{"items":[{"id":2279,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-25qc-m4pw-2w8r / CVE-2026-122247: Budibase: Unauthenticated global-admin & database creation via tenant-confusion bypass of the one-time init guard (`POST /api/global/users/init`)","summary":"Budibase: Unauthenticated global-admin & database creation via tenant-confusion bypass of the one-time init guard (`POST /api/global/users/init`)\n\n## Description\n\n### Summary\n\nOn a self-hosted, single-tenant Budibase instance (`multiTenancy:false`), the public bootstrap endpoint `POST /api/global/users/init` remains fully exploitable **after** the instance has been provisioned. Its \"already initialised\" guard (`checkAnyUserExists()`) is evaluated inside a **tenant-scoped** database context derived from an **attacker-controlled `tenantId`** in the request body. Because the tenancy layer never constrains that `tenantId` to the only legitimate tenant (`default`) on a single-tenant deployment, an unauthenticated attacker simply supplies any unused tenant name to make the guard see an empty user list, and the endpoint then creates a brand-new CouchDB database (`\n_global-db`) and a **global-admin** user document (`admin.global = true`, `builder.global = true`) inside it - with no authentication and no CSRF token.\n\nThis is (a) a bypass of the security control meant to permanently close first-run setup, and (b) an unauthenticated, persistent write primitive that lets an anonymous attacker create an unbounded number of databases and admin-user documents - a resource-exhaustion / denial-of-service vector against the CouchDB datastore, plus creation of latent rogue admin accounts.\n\n### Details\n\nRoot cause chain (source, tag v3.44.0):\n\n1. `packages/worker/src/api/index.ts:41` - `POST /api/global/users/init` is in `PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS`, so `auth.buildAuthMiddleware(PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS)` marks it `publicEndpoint` and the \"no public access to worker\" gate (`api/index.ts:159-165`) lets it through **without any session**. It is also in `NO_TENANCY_ENDPOINTS` (`api/index.ts:83`), so the tenancy middleware does **not** pin the request to `default` - the tenant is taken verbatim from the request body - and in `NO_CSRF_ENDPOINTS`.\n2. `packages/worker/src/middleware/cloudRestricted.ts:10,25` - the `cloudRestricted` guard only enforces the internal API key when `!env.SELF_HOSTED && !env.DISABLE_ACCOUNT_PORTAL`. On a self-hosted instance (`SELF_HOSTED=true`) it is a **no-op** (`return next()`), so `cloudRestrictedRoutes` provides no protection here.\n3. `packages/worker/src/api/routes/global/users.ts:69-79` - `cloudRestrictedRoutes.post(\"/api/global/users/init\", … controller.adminUser)`.\n4. `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:232` - the handler runs `await tenancy.doInTenant(tenantId, …)` using the **attacker-supplied** `tenantId`.\n5. `packages/worker/src/api/controllers/global/users.ts:238` - the only guard, `const userExists = await checkAnyUserExists()`, throws 403 only if a user exists **in the current tenant context**.\n6. `packages/worker/src/utilities/users.ts:3-15` - `checkAnyUserExists()` calls `tenancy.getGlobalDB()`, which resolves to `\n_global-db`. For any unused `tenantId` this DB is empty → the guard passes → `userSdk.db.createAdminUser(email, tenantId, …)` (`users.ts:247`) creates a full global admin.\n\nThe defect is **incorrect authorization scoping**: the single-tenant de\n\nAffected packages: npm:@budibase/server","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-25qc-m4pw-2w8r","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:50:01Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:50:04Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416716Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.2,"epss":0.00838,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"@budibase/server","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-122247","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-122247","GHSA-25QC-M4PW-2W8R"],"tags":["ghsa","npm","CWE-284","CWE-306","CWE-770","CWE-863"],"cluster_id":1974,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2279","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2279"}},{"id":2280,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-r2q3-7m4h-63qg / CVE-2026-122244: Budibase: Cross-privilege Stored XSS in the Budibase Builder via broken HTML-escaping in `jsonFormatter.format()` rendered through `{@html}` in the CSP-less Builder origin","summary":"Budibase: Cross-privilege Stored XSS in the Budibase Builder via broken HTML-escaping in `jsonFormatter.format()` rendered through `{@html}` in the CSP-less Builder origin\n\n## Description\n\n### Summary\n\nA **low-privileged application end-user** (role `BASIC` - **not** a builder or admin, and on a public data-collection form, an unauthenticated visitor) can store an HTML/JavaScript payload in ordinary row data. When a **builder or admin** later opens that table in the Budibase Builder and evaluates any Handlebars binding whose Preview surfaces the value (the Data-section **Formula** column editor, or any binding drawer), the stored value is rendered as **raw HTML** and the attacker's JavaScript executes in the Builder's origin.\n\nThe Builder SPA is served by nginx with **no Content-Security-Policy** (the CSP middleware only decorates the server-rendered *published-app* document, not `/builder/`). The injected script therefore runs unrestricted in the highest-trust surface of the product - the admin/builder session that can create datasources, run server-side JavaScript via automations, read and modify every table, and manage users. This is a **cross-privilege stored XSS** (app end-user → builder/admin), i.e. full workspace takeover, not self-XSS.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 - the escaper is a no-op.**\n`packages/frontend-core/src/utils/jsonFormatter.ts` (`format()`):\n\n```js\njsonString = jsonString\n.replace(/&/g, \"&\") // no-op: replaces \"&\" with \"&\" (should be \"&\")\n.replace(//g, \">\") // no-op (should be \">\")\n\nreturn jsonString.replace(\n/(\"(\\\\u[a-zA-Z0-9]{4}|\\\\[^u]|[^\\\\\"])*\"(\\s*:)?|\\b(true|false|null)\\b|-?\\d+...)/g,\n(match) => {\nif (/^\"/.test(match)) {\nif (/:$/.test(match)) { color = colors.keyColor } // KEY: NOT escaped\nelse { match = '\"' + escapeHtml(match.substr(1, match.length - 2)) + '\"' } // string VALUE: escaped\n}\nreturn `\n${match}\n`\n})\n```\n\nOnly quoted JSON *string values* are passed through `escapeHtml`. Everything else is emitted verbatim, because the leading `.replace(/&/g,\"&\")…` chain replaces each character with itself. Two consequences:\n\n1. A **raw, non-JSON string** (the normal result of a Handlebars binding that resolves to a plain text field value) matches none of the regex tokens and is returned **completely un-escaped**.\n2. **Object keys** are never escaped.\n\n**Root cause 2 - the output is injected with `{@html}`.**\n`packages/builder/src/components/common/bindings/EvaluationSidePanel.svelte`:\n\n- line 116: `{@html logLine.log}`\n- line 128: `{@html highlightedResult}`\n\n`highlightedResult` is the output of `JsonFormatter.format()`, so the un-escaped attacker string is inserted into the DOM as live markup.\n\n**Root cause 3 - binding output is not entity-escaped upstream.**\nEvery `{{ … }}` statement is wrapped by the `ALL` helper in `packages/string-templates/src/helpers/index.ts`, which returns a `Handlebars.SafeString`; Handlebars therefore performs no HTML escaping, and the raw field value reaches the formatter/`{\n\nAffected packages: npm:@budibase/server","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r2q3-7m4h-63qg","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:49:47Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:49:49Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416717Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.7,"epss":0.00678,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"@budibase/server","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-122244","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-122244","GHSA-R2Q3-7M4H-63QG"],"tags":["ghsa","npm","CWE-79","CWE-116","CWE-1021"],"cluster_id":1976,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2280","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2280"}},{"id":2281,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-53pm-wgxf-c6qf / CVE-2026-132276: wcmatch: Polynomial-time ReDoS when matching untrusted names against multi-star patterns (default flags)","summary":"wcmatch: Polynomial-time ReDoS when matching untrusted names against multi-star patterns (default flags)\n\n# Summary\n\nWith default flags, a pattern that contains several `*` wildcards takes polynomial time, O(n^k) for k stars, to reject a crafted file name. The pattern is an ordinary developer constant such as `*_*_*_*_*.csv`; only the string being matched comes from the attacker. A 255-byte file name (the maximum on common filesystems) takes 73 s with `fnmatch.fnmatch()` and 86 s with `glob.globmatch()`. The standard library's `fnmatch` handles the same input in under a millisecond.