql/2022-07-27-110000_add_group_support/up.sql:11-23`\r\n- `migrations/sqlite/2022-07-27-110000_add_group_support/up.sql:11-23`\r\n- `migrations/mysql/2022-07-27-110000_add_group_support/up.sql:11-23`\r\n\r\n### 3. Cipher enumeration trust\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.35.5","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-569v-845w-g82p","published_at":"2026-04-25T20:49:32Z","updated_at":"2026-05-04T17:50:11Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224735Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.7,"epss":0.00289,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-43912","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-43912","GHSA-569V-845W-G82P"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-285","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11376,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12058","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12058"}},{"id":12059,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx / CVE-2026-43911: Refresh tokens not invalidated on security stamp rotation","summary":"Refresh tokens not invalidated on security stamp rotation ### Summary Refresh tokens are not invalidated when the user's `security_stamp` is rotated by some security-sensitive operations (password change, KDF change, key rotation, email change, org admin password reset, emergency access takeover). This allows an attacker holding a previously obtained refresh token to maintain session access even after the user has taken action to secure their account. ### Details #### How access tokens are validated When a client makes an API request with an access token, `Headers::from_request` in `src/auth.rs` (line ~626) checks that the `sstamp` claim embedded in the JWT matches the user's current `security_stamp` in the database. If they don't match, the request is rejected (unless a temporary stamp exception applies). This correctly invalidates access tokens after stamp rotation. #### How refresh tokens bypass the sstamp check The refresh token flow (`refresh_tokens` in `src/auth.rs`, line ~1205) works as follows: ```rust pub async fn refresh_tokens( ip: &ClientIp, refresh_token: &str, client_id: Option, conn: &DbConn, ) -> ApiResult<(Device, AuthTokens)> { let refresh_claims = decode_refresh(refresh_token)?; let mut device = Device::find_by_refresh_token(&refresh_claims.device_token, conn).await .ok_or(\"Invalid refresh token\")?; device.save(true, conn).await?; let user = User::find_by_uuid(&device.user_uuid, conn).await .ok_or(\"Impossible to find user\")?; // No security stamp validation here let auth_tokens = AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, refresh_claims.sub, client_id); Ok((device, auth_tokens)) } ``` The `RefreshJwtClaims` struct does not contain a `security_stamp` field: ```rust pub struct RefreshJwtClaims { pub nbf: i64, pub exp: i64, pub iss: String, pub sub: AuthMethod, pub device_token: String, pub token: Option, // No sstamp / security_stamp field } ``` Since the refresh flow only looks up the Device by `device_token` and never checks the security stamp, any refresh token issued before a stamp rotation remains valid as long as the Device record exists in the database. #### Comparison with upstream Bitwarden The upstream Bitwarden server (`bitwarden/server`) persists the `SecurityStamp` claim into the grant when issuing a refresh token. On every refresh, `ProfileService.IsActiveAsync` validates this: ```csharp // From bitwarden/server src/Identity/IdentityServer/ProfileService.cs public async Task IsActiveAsync(IsActiveContext context) { var securityTokenClaim = context.Subject?.Claims .FirstOrDefault(c => c.Type == Claims.SecurityStamp); var user = await _userService.GetUserByPrincipalAsync(context.Subject); if (user != null && securityTokenClaim != null) { context.IsActive = string.Equals( user.SecurityStamp, securityTokenClaim.Value, StringComparison Affected packages: rust:Vaultwarden Patched: Vaultwarden 1.35.5","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx","published_at":"2026-04-25T20:49:19Z","updated_at":"2026-05-04T17:50:06Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224736Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.8,"epss":0.00216,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"Vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-43911","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-43911","GHSA-6J4W-G4JH-XJFX"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-613","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11378,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12059","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12059"}},{"id":12061,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-x7g7-cgx5-jhx2 / CVE-2026-31835: Vaultwarden: WebAuthn assertion processed before signature verification allows persistent credential backup-flag tampering","summary":"Vaultwarden: WebAuthn assertion processed before signature verification allows persistent credential backup-flag tampering\n\n### Summary\r\nVaultwarden updates persistent WebAuthn credential metadata based on unverified authenticatorData before signature validation during the WebAuthn authentication flow.\r\n\r\nAn attacker who knows a user's password but cannot produce a valid WebAuthn signature can still permanently modify the stored backup_eligible and backup_state flags for that user's credential.\r\n\r\nThis can result in permanent denial of service of WebAuthn 2FA for affected credentials.\r\n\r\n### Details\r\nIn `validate_webauthn_login()`\r\n```\r\ncheck_and_update_backup_eligible(...);\r\nlet authentication_result =\r\n    WEBAUTHN.finish_passkey_authentication(...)?;\r\n```\r\n\r\n`check_and_update_backup_eligible()` parses `rsp.response.authenticator_data and` updates the stored WebAuthn registration before calling `finish_passkey_authentication()`\r\n\r\nThe function extracts the Backup Eligible (BE) and Backup State (BS) flags directly from the unverified authenticatorData and persists them to the database.\r\n\r\nHowever, `finish_passkey_authentication()` performs signature validation only afterward.\r\n\r\nIf signature verification fails, the database update is not rolled back.\r\n\r\n### PoC\r\n1. Use a normal user account with an existing WebAuthn credential already registered.\r\n2. Start a login that reaches the WebAuthn 2FA assertion step (so a login challenge state exists).\r\n3. Submit a WebAuthn assertion response where:\r\n  - .`rawId` matches one of the user’s registered credentials, and\r\n  - `response.authenticatorData[32]` (flags) is tampered to set BE=1 (and optionally toggle BS), but the signature is invalid (expected after tampering).\r\n 4. Observe: authentication fails, but the server updates the stored credential metadata (`backup_eligible`/`backup_state`) before signature verification and persists it.\r\n\r\n### Impact\r\nAn authenticated user can cause a persistent DB update of their WebAuthn credential’s `backup_eligible` / `backup_state` metadata based on an unverified assertion response (i.e., even when signature verification fails), because the DB write occurs prior to `finish_passkey_authentication()`.\r\n\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.35.5","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-x7g7-cgx5-jhx2","published_at":"2026-04-25T20:48:06Z","updated_at":"2026-04-25T20:48:06Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224738Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.3,"epss":0.00151,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-31835","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-31835","GHSA-X7G7-CGX5-JHX2"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-345","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11380,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12061","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12061"}},{"id":12712,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[New release] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.8","summary":"## What's Changed\r\n* Dummy org Master password policy auth fix by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7097\r\n* Fix recovery-code not working by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7102\r\n* Fix invalid refresh token response by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7105\r\n* Update Rust, Crates, GHA and fix a DNS issue by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7108\r\n* Update web-vault and crates by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7121\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.7...1.35.8","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.8","published_at":"2026-04-25T18:08:50Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135283Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12712","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12712"}},{"id":12713,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[New release] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.7","summary":"## What's Changed\r\n* Fix 2FA for Android by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7093\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.6...1.35.7","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.7","published_at":"2026-04-13T21:51:32Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135284Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12713","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12713"}},{"id":12714,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[New release] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.6","summary":"## Notes\r\nThe previous release contained an issue where Two Factor Remember Tokens and Recovery Tokens were not accepted at all.\r\nThis has been fixed now in this release.\r\n\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* Fix MFA Remember by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7085\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.5...1.35.6","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.6","published_at":"2026-04-12T19:28:35Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135284Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12714","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12714"}},{"id":12715,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.5","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-937x-3j8m-7w7p, GHSA-569v-845w-g82p, GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx, GHSA-jjxg-p3v6-52ww, GHSA-x7g7-cgx5-jhx2\n\nSecurity keywords: security, GHSA-937X-3J8M-7W7P, GHSA-569V-845W-G82P, GHSA-6J4W-G4JH-XJFX\n\n## Security Fixes\r\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advice to update as soon as possible.\r\n- [GHSA-937x-3j8m-7w7p](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-937x-3j8m-7w7p) Unconfirmed Owner Can Purge Entire Organization Vault.\r\n- [GHSA-569v-845w-g82p](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-569v-845w-g82p) Cross-Org Group Binding Enables Unauthorized Read And Write Access Into Another Organization\r\n- [GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx) Refresh tokens not invalidated on security stamp rotation\r\n\r\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment.\r\n\r\n## Notes\r\n- The admin templates have changed, please update them if you override these via templates.\r\n- Two Factor Remember Tokens are now valid for max 30 days. Old tokens are invalid directly after upgrading.\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* apply policies only to confirmed members by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6892\r\n* Feat(config): add feature flag for Safari account switching by @DerPlayer2001 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6891\r\n* fix: add ForcePasswordReset to api key login by @montdidier in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6904\r\n* Add Webauthn related origins flag to known flags. by @pasarenicu in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6900\r\n* Add 30s cache to SSO exchange_refresh_token by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6866\r\n* Add cxp-import-mobile and cxp-export-mobile: feature flags on mobile by @phoeagon in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6853\r\n* Misc updates and fixes by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6910\r\n* Support new desktop origin on CORS by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6920\r\n* Fix `checkout` action version by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6921\r\n* Fix apikey login by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6922\r\n* Fix email header base64 padding by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6961\r\n* Update Feature Flags by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6981\r\n* Update crates and GHA by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6980\r\n* Use protected CI environment by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7004\r\n* Fix 2FA Remember to actually be 30 days by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6929\r\n* Misc Updates by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7027\r\n* Switch to `attest` action by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7017\r\n* Rotate