\n\nThis is different from GHSA-84v8-qmgq-9g88: that advisory covers extglob patterns, while this case needs no flags and no attacker-controlled pattern.\n\n# Details\n\nEvery `*` is translated to a lazy `.*?` (`_STAR`, `wcmatch/_wcparse.py:212`; `_PATH_STAR` `[^/]*?`, `:218`), which is emitted in `_handle_star` (`:1405-1424`):\n\n```text\n*_*_*_*_*.csv  ->  ^(?s:(?=.)(?![.]).*?_.*?_.*?_.*?_.*?\\.csv)$\n```\n\nWhen the subject consists of many `_` and does not end in `.csv`, the regex engine tries every way of splitting it between the stars. CPython fixed the same problem in its own `fnmatch` (bpo-40480) by making every star segment except the last one atomic.\n\n# PoC\n\n```python\nimport time, fnmatch as std\nfrom wcmatch import fnmatch, glob\n\nfor pat, n in [('*_*_*_*.csv', 255), ('*_*_*_*.csv', 400), ('*_*_*_*_*.csv', 150),\n               ('*_*_*_*_*.csv', 200), ('*_*_*_*_*.csv', 255)]:\n    name = '_' * n\n    t = time.perf_counter(); fnmatch.fnmatch(name, pat); w = time.perf_counter() - t\n    t = time.perf_counter(); std.fnmatchcase(name, pat); s = time.perf_counter() - t\n    print(f'{pat:15} len={n}  wcmatch={w:.3f}s  stdlib={s:.5f}s')\n\nt = time.perf_counter(); glob.globmatch('uploads/' + '_' * 255, 'uploads/*_*_*_*_*.csv')\nprint(f'globmatch {time.perf_counter() - t:.2f}s')\n```\n\nwcmatch 11.1, CPython 3.13, macOS:\n\n```text\n*_*_*_*.csv     len=255  wcmatch=1.412s   stdlib=0.00001s\n*_*_*_*.csv     len=400  wcmatch=8.599s   stdlib=0.00004s\n*_*_*_*_*.csv   len=150  wcmatch=5.333s   stdlib=0.00003s\n*_*_*_*_*.csv   len=200  wcmatch=22.415s  stdlib=0.00007s\n*_*_*_*_*.csv   len=255  wcmatch=72.732s  stdlib=0.00047s\nglobmatch 85.75s\n```\n\n`glob.glob('*_*_*_*.csv', root_dir=d)` on a real directory that contains one file named `'_' * 255` takes 1.7 s.\n\n# Impact\n\nApplications that match untrusted names against multi-star patterns can be blocked on a single CPU core for minutes per name. Examples: upload handlers, archive or object-store key filters, and `glob`/`WcMatch` scans of directories where other users can create files. No authentication is needed.\n\n# Fix\n\nEmit every star segment except the last one as an atomic group, as the standard library does. On Python 3.11 and later use `(?>.*?_)`; on 3.10 use the lookahead/backreference form from `fnmatch._join_translated_parts`. For example:\n\n```text\n^(?s:(?=.)(?![.])(?>.*?_)(?>.*?_)(?>.*?_)(?>.*?_).*?\\.csv)$\n```\n\nThis rejects the 255-byte name in under 1 ms. On my spot-check inputs it gives the same results as the current regex. The same change applies\n\nAffected packages: pip:wcmatch\nPatched: wcmatch 11.2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-53pm-wgxf-c6qf","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:49:18Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:49:19Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416718Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.9,"epss":0.00881,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"wcmatch","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-132276","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-132276","GHSA-53PM-WGXF-C6QF","GHSA-84V8-QMGQ-9G88"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-1333"],"cluster_id":1978,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2281","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2281"}},{"id":2282,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-q87h-c5m7-659j / CVE-2026-132277: Inscriptis: Quadratic memory growth from sibling <table> elements in get_text()","summary":"Inscriptis: Quadratic memory growth from sibling elements in get_text()\n\n# Summary\n\nEvery sibling `\n` adds another level of the parent's indentation, so the size of `get_text()` output grows quadratically with the number of tables. In the measurements below, a 240 KB HTML document produces about 1 billion characters and uses about 1 GB of memory.\n\n# Details\n\n`table_end_handler()` (`model/tag/table_tag.py`) writes the rendered table into the parent element with `HtmlElement.write_verbatim_text()` (`model/html_element.py`). For a block-level parent, `write_verbatim_text()` calls `canvas.open_block()`, which pushes the parent's `padding_inline` onto the prefix stack. The following `close_block()` never pops it; only `Canvas.close_tag()` calls `prefix.remove_last_prefix()`. So each table leaves one extra padding entry on the stack.\n\nThis has been present since 2.0 (commit 84ec720).\n\n```python\n>>> get_text('\n' + '\na\n' * 4 + '')\n' a\\n \\n a\\n \\n a\\n \\n a\\n '\n```\n\n# PoC\n\n```python\nimport sys, time, resource\nfrom inscriptis import get_text\n\nn = int(sys.argv[1])\nhtml = \"\n\" + \"\n\" * n + \"\n\"\nt = time.time(); out = get_text(html)\nprint(len(html), f\"{time.time()-t:.2f}s\", len(out), resource.getrusage(resource.RUSAGE_SELF).ru_maxrss // 2**20, \"MiB\")\n```\n\ninscriptis 2.7.5, Python 3.11, macOS (2.0.0 behaves the same):\n\n| tables | HTML | time | output chars | peak RSS |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1,000 | 15 KB | 0.02 s | 4.0 M | 31 MiB |\n| 4,000 | 60 KB | 0.33 s | 64 M | 154 MiB |\n| 8,000 | 120 KB | 1.31 s | 256 M | 463 MiB |\n| 16,000 | 240 KB | 5.63 s | 1,024 M | 991 MiB |\n\nWhen the input doubles, output size and memory grow about 4 times.\n\n# Impact\n\nAny application that converts untrusted HTML with inscriptis can be made to exhaust memory with a small document. This includes crawlers, RAG and LLM ingestion pipelines, and `inscriptis-api`. No authentication and no user interaction are needed.\n\n# Fix\n\n```diff\nself.canvas.write(self, text, whitespace=WhiteSpace.pre)\n\nif self.display == Display.block:\n+ self.canvas.current_block.prefix.remove_last_prefix()\nself.canvas.close_block(self)\n```\n\nWith this change the 240 KB input above produces 288 K characters in 0.14 s with 27 MiB peak RSS. A single table renders exactly as before, and the existing test suite passes.\n\nAffected packages: pip:inscriptis\nPatched: inscriptis 2.7.6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q87h-c5m7-659j","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:48:51Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:48:53Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416719Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":0.00913,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"inscriptis","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-132277","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-132277","GHSA-Q87H-C5M7-659J"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-400","CWE-407"],"cluster_id":1981,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2282","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2282"}},{"id":2283,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-555j-qj3j-c8jv / CVE-2026-132275: svglib: Exponential resource consumption via nested <use> references in svg2rlg","summary":"svglib: Exponential resource consumption via nested\nreferences in svg2rlg\n\n# Summary\n\n`svg2rlg()` expands `\n` references without any limit on the total number of expansions. Only direct cycles are rejected (`CircularRefError`). A group containing N `\n` elements that point to another such group multiplies the work by N per nesting level, so an SVG of about 1.4 KB makes svglib clone and render over 100,000 nodes, taking tens of seconds of CPU time and hundreds of MiB of memory. Each additional level adds about 245 bytes to the document and multiplies time by ~10.\n\nThis is the SVG `\n` variant of the XML \"billion laughs\" attack (the same class as librsvg CVE-2019-20446).\n\n# Details\n\n`SvgRenderer.renderUse()` in `src/svglib/svglib.py`:\n\n```python\ntry:\nitem = self.xlink_href_target(node, group=group)\nexcept CircularRefError:\nnode.parent.etree_element.remove(node.etree_element)\nreturn group\n...\nif len(node.getchildren()) == 0:\n# Append a copy of the referenced node as the\nchild (if not\n# already done)\nnode.append(copy.deepcopy(item))\nself.renderNode(list(node.iter_children())[-1], parent=group)\n```\n\nThe referenced node is deep-copied under the `\n` element and rendered. Any `\n` elements inside the copied subtree go through `renderUse()` again. `xlink_href_target()` raises `CircularRefError` only for a direct cycle, so a reference DAG with fan-out is expanded fully: `fan ** levels` renders.\n\nPayload shape (fan = 10, levels = 5):\n\n```xml\n\n... 10 times ...\n\n... 10 times ...\n\n...\n\n... 10 times ...\n\n```\n\n# Impact\n\nDenial of service (CPU and memory exhaustion) for any application that renders SVG from an untrusted source with svglib: thumbnail/preview generation, SVG-to-PDF conversion, report generation. Only the SVG document needs to be attacker-controlled; no non-default option is required.\n\nThe same happens through `xhtml2pdf`, which depends on svglib to render SVG images. An HTML document containing `\n` passed to `pisa.CreatePDF()` triggers the expansion. HTML-to-PDF conversion of user-supplied content is a common use of xhtml2pdf in web applications.\n\n# Reproduction\n\nMinimal local PoC, non-destructive:\n\n```python\nimport io, time\nfrom svglib.svglib import svg2rlg\n\ndef make(levels, fan=10):\nparts = ['\n',\n'\n']\nfor i in range(1, levels + 1):\nparts.append(f'\n' + f'\n' * fan + '\n')\nparts.append(f'\n')\nreturn \"\".join(parts).encode()\n\nfor levels in (3, 4, 5):\nd\n\nAffected packages: pip:svglib\nPatched: svglib 2.3.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-555j-qj3j-c8jv","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:47:58Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:47:59Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416719Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.5,"epss":0.02125,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"svglib","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-132275","vuln_ids":["CVE-2019-20446","CVE-2026-132275","GHSA-555J-QJ3J-C8JV"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-400","CWE-776"],"cluster_id":1983,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2283","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2283"}},{"id":2284,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-h57j-5f5m-789v / CVE-2026-104884: contao/core-bundle: Cross-site scripting in the frontend search results","summary":"contao/core-bundle: Cross-site scripting in the frontend search results\n\nCommit `23e8cca3136a` hardened the search-result title against insert-tag/XSS by setting `$objTemplate->title = StringUtil::specialchars(StringUtil::stripInsertTags($arrResult[$i]['title']))`. But the legacy HTML5 template does not use that `title` variable - it prints the raw `link` variable, which is assigned without escaping.\n\n## Impact\n\nAffected configuration (important): on 5.7.9 the default search template is the Twig `search_default.html.twig`, which does not use the raw `link` variable and auto-escapes - so a default Twig install is not affected. The vulnerable raw echo is in the legacy `search_default.html5` template (still shipped and selectable in 5.7.9, line 8: `\nlink ?>`); exploitation requires that legacy template to be active for the search module (common on sites migrated from earlier Contao / using custom template selection). Where the legacy template is used, the sink is unambiguously raw and `ModuleSearch::compile()` assigns `link` from the entity-decoded indexed title.\n\nA backend page editor can store script that executes for anonymous front-end visitors (and admins) viewing search results, a stored XSS crossing the editor -> anonymous-visitor boundary.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by @HDWSec\n\nAffected packages: composer:contao/core-bundle\nPatched: contao/core-bundle 5.3.50, contao/core-bundle 5.7.12","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h57j-5f5m-789v","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:46:56Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:46:58Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416720Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.4,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"contao/core-bundle","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104884","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-104884","GHSA-H57J-5F5M-789V"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-79"],"cluster_id":1986,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2284","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2284"}},{"id":2285,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-r9qp-pqx5-8369 / CVE-2026-104883: contao/core-bundle: Non-admin users can self-grant permissions that implicitly make them administrators","summary":"contao/core-bundle: Non-admin users can self-grant permissions that implicitly make them administrators\n\nCommit `2b83a60f7763` (5.7.3) hardened the template editor: it added `TemplateEditorModuleVoter` + `CheckTemplateEditorSaveListener` so a non-admin cannot self-grant the `tpl_editor` backend module (editable PHP-capable templates permit server-side code execution). That voter supports only the `modules` field and the literal value `tpl_editor`.\n\nThe equally RCE-capable `theme_import` capability lives in a different field - the `themes` checkbox field (tl_user_group.php:98-105 options include `theme_import`; identical on tl_user.php:248-253) - which has no save_callback and no voter. `TemplateEditorModuleVoter` is the only DC voter registered for tl_user_group, and it does not cover the `themes` field. So a delegated user manager can add `theme_import` to their own (or a managed) account.\n\nLive repro (Contao 5.7.9):\n1. As admin, create a non-admin backend group with the `user` (or `group`) module (a delegated user manager), and a user in it. Confirm the user cannot access `tpl_editor` (blocked by the 5.7.3 voter).\n2. As that non-admin, edit a group/account: add `themes` to the modules field and `theme_import` to the themes field (both accepted - only `tpl_editor` is blocked). Re-authenticate.\n\n## Impact\n\nA delegated user/group manager (a role explicitly not trusted with template/code access) escalates to arbitrary PHP execution on the server, fully compromising the installation. This bypasses the exact protection the 5.7.3 `tpl_editor` fix introduced.\n\n## Credits\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by @HDWSec\n\nAffected packages: composer:contao/core-bundle\nPatched: contao/core-bundle 5.3.50, contao/core-bundle 5.7.12","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9qp-pqx5-8369","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:45:41Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:45:43Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416721Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.2,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"php","product":"contao/core-bundle","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104883","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-104883","GHSA-R9QP-PQX5-8369"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-94","CWE-266"],"cluster_id":1988,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2285","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2285"}},{"id":2286,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-23w9-4pg3-xwm3 / CVE-2026-104882: contao/core-bundle: Improper access control in the CSV import wizard","summary":"contao/core-bundle: Improper access control in the CSV import wizard\n\nCustom backend module \"key\" actions are dispatched in `Backend::getBackendModule()` (Backend.php:322-327) after only the module-level `USER_CAN_ACCESS_MODULE` check - no per-record voter runs.\n\n## Impact\n\nA non-admin editor scoped to certain pages/forms can overwrite the tableitems/listitems/options of arbitrary tl_content / tl_form_field records outside their scope, defeating the per-record access control. Integrity IDOR (blind content overwrite; the value written is `serialize()` of a plain string array from the CSV - not object injection).