refresh-tokens on sstamp reset by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7031\r\n* Misc org fixes by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7032\r\n* Fix empty string FolderId by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7048\r\n* Disable deployments for release env by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7033\r\n* Fix Send icons by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7051\r\n* prevent managers from creating collections by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6890\r\n* Change SQLite backup to use VACUUM INTO query by @getaaron in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6989\r\n* Handle `SIGTERM` and `SIGQUIT` shutdown signals. by @0x484558 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7008\r\n* Do not display unavailable 2FA options by @0x484558 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7013\r\n* Fix logout push identifiers and send logout before clearing devices by @qaz741wsd856 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7047\r\n* Fix windows build issues by @idontneedonetho in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7065\r\n* Crat","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.5","published_at":"2026-04-12T15:59:21Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135285Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.7,"epss":0.00289,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-43913","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-31835","CVE-2026-33420","CVE-2026-43911","CVE-2026-43912","CVE-2026-43913","GHSA-569V-845W-G82P","GHSA-6J4W-G4JH-XJFX","GHSA-937X-3J8M-7W7P","GHSA-JJXG-P3V6-52WW","GHSA-X7G7-CGX5-JHX2"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11374,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12715","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12715"}},{"id":12062,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh / CVE-2026-27898: Unauthorized Access via Partial Update API on Another User’s Cipher","summary":"Unauthorized Access via Partial Update API on Another User’s Cipher **Summary** An authenticated regular user can specify another user’s `cipher_id` and call the following API: ``` PUT /api/ciphers/{id}/partial ``` Although the standard retrieval API correctly denies access to the target cipher, this **partial update endpoint** returns **200 OK** and includes information such as `cipherDetails` (`name`, `notes`, `data`, `secureNote`, etc.) in the response. --- **Impact** * Retrieval of another user's **encrypted cipher information** * Creation of **unauthorized associations** within the attacker's user context (e.g., favorite or folder operations) In addition, the response from `/api/ciphers//partial` contains `attachments[].url`. For **filesystem (FS) deployments**, the following **tokenized endpoint** is returned: ``` /attachments//?token=... ``` For **object storage deployments**, a **short-lived pre-signed URL** is returned. As a result, an attacker can use these URLs to **directly download attachment data that they are not authorized to access**. Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.35.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh","published_at":"2026-03-04T18:57:27Z","updated_at":"2026-03-05T12:54:25Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224738Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.4,"epss":0.0019,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-27898","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-27898","GHSA-W9F8-M526-H7FH"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-639","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11382,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12062","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12062"}},{"id":12704,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-v6pg-v89r-w8wr / CVE-2026-27801: 2FA Bypass on Protected Actions due to Faulty Rate Limit Enforcement","summary":"2FA Bypass on Protected Actions due to Faulty Rate Limit Enforcement ### Summary Vaultwarden v1.34.3 and prior are susceptible to a 2FA bypass when performing protected actions. An attacker who gains authenticated access to a user’s account can exploit this bypass to perform protected actions such as accessing the user’s API key or deleting the user’s vault and organisations the user is an admin/owner of. Note that ### Details Within Vaultwarden, the `PasswordOrOtpData` struct is used to gate certain protected actions such as account deletion behind a 2FA validation. This validation requires the user to either re-enter their master password, or to enter a one-time passcode sent to their email address. By default, the one-time passcode is comprised of six digits, and the expiry time for each token is ten minutes. The validation of this one-time passcode is performed by the following function: ```rust pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp( otp: &str, user_id: &UserId, delete_if_valid: bool, conn: &mut DbConn, ) -> EmptyResult { let pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn) .await .map_res(\"Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process\")?; let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?; pa_data.add_attempt(); // Delete the token after x attempts if it has been used too many times // We use the 6, which should be more then enough for invalid attempts and multiple valid checks if pa_data.attempts > 6 { pa.delete(conn).await?; err!(\"Token has expired\") } // Check if the token has expired (Using the email 2fa expiration time) let date = DateTime::from_timestamp(pa_data.token_sent, 0).expect(\"Protected Action token timestamp invalid.\").naive_utc(); let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time() as i64; if date + TimeDelta::try_seconds(max_time).unwrap() < Utc::now().naive_utc() { pa.delete(conn).await?; err!(\"Token has expired\") } if !crypto::ct_eq(&pa_data.token, otp) { pa.save(conn).await?; err!(\"Token is invalid\") } if delete_if_valid { pa.delete(conn).await?; } Ok(()) } ``` Since the one-time passcode is only six-digits long, it has significantly less entropy than a typical password or secret key. Hence, Vaultwarden attempts to prevent brute-force attacks against this passcode by enforcing a rate limit of 6 attempts per code. However, the number of attempts made by the user is not persisted correctly. In the `validate_protected_action_top` function, Vaultwarden first reads the OTP data from a JSON blob stored in `pa.data`. The resulting `ProtectedActionData` structure is then a deserialised copy of the underlying JSON value. ```rust let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?; ``` Next, Vaultwarden calls `pa_data.add_attempt()` in order to i Affected packages: :Vaultwarden Patched: Vaultwarden 1.35.