\n\n## Credits\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by @HDWSec\n\nAffected packages: composer:contao/core-bundle\nPatched: contao/core-bundle 5.3.50, contao/core-bundle 5.7.12","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-23w9-4pg3-xwm3","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:44:33Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:44:34Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416722Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.5,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"php","product":"contao/core-bundle","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104882","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-104882","GHSA-23W9-4PG3-XWM3"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-639","CWE-862"],"cluster_id":1990,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2286","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2286"}},{"id":2287,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-3r9g-pfhv-3228 / CVE-2026-104881: contao/newsletter-bundle: Contao newsletter custom actions bypass channel-scoped authorization","summary":"contao/newsletter-bundle: Contao newsletter custom actions bypass channel-scoped authorization\n\nChannel access is enforced only by the DataContainer voters (`NewsletterChannelAccessVoter` / `NewsletterRecipientsAccessVoter`, requiring USER_CAN_EDIT_CHANNEL), whose `supportsType()` fires exclusively for Create/Read/Update/DeleteAction subjects dispatched inside DC_Table's create/edit/delete methods. The newsletter custom key-actions are dispatched directly by `Backend::getBackendModule()` (Backend.php:324-327) after only the module-level `USER_CAN_ACCESS_MODULE` check; the DC_Table constructor runs no per-record ReadAction vote for a key-action. `Newsletter.php` contains no `isGranted` / `denyAccess` / `isAdmin` / `hasAccess` calls, and none of the newsletter DCAs have a `checkPermission` onload callback.\n\n## Impact\n\nA channel-scoped newsletter editor can inject recipients into, mass-mail, and in some versions, delete/denylist recipients of channels they are not authorized to edit - defeating the per-channel permission model (integrity + abuse of the mail-sending capability).\n\n## Credits\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by @HDWSec\n\nAffected packages: composer:contao/newsletter-bundle\nPatched: contao/newsletter-bundle 5.3.50, contao/newsletter-bundle 5.7.12","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3r9g-pfhv-3228","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:43:26Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:43:27Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416722Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.3,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"contao/newsletter-bundle","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104881","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-104881","GHSA-3R9G-PFHV-3228"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-639","CWE-862"],"cluster_id":1992,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2287","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2287"}},{"id":2288,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-72jh-722p-rqr3 / CVE-2026-77331: memtomem-stm: Concurrent LTM recovery can duplicate reconnects or reuse a cancelled transport session","summary":"memtomem-stm: Concurrent LTM recovery can duplicate reconnects or reuse a cancelled transport session\n\nConcurrent surfacing RPC failures can trigger more than one reconnect for the same dirty session, and cancellation during a post-reconnect retry can leave the replacement session reusable despite an interrupted protocol exchange. The private fix introduces monotonic session generations, one shielded shared reconnect flight per dirty generation, and generation-aware cancellation handling across search, access-count, and scratch RPCs. The duplicate-reconnect subcase was introduced in 0.1.24; cancellation recovery affects the broader listed range.\n\nAffected packages: pip:memtomem-stm\nPatched: memtomem-stm 0.1.34","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-72jh-722p-rqr3","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:38:15Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:38:16Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416723Z","severity":"low","cvss_score":2.0,"epss":0.00192,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"memtomem-stm","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77331","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77331","GHSA-72JH-722P-RQR3"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-362"],"cluster_id":1994,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2288","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2288"}},{"id":2289,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-43hx-xm7w-3mhj / CVE-2026-77332: memtomem-stm: Surfaced memory data can escape the Markdown compatibility boundary","summary":"memtomem-stm: Surfaced memory data can escape the Markdown compatibility boundary\n\nUntrusted long-term and working-memory fields can introduce Markdown or HTML-compatible structure into the surfaced-memory envelope. A crafted memory may create misleading structural boundaries or visually conceal content. The private fix serializes every untrusted field as inert single-line data, validates copyable memory identifiers, and pins an explicit untrusted-data preamble. Ordinary natural-language persuasion remains a residual model-level risk.\n\nAffected packages: pip:memtomem-stm\nPatched: memtomem-stm 0.1.34","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-43hx-xm7w-3mhj","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:37:39Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:37:41Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416724Z","severity":"low","cvss_score":2.3,"epss":0.00572,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"memtomem-stm","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77332","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77332","GHSA-43HX-XM7W-3MHJ"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-116"],"cluster_id":1996,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2289","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2289"}},{"id":2290,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-jrjx-9jjw-747m / CVE-2026-77309: AIT-GUI route chain allows unauthenticated Python execution in server process","summary":"AIT-GUI route chain allows unauthenticated Python execution in server process\n\n## Summary\nA security issue exists where unauthenticated callers can instruct the AIT-GUI server to execute arbitrary Python scripts. The attack vector involves obtaining a session cookie through GET /, followed by a malicious POST /script/run request containing an absolute file path that bypasses the configured script directory restrictions.\n\n### Patches\n* 2.5.1\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote code execution on the AIT-GUI server. Any attacker with network access can execute arbitrary Python code with daemon privileges.\n\n## Details\n_Chain:_\n1. `POST /tlm/query` writes the user-controlled `fields` value into `fields_in.txt` under the AIT-GUI static directory.\n* If the supplied `dataDir` has no `.pcap` files, the route returns the expected `400 Bad Request` before deleting that file.\n2. `POST /script/run` accepts `scriptPath=../static/fields_in.txt`.\n* AIT-GUI reads that file and runs it as Python.\n\n_Relevant code:_\n- `ait/gui/__init__.py:930,935,942-944`: `/tlm/query` writes `fields` to `fields_in.txt`.\n- `ait/gui/__init__.py:952-958,978`: the no-PCAP error path aborts before cleanup.\n- `ait/gui/__init__.py:1130-1136`: `/script/run` joins `scriptPath` with `ScriptRoot` and only checks that the path exists.\n- `ait/gui/__init__.py:1186-1191`: the selected file is read and executed as Python.\n- `ait/gui/__init__.py:1105-1108`: nearby `/scripts/load/\n` has a path containment check, but `/script/run` does not.\n\n### Fix Information\nRestricted script execution paths and avoided using static temp files.\n\n## PoC\n1. `POST /tlm/query` writes the user-controlled `fields` value into `fields_in.txt` under the AIT-GUI static directory.\n* If the supplied `dataDir` has no `.pcap` files, the route returns the expected `400 Bad Request` before deleting that file.\n```\n# Remove file to ensure nothing exists\nAIT-GUI % rm\n/fields_in.txt\n\n# With server started, send POST request to /tlm/query endpoint\nAIT-GUI % curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/tlm/query \\ -d \"dataDir=\n\" \\\n-d \"timeField=time\" \\\n-d \"packet=CCSDS_HEADER\" \\\n-d \"fields=field1,field2,field3\" \\\n-d \"startTime=2026-07-01T00:00:00\" \\\n-d \"endTime=2026-07-10T00:00:00\" \\\n-o query_out.csv\n% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current\nDload Upload Total Spent Left Speed\n100 925 100 782 100 143 34798 6363 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:-- 42045\n\n# AIT-server log verify that PCAP file cannot be found:\n2026-07-10T11:46:37.873 | ERROR | Unable to locate PCAP files for query given data directory\n\n# Verify file is created and not cleaned up\nAIT-GUI % cat\n/fields_in.txt\nfield1\nfield2\nfield3\n```\n2. `POST /script/run` accepts `scriptPath=../static/fields_in.txt`.