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-v6pg-v89r-w8wr","published_at":"2026-03-04T18:57:19Z","updated_at":"2026-03-04T18:57:19Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135269Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.0,"epss":0.00287,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"Vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-27801","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-27801","GHSA-V6PG-V89R-W8WR"],"tags":["repo-advisory","CWE-307","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11802,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12704","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12704"}},{"id":12703,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-r32r-j5jq-3w4m / CVE-2026-27802: Privilege Escalation via Bulk Permission Update to Unauthorized Collections by Manager","summary":"Privilege Escalation via Bulk Permission Update to Unauthorized Collections by Manager\n\n## Summary\r\n\r\nA Manager account (`access_all=false`) was able to escalate privileges by directly invoking the **bulk-access API** against collections that were not originally assigned to them.\r\nThe API allowed changing `assigned=false` to `assigned=true`, resulting in unauthorized access.\r\n\r\nAdditionally, prior to the bulk-access call, the regular single-update API correctly returned **401 Unauthorized** for the same collection. After executing the bulk-access API, the same update API returned **200 OK**, confirming an authorization gap at the HTTP level.\r\n\r\n---\r\n\r\n## Potential Impact\r\n\r\n* **Confidentiality:** Unauthorized access to sensitive information within restricted collections.\r\n* **Integrity:** Unauthorized modification of collection permission settings and arbitrary changes to access controls.\r\n* **Availability:** Deletion of existing assignments may cause legitimate users to lose access.\r\n\n\nAffected packages: rust:vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.35.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-r32r-j5jq-3w4m","published_at":"2026-03-04T18:57:11Z","updated_at":"2026-03-05T12:46:03Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135263Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.3,"epss":0.00333,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-27802","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-27802","GHSA-R32R-J5JQ-3W4M"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-269","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11800,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12703","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12703"}},{"id":12063,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27 / CVE-2026-27803: Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role","summary":"Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role ## Summary Testing confirmed that even when a Manager has `manage=false` for a given collection, they can still perform the following management operations as long as they have access to the collection: * `PUT /api/organizations//collections/` succeeds (HTTP 200) * `PUT /api/organizations//collections//users` succeeds (HTTP 200) * `DELETE /api/organizations//collections/` succeeds (HTTP 200) ## Potential Impact * **Confidentiality:** Expansion of access scope through unauthorized privilege escalation and configuration changes. * **Integrity:** Unauthorized modification of collection settings and assignments; potential disabling of access controls. * **Availability:** Deletion of collections may disrupt business operations. Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.35.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27","published_at":"2026-03-04T18:56:56Z","updated_at":"2026-03-05T12:47:32Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224739Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.3,"epss":0.00333,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-27803","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-27803","GHSA-H4HQ-RGVH-WH27"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-269","CWE-285","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11384,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12063","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12063"}},{"id":12716,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.4","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-c5rv-q295-7w4g, GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh, GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27, GHSA-r32r-j5jq-3w4m\n\nSecurity keywords: security, GHSA-W9F8-M526-H7FH, vulnerability, GHSA-H4HQ-RGVH-WH27, GHSA-R32R-J5JQ-3W4M\n\n## Security Fixes\r\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advice to update as soon as possible.\r\n- [GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh). This vulnerability would allow an attacker to access a cipher from a different user (fully encrypted) if they already know its internal UUID.\r\n- [GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27). This vulnerability allows an attacker with manager-level access within an organization to modify collections they can access, even if they do not have management permissions for them.\r\n- [GHSA-r32r-j5jq-3w4m](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-r32r-j5jq-3w4m). This vulnerability allows an attacker with manager-level access within an organization to modify collections they are not assigned.\r\n\r\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment.\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* Update Rust and Crates and GHA by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6843\r\n* hide remember 2fa token by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6852\r\n* fix(send_invite): invite links by @proofofcopilot in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6824\r\n* Misc organization fixes by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6867\r\n\r\n## New Contributors\r\n* @proofofcopilot made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6824\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.3...1.35.