\n* AIT-GUI reads that file and runs it as Python.\n\n```\n# Generate session cookie\ncurl -c cookies.txt -v http://localhost:8080/ -o /dev/null\n\n# Execute example script which currently exists in conf\n\nAffected packages: pip:ait-gui\nPatched: ait-gui 2.5.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jrjx-9jjw-747m","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:36:41Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:36:41Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416725Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.8,"epss":0.01051,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"ait-gui","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77309","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77309","GHSA-JRJX-9JJW-747M"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-22","CWE-459"],"cluster_id":1998,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2290","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2290"}},{"id":2291,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc / CVE-2026-61725: sevenz-rust2: decompress builds each output path as dest.join(entry.name()) with no traversal guard, allowing a crafted .7z to write files outside the destination (Zip-Slip)","summary":"sevenz-rust2: decompress builds each output path as dest.join(entry.name()) with no traversal guard, allowing a crafted .7z to write files outside the destination (Zip-Slip)\n\n### Summary\n\nExtracting an attacker-supplied 7z archive can write files outside the destination directory. The 7z header stores each entry's path as a UTF-16 name with nothing constraining it to a relative, in-tree path. The extractor joins that name onto the destination and writes to the result without normalizing it or checking that it stays under the destination root, so an entry named `../../etc/cron.d/x` or an absolute path escapes the target.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `src/util/decompress.rs`, `decompress_impl` computes the per-entry destination directly (line 140):\n\n```rust\nlet dest_path = dest.join(entry.name());\nextract_fn(entry, reader, &dest_path)\n```\n\n`default_entry_extract_fn` (line 154) then acts on that path:\n\n```rust\nlet file = File::create(path)\n    .map_err(|e| Error::file_open(e, path.to_string_lossy().to_string()))?;\n```\n\nThere is no normalization, no `dest_path.starts_with(dest)` check, and no symlink-entry handling. `Path::join` discards the base when the joined component is absolute, and `..` components are not collapsed against the base. The convenience entry points (`decompress`, `decompress_file`, `decompress_with_password`, `decompress_file_with_password`) all route through `decompress_impl` with `default_entry_extract_fn`, so the default API is affected.\n\nThe trust boundary is the archive bytes. Any caller that extracts an untrusted `.7z` reaches the sink.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Build a `.7z` whose `FilesInfo` contains an entry named `../../../../tmp/pwned` (or, on Windows, an absolute path such as `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\pwned`).\n2. Call `sevenz_rust2::decompress_file(\"evil.7z\", \"./out\")`.\n3. The file is created at the traversed location outside `./out`. Targeting a startup/cron path or a config file turns the write into code execution or persistence.\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file write outside the intended directory (CWE-22 / CWE-23, the Zip-Slip class). On extraction of an attacker-controlled archive, an entry overwrites files outside the destination — config, cron, autostart, or build artifacts — which can escalate to code execution. Reachable by upload-handling backends, malware-analysis sandboxes, mod/game installers, and CI steps that unpack user-supplied 7z files.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\nReject any entry whose name contains a `ParentDir`, `RootDir`, or `Prefix` component, or canonicalize the joined path and verify `starts_with(dest)` before creating it. Apply the guard inside `default_entry_extract_fn` (and `decompress_impl`) so the hardening is the default rather than left to each caller. Reject or explicitly opt-in symlink entries.\n\n## Maintainer response\n\nThis issue was patched with ef760b61f3535ac8b93006212aef41bfebc237eb and released as `v0.21.1` to crates.io\n\nConsumers that extract attacker-supplied archives received over a network without user interaction should re-score as AV:N/UI:N (≈8.6).\n\nAffected packages: rust:sevenz-rust2\nPatched: sevenz-rust2 0.21.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qh76-45cr-8xrc","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:33:14Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:33:15Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416725Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.1,"epss":0.00236,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"sevenz-rust2","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-61725","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-61725","GHSA-QH76-45CR-8XRC"],"tags":["ghsa","rust","CWE-22","CWE-23"],"cluster_id":2000,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2291","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2291"}},{"id":2292,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-xxqp-5qx8-gj5q / CVE-2026-63341: Aedes has Uncaught Exception and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption","summary":"Aedes has Uncaught Exception and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption\n\n### Summary\nA remote Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability, allows any remote client to cause a complete crash of the Aedes MQTT broker process. This is achieved by sending a specially crafted MQTT message (via PUBLISH or SUBSCRIBE), or by setting a Will message with such a topic, containing a highly recursive topic string (e.g., with thousands of '/' delimiters). The lack of input validation and error handling leads to an uncaught exception in an internal routing library, terminating the entire Node.js application.\n\n### Details\nThe Aedes broker fails to enforce limits on the depth or structural complexity of MQTT topic strings. When a client publishes to or subscribes to a topic with excessive levels of recursion, the internal routing logic cascading into the qlobber library (via mqemitter) reaches an hard-coded limit within the qlobber._split_words function.\n\nThis function throws a hard Error: too many words (found in lib/qlobber.js:604). Crucially, Aedes does not wrap the calls to these internal modules (such as in handlers/subscribe.js or the publishing logic) in try-catch blocks. Consequently, this exception propagates up to the main Node.js event loop as an unhandled exception, causing the entire broker process to crash immediately.\n\nThis vulnerability affects all stable versions of Aedes due to the underlying dependency behavior and missing perimetral validation.\n\nStack Trace from Crash:\n```Plaintext\naedes-broker  | /app/node_modules/mqemitter/node_modules/qlobber/lib/qlobber.js:604\naedes-broker  | \tthrow new Error('too many words');\naedes-broker  | \t^\naedes-broker  | \naedes-broker  | Error: too many words\naedes-broker  |     at Qlobber._split_words (/app/node_modules/mqemitter/node_modules/qlobber/lib/qlobber.js:604:15)\naedes-broker  |     at Qlobber._split (/app/node_modules/mqemitter/node_modules/qlobber/lib/qlobber.js:624:18)\naedes-broker  |     at Qlobber.add (/app/node_modules/mqemitter/node_modules/qlobber/lib/qlobber.js:651:43)\naedes-broker  |     at MQEmitter.on (/app/node_modules/mqemitter/mqemitter.js:65:17)\naedes-broker  |     at Aedes.subscribe (/app/node_modules/aedes/aedes.js:289:11)\naedes-broker  |     at SubState.addSubs (/app/node_modules/aedes/lib/handlers/subscribe.js:167:12)\n```\nThe same uncaught exception can be triggered without an explicit PUBLISH/SUBSCRIBE: a client that registers a Will message with a deeply nested topic crashes the broker when the Will is published on ungraceful disconnect, because the Will publish path calls broker.publish directly and bypasses the PUBLISH handler.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites**\n+ Aedes MQTT Broker running and accessible over the network. For testing and replication, the broker was deployed using the official Docker image via the following command:\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name aedes-broker -p 1883:1883 moscajs/aedes:latest\n```\n+ Ability to establish an MQTT session (authenticated or unauthenticated, as per the broker's configuration).\n\n**Reproduction Steps**\n\n1. Save the following P\n\nAffected packages: npm:aedes\nPatched: aedes 1.1.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xxqp-5qx8-gj5q","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:32:35Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:32:36Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416726Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.5,"epss":0.00548,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"aedes","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-63341","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-63341","GHSA-XXQP-5QX8-GJ5Q"],"tags":["ghsa","npm","CWE-248","CWE-400"],"cluster_id":2002,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2292","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2292"}},{"id":2293,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-p3j5-5hrq-p75h / CVE-2026-58254: nats-server Leaf node connections bypass Nats-Trace-Dest permission check","summary":"nats-server Leaf node connections bypass Nats-Trace-Dest permission check\n\n### Background\n\nNATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT and edge computing.\n\nThe NATS Server supports leafnode connections between servers and message tracing through NATS headers.\n\n### Problem Description\n\nMessage trace destination checks were applied to ordinary client connections but not consistently to messages arriving through leafnode connections.\n\nA leafnode operator could cause trace events to be sent to subjects that would not otherwise be permitted and could use trace-only behavior to prevent normal delivery or storage of affected messages.\n\nTrace events can include routing, subscription, account, service import and JetStream metadata. The payload of the original application message is not chosen through the trace event itself.\n\n### Affected Versions\n\nVersions v2.14.2, v2.12.7 and below are vulnerable. The issue is fixed in v2.14.3 and v2.12.8.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nWhere possible, avoid granting publish paths from less-trusted leaf nodes into subjects for which trace-only behavior would affect delivery guarantees. No other known workarounds are available aside from upgrading to a fixed release.\n\n### References\n\n* GHSA advisory:\n\n* Credit: Koda Reef\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2\nPatched: github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 2.12.8, github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2 2.14.3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p3j5-5hrq-p75h","published_at":"2026-11-20T23:31:59Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T23:32:00Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416727Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":0.00308,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-58254","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-58254","GHSA-P3J5-5HRQ-P75H"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-863"],"cluster_id":2004,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2293","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2293"}},{"id":2294,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-9rv8-9hvg-92mq / CVE-2026-35376: chcon: recursive relabel not anchored to traversal dirfd (TOCTOU)","summary":"chcon: recursive relabel not anchored to traversal dirfd (TOCTOU)\n\n`chcon` resolved recursive targets from `fts_accpath` with a fresh path lookup, so traversal and the SELinux get/set were not bound to traversal directory state. A privileged recursive relabel can be redirected to unintended objects under rename/symlink races. Fix opens targets with `openat` against the traversal cwd fd before the SELinux operation.\n\n**Fixed in 0.10.0** (PR #12566, commit 7cfc74e47ffab452663be6842d788a5164d9688b): recursive relabel resolution is anchored to the traversal dirfd.\n\n---\n_Zellic private finding (zellic-ext/coreutils-private PR #120). Reported in the Zellic *uutils coreutils Program Security Assessment* (for Canonical, Jan 2026), audited commit `3a07ffc5a9bd4c283e75afa548ba1f1957bad242`._\n\nAffected packages: rust:uu_chcon\nPatched: uu_chcon 0.10.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9rv8-9hvg-92mq","published_at":"2026-11-20T16:39:34Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T16:39:35Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416728Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.5,"epss":0.0011,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"uu_chcon","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-35376","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-35376","GHSA-9RV8-9HVG-92MQ"],"tags":["ghsa","rust","CWE-59","CWE-367"],"cluster_id":2006,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2294","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2294"}},{"id":2295,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-xhrc-7f76-vh96 / CVE-2026-35377:  uu_env incorrectly rejects backslashes within single-quoted strings accepted by GNU env","summary":"uu_env incorrectly rejects backslashes within single-quoted strings accepted by GNU env\n\nIn `env -S`, GNU keeps backslashes literal inside single quotes (except `\\\\` and `\\'`); uutils errors on sequences like `\\a`. This is the backslash-handling issue of the broader `-S`/`--split-string` parsing divergence.\n```\nenv -S\"printf %s '\\''\\\\x'\\''\"   # GNU prints \\x ; uutils: invalid sequence '\\x' in -S (125)\n```\n\n---\n_Zellic private finding (zellic-ext/coreutils-private PR #117). Reported in the Zellic *uutils coreutils Program Security Assessment* (for Canonical, Jan 2026), audited commit `3a07ffc5a9bd4c283e75afa548ba1f1957bad242`._\n\nAffected packages: rust:uu_env\nPatched: uu_env 0.10.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xhrc-7f76-vh96","published_at":"2026-11-20T16:36:31Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T16:36:32Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416728Z","severity":"low","cvss_score":3.3,"epss":0.00106,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"uu_env","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-35377","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-35377","GHSA-XHRC-7F76-VH96"],"tags":["ghsa","rust","CWE-20"],"cluster_id":2008,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2295","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2295"}},{"id":2296,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-fjjq-8hw5-cf9f / CVE-2026-35374: split: TOCTOU output-open allows truncating a swapped file","summary":"split: TOCTOU output-open allows truncating a swapped file\n\n`split` checks input/output identity by path before opening the output, then opens with truncation, leaving a race window on mutable path components. GNU opens first and compares the opened output inode against the input before truncating. The race can cause `split` to truncate/write a file different from the one validated — including the input file or another file the process can access.\n\n**Fixed in 0.10.0** (PR #12565, commit 58040feb5c66fce588a7ffac299b3a23bd55cd81): the output open path is hardened against TOCTOU target swaps.\n\n---\n_Zellic private finding (zellic-ext/coreutils-private PR #119). Reported in the Zellic *uutils coreutils Program Security Assessment* (for Canonical, Jan 2026), audited commit `3a07ffc5a9bd4c283e75afa548ba1f1957bad242`._\n\nAffected packages: rust:uu_split\nPatched: uu_split 0.10.