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.4","published_at":"2026-02-23T21:43:25Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135286Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.3,"epss":0.00333,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-27898","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-27802","CVE-2026-27803","CVE-2026-27898","CVE-2026-43914","GHSA-C5RV-Q295-7W4G","GHSA-H4HQ-RGVH-WH27","GHSA-R32R-J5JQ-3W4M","GHSA-W9F8-M526-H7FH"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11382,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12716","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12716"}},{"id":12705,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-h265-g7rm-h337 / CVE-2026-26012: Full Cipher Enumeration Ignoring Organization Collection Permissions","summary":"Full Cipher Enumeration Ignoring Organization Collection Permissions\n\nA regular organization member can retrieve **all ciphers within an organization**, regardless of collection permissions.\r\nThe endpoint `/ciphers/organization-details` is accessible to any organization member and internally uses `Cipher::find_by_org` to retrieve all ciphers. These ciphers are returned with `CipherSyncType::Organization` **without enforcing collection-level access control**.\r\n\r\n## Attack Preconditions\r\n\r\n* The attacker is a member of the target organization (User, Manager, Admin, or Owner).\r\n* The organization contains one or more collections to which the attacker does **not** have access.\r\n\r\n## Attack Scenario\r\n\r\n1. The attacker (a regular organization member) joins the organization.\r\n2. The attacker calls `/ciphers/organization-details` for the organization, including collections they do not have permission to access.\r\n3. The response contains **all ciphers in the organization**, ignoring collection restrictions, allowing the attacker to obtain other members’ data (encrypted cipher data, keys, and attachment metadata).\r\n\r\n## Potential Impact\r\n\r\n* Collection-based access separation within the organization is bypassed, significantly reducing data confidentiality.\r\n* Access to encrypted cipher data, keys, and attachment metadata may directly lead to data disclosure if client-side decryption is possible.\r\n\n\nAffected packages: :vaultwarden\nPatched: vaultwarden 1.35.3","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-h265-g7rm-h337","published_at":"2026-02-11T20:56:42Z","updated_at":"2026-02-12T02:10:27Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135271Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.5,"epss":0.00467,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-26012","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-26012","GHSA-H265-G7RM-H337"],"tags":["repo-advisory","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11804,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12705","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12705"}},{"id":12717,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.3","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-h265-g7rm-h337\n\nSecurity keywords: security, GHSA-H265-G7RM-H337, vulnerability\n\n## Security Fixes\r\n\r\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisory. We strongly advice to update as soon as possible if you believe it could affect you.\r\n- [GHSA-h265-g7rm-h337](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-h265-g7rm-h337) (Publication in process, waiting for CVE assignment)\r\n  This vulnerability would allow an authenticated attacker that is part of an organization to access items from collections to which the attacker does not belong.\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* Fix User API Key login by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6712\r\n* use email instead of empty name for webauhn by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6733\r\n* hide password hints via CSS by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6726\r\n* fix email as 2fa with auth requests by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6736\r\n* Update crates, web-vault, js, workflows by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6749\r\n* refactor: improve tooltips in diagnostics page by @tessus in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6765\r\n* Empty AccountKeys when no private key by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6761\r\n* fix error message for purging auth requests by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6776\r\n* Misc updates, crates, rust, js, gha, vault by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6799\r\n* Update crates and web-vault by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6810\r\n* Fix org-details issue by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6811\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.2...1.35.3","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.3","published_at":"2026-02-10T20:37:03Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135287Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.5,"epss":0.00467,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-26012","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-26012","GHSA-H265-G7RM-H337"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11804,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12717","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12717"}},{"id":12718,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[New release] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.2","summary":"## Notable changes\r\n\r\nFixed an issue with the web-vault which prevent creating an organization.\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* update web-vault to fix org creation by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6646\r\n* return no content with status code 204 by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6665\r\n* allow MasterPasswordHash for Android by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6673\r\n* improve sso callback path by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6676\r\n* Fix web-vault version check and update web-vault by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6686\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.1...1.35.2","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.2","published_at":"2026-01-09T18:37:04Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135287Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12718","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12718"}},{"id":12719,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[New release] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.1","summary":"## Notable changes\r\n- Fixed issue with applications being logged out after upgrading due to changes to refresh token parsing\r\n- Updated web vault to 2025.12.1\r\n- Correctly publish `alpine` tag, which was missing in 1.35.0\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* Update lockfile by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6600\r\n* Re-add `alpine` tag by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6626\r\n* Misc updates by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6627\r\n* Try old refresh token if we fail to decode jwt by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6629\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.0...1.35.1","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.1","published_at":"2025-12-30T14:21:05Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135288Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12719","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12719"}},{"id":12720,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.0","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-v6pg-v89r-w8wr\n\nSecurity keywords: security\n\n## Notable changes\r\n- Implemented support for SSO with OpenID Connect, https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect\r\n- Updated web vault to 2025.12.0\r\n- Added support for future mobile apps with versions 2026.1.0+\r\n- This is the first vaultwarden release using [immutable releases](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/supply-chain-security/understanding-your-software-supply-chain/immutable-releases) and release attestation!\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* Fix multi delete slowdown by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6144\r\n* Perform same checks when setting kdf by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6141\r\n* SSO using OpenID Connect by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/3899\r\n* Delete SSO.md by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6152\r\n* Update webauthn-rs to 0.5.x by @zUnixorn in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/5934\r\n* a little cleanup after SSO merge by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6153\r\n* Fix link to point to the wiki by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6157\r\n* Fix Email 2FA for mobile apps by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6156\r\n* Update Rust to 1.89.0 by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6150\r\n* Fix several more multi select push issues by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6151\r\n* Fix minor typo by @ncguk in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6165\r\n* Update crates, fixes some yanked crates by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6167\r\n* Fix WebauthN issue with Software Keys by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6168\r\n* Fix Playwright test conf and update deps by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6176\r\n* Misc updates by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6185\r\n* fix typo in description of helo_name by @Flottegurke in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6194\r\n* Fix Playwright by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6206\r\n* Switch to GHA's concurrency control by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6164\r\n* Make database connection pool dynamic by @Samoth69 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6166\r\n* Re-add `if` check to release workflow by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6227\r\n* Fix Webauthn/Passkey 2FA migration/validation issues by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6190\r\n* refactor(config): update template, add validation by @tessus in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6229\r\n* Show SSO_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_EMAIL_VERIFICATION in admin by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6235\r\n* Update crates, gha and web-vault by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6234\r\n* Fix panic around sso_master_password_policy by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6233\r\n* make webauthn more optional by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6160\r\n* Fix 2fa recovery endpoint by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6240\r\n* update trivy-action to v0.33.0 by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6248\r\n* update web vault to v2025.9.1 and allow new policy by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6340\r\n* prevent changing collections when hide_passwords is true by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6278\r\n* Fix `sso_user` dropped on `User::save` by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6262\r\n* Change OIDC dummy identifier by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6263\r\n* add new billing warnings endpoint by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6369\r\n* Add auth_r","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.0","published_at":"2025-12-27T23:07:12Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135289Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.0,"epss":0.00287,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-27801","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-27801","GHSA-V6PG-V89R-W8WR"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11802,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12720","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12720"}},{"id":12721,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[New release] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.34.3","summary":"## Notable changes\r\nThis release should fix an issue with MySQL/MariaDB database connections when using the Alpine images.\r\nThe alpine build image has reverted to use MariaDB Connector/C v3.4.5 which resolved the issue.\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* Update crates to trigger rebuild for mysql issue by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6111\r\n* fix hiding of signup link by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6113\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.34.2...1.34.3","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.34.3","published_at":"2025-07-30T09:10:59Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135290Z","severity":"unknown","cvss_score":null,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":null,"vuln_ids":[],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":null,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12721","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12721"}}],"total":67,"has_more":true,"next_cursor":"MjAyNS0wNy0zMFQwOToxMDo1OS4wMDAwMDB8MTI3MjE","limit":50,"page":1,"grouped":false,"filter":{"builds":"exclude","source":"gh-vaultwarden"}}