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjjq-8hw5-cf9f","published_at":"2026-11-20T16:33:27Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T16:33:27Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416729Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.3,"epss":0.00077,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"uu_split","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-35374","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-35374","GHSA-FJJQ-8HW5-CF9F"],"tags":["ghsa","rust","CWE-59","CWE-367"],"cluster_id":2010,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2296","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2296"}},{"id":2297,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-6499-jgj4-2wpf / CVE-2026-104773: CKAN: Session Fixation in Registration View","summary":"CKAN: Session Fixation in Registration View\n\n## Description\n\nWeb user registration form is vulnerable to session fixation if the site is configured with server-side session storage (CKAN uses cookie-based session storage by default). The attacker would need to either set a cookie on the victim's browser or steal the victim's currently valid session. Session identifiers are now regenerated after registration.\n\n## Patches\n\nThis vulnerability has been fixed in CKAN 2.10.11, 2.11.6 and 2.12.0\n\n## Workarounds\n\nswitch to cookie-based session storage (the default) or disable web user registration by setting `ckan.auth.create_user_via_web` to false (the default)\n\nAffected packages: pip:ckan\nPatched: ckan 2.10.11, ckan 2.11.6","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6499-jgj4-2wpf","published_at":"2026-11-20T16:25:26Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T16:25:28Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416730Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.8,"epss":0.00327,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"ckan","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104773","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-104773","GHSA-6499-JGJ4-2WPF"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-384"],"cluster_id":2012,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2297","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2297"}},{"id":2298,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-cg26-4c6j-2x8h / CVE-2026-69133: netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: OHTTP codecs retain consumed outer cumulation buffers after completed exchanges","summary":"netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: OHTTP codecs retain consumed outer cumulation buffers after completed exchanges\n\n## Summary:\n\nOHttpClientCodec and OHttpServerCodec retain the encrypted outer HttpContent in a handler-level cumulationBuffer. After a valid OHTTP exchange completes, the OHTTP request/response context is destroyed, but the outer cumulationBuffer is not released or reset. It remains referenced by the codec until a later inbound content frame replaces it or the handler is removed/channel is closed.\n\nThis can pin attacker-influenced pooled/direct buffer capacity on idle keep-alive channels. Across many long-lived idle connections, this can create availability pressure.\n\nAffected components:\n\n* codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpClientCodec.java\n* codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpServerCodec.java\n* codec-ohttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpRequestResponseContext.java\n\n## Root cause:\n\nOHttpClientCodec retains inbound content into a handler-level cumulationBuffer. On LastHttpContent, it destroys only the OHttpRequestResponseContextHolder. The cumulationBuffer is released in handlerRemoved(), not immediately after successful exchange completion.\n\nOHttpServerCodec follows the same pattern: it retains inbound content into a handler-level cumulationBuffer, and on completed request/response it destroys the OHttpRequestResponseContext. The outer cumulationBuffer remains owned by the codec and is released only when the handler is removed.\n\nOHttpRequestResponseContext.parse() consumes bytes from the caller-provided outer cumulation buffer, but its destroy() path releases only the inner binary HTTP cumulation, not the codec-level outer cumulationBuffer.\n\n## PoC:\n\nA local test only:\n\n```\ncodec-ohttp/src/test/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/ohttp/OHttpCumulationBufferRetentionTest.java\n```\n\nThe test reuses existing OHTTP test helpers and BouncyCastle crypto provider to perform valid completed OHTTP exchanges over EmbeddedChannel pairs. It sends both a small and a large request/response exchange, confirms completion, then reflects the private cumulationBuffer field from both OHttpClientCodec and OHttpServerCodec.\n\nCommand:\n\n```\n./mvnw -pl codec-ohttp -Dtest=OHttpCumulationBufferRetentionTest -DfailIfNoTests=false test\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```\nsmall client after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=1064 readerIndex=1064 writerIndex=1064 readableBytes=0\nsmall server after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=1110 readerIndex=1110 writerIndex=1110 readableBytes=0\nlarge client after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 readerIndex=131114 writerIndex=131114 readableBytes=0\nlarge server after completion: refCnt=1 capacity=262144 readerIndex=131160 writerIndex=131160 readableBytes=0\nsmall after close: clientOldRefCnt=0 serverOldRefCnt=0\nlarge after close: clientOldRefCnt=0 serverOldRefCnt=0\nTests run: 1, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0\nBUILD SUCCESS\n```\n\nInterpretation:\n\nAfter completion, both the client and server cumulationBuffer objects have:\n\n* refCnt=1\n* readableBytes=0\n* large retained capacity for t\n\nAffected packages: maven:io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp\nPatched: io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp 0.0.27.Final","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cg26-4c6j-2x8h","published_at":"2026-11-20T16:22:09Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T16:22:10Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416731Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":0.00476,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-69133","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-69133","GHSA-CG26-4C6J-2X8H"],"tags":["ghsa","maven","CWE-772"],"cluster_id":2014,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2298","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2298"}},{"id":2299,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-x72p-hmqp-46hw / CVE-2026-105803: Git LFS may execute arbitrary commands via crafted Git LFS configurations","summary":"Git LFS may execute arbitrary commands via crafted Git LFS configurations\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen fetching objects from a malicious repository, Git LFS may execute an arbitrary command or binary after failing to sufficiently restrict the set of configuration options defined in an `.lfsconfig` file in the repository.\n\nGit LFS permits a limited set of configuration options to be defined in an `.lfsconfig` file at the root of a Git repository, but does not filter these options correctly if their keys contain certain additional components, which allows an attacker to mimic options that configure Git LFS to use a custom command to transfer objects.  An attacker can then provide an arbitrary command which Git LFS will invoke when fetching objects.\n\nGit LFS has resolved this issue by correctly restricting the configuration of custom object transfer commands to local Git configuration files.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis problem exists in all versions since 1.3.0 and is patched in v3.8.1. All users should upgrade to v3.8.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo single workaround exists other than to disable Git LFS entirely. As far as possible, users and administrators should avoid cloning repositories from untrusted sources.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* For general questions, start a discussion in the Git LFS [discussion forum](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/discussions).\n* For reports of additional vulnerabilities, please follow the Git LFS [security reporting policy](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/blob/main/SECURITY.md).\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs, go:github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/v3\nPatched: github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/v3 3.8.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x72p-hmqp-46hw","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:59:40Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:59:41Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416731Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.6,"epss":0.00642,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-105803","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-105803","GHSA-X72P-HMQP-46HW"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-777","CWE-1286"],"cluster_id":2016,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2299","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2299"}},{"id":2300,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-xrgv-7vx6-5vx6 / CVE-2026-105802: Git LFS may execute arbitrary commands via crafted Git configurations","summary":"Git LFS may execute arbitrary commands via crafted Git configurations\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen fetching objects from a malicious repository, Git LFS may execute an arbitrary command or binary after incorrectly parsing the Git configuration options defined for a submodule.\n\nGit LFS reads Git configuration options without checking for embedded line-ending control characters.  By inserting control characters such as line feed (LF) into certain values, an attacker may be able to mimic options that cause Git LFS to execute an arbitrary command when fetching or adding objects.\n\nGit LFS has resolved this issue by always using an unambiguous format to read and parse Git configuration options.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis problem exists in all versions since 0.6.0 and is patched in v3.8.1. All users should upgrade to v3.8.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nTo work around the problem, users should prevent Git from initializing any submodules by disabling the `fetch.recurseSubmodules` and `submodule.recurse` configuration options and by never running the `git submodule init` command.  Any submodules which have already been initialized in a repository may be deactivated with the `git submodule deinit` command.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* For general questions, start a discussion in the Git LFS [discussion forum](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/discussions).\n* For reports of additional vulnerabilities, please follow the Git LFS [security reporting policy](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/blob/main/SECURITY.md).\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs, go:github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/v3\nPatched: github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/v3 3.8.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xrgv-7vx6-5vx6","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:58:53Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:58:55Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416732Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.6,"epss":0.00557,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-105802","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-105802","GHSA-XRGV-7VX6-5VX6"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-144"],"cluster_id":2017,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2300","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2300"}},{"id":2301,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-3h6w-xcw3-9xjj / CVE-2026-104885: OpenRemote: Cross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization","summary":"OpenRemote: Cross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization\n\n### Summary\n\nCross-realm MQTT session disconnect without authorization\n\n## Vulnerability\n\nThe `disconnectUserSession` endpoint in `UserResourceImpl.java` (line 443) accepts a `realm` path parameter but ignores it entirely, performing no authorization or realm-boundary check before force-disconnecting an MQTT session. Any authenticated user from any realm can disconnect MQTT broker sessions belonging to users in other realms by supplying the target session ID.\n\nFile: `manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java`, lines 443-447\n\n```java\n@Override\npublic void disconnectUserSession(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String sessionID) {\n    if (!mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID)) {\n        throw new NotFoundException(\"User session not found\");\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe REST interface at `model/src/main/java/org/openremote/model/security/UserResource.java` (line 201-204) maps this to `GET {realm}/disconnect/{sessionID}` with no `@RolesAllowed` annotation, so any authenticated user (not just admins) can call it.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nCVE-2026-54641 (commit de89b8d) fixed cross-realm information disclosure in three read methods of the same file (`get()`, `getUserClientRoles()`, `getUserRealmRoles()`) and also added a realm check to `getClientRoles()`. The fix added `throwIfCannotReadUserInRealm()` and `throwIfCannotAdminRealm()` guards. However, `disconnectUserSession` was not patched and remains unprotected. Every other mutating method in this class has either a `@RolesAllowed` annotation on the interface or an explicit realm check in the implementation. This one has neither.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nGiven two realms, \"master\" and \"building\":\n\n1. User A authenticates in the \"building\" realm (any role, no admin needed).\n2. User B has an active MQTT session in the \"master\" realm with session ID `S`.\n3. User A sends: `GET /api/master/user/master/disconnect/S` with their building-realm bearer token.\n4. The handler ignores the realm path segments, looks up session `S` in the global `connectionIDConnectionMap`, and calls `doForceDisconnect()`. User B's MQTT connection is terminated.\n\nSession IDs use the Netty `ChannelId.asLongText()` format (deterministic, partially sequential). While not trivially brute-forceable, IDs can leak through monitoring, logs, or correlated API calls. Within the same realm, any user (not just admins) can also disconnect sessions they should not have access to.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a multi-tenant IoT deployment, an attacker authenticated in any realm can disrupt MQTT device connectivity in other realms. Since OpenRemote is used for building management, energy monitoring, and industrial IoT, forcibly disconnecting MQTT sessions can:\n\n- Knock IoT sensors and actuators offline across tenant boundaries\n- Disrupt safety-critical alarm monitoring (compounding the alarm IDOR fixed in CVE-2026-57168)\n- Cause denial of service against other tenants' device fleets\n\nThe method also uses HTTP GET for a destructive op\n\nAffected packages: maven:io.openremote:openremote-manager\nPatched: io.openremote:openremote-manager 1.31.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3h6w-xcw3-9xjj","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:56:58Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:56:59Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416733Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.7,"epss":0.00321,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"io.openremote:openremote-manager","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104885","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-104885","CVE-2026-54641","CVE-2026-57168","GHSA-3H6W-XCW3-9XJJ"],"tags":["ghsa","maven","CWE-862"],"cluster_id":2019,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2301","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2301"}},{"id":2302,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-prhx-9q2h-ph2x / CVE-2026-103026: Paymenter: Unauthenticated arbitrary method invocation in Livewire components","summary":"Paymenter: Unauthenticated arbitrary method invocation in Livewire components\n\n### Summary\n\nA Livewire function allowed attackers to call any public function, allowing attackers to call any public method on the component. Because an attacker can call any function, they can also overwrite locked data.\n\n### Technical Details\n\n`app/Livewire/Traits/HasConfirmation.php` exposed a public Livewire action that dispatches to any method that exists on the component:\n\n```php\npublic function executeConfirmedAction($action, $parameters = [])\n{\n    if (method_exists($this, $action)) {\n        return $this->{$action}(...$parameters);\n    }\n    throw new \\Exception(\"Method {$action} does not exist\");\n}\n```\n\nThe trait is applied on the base component, `app/Livewire/Component.php` (`use Disabled, HasConfirmation, HasNotifications;`), so it is present on all 36 client-facing components. \n`executeConfirmedAction` is itself invocable, and because it only checks `method_exists` it re-admits the whole inherited framework API. The most important is `InteractsWithProperties::fill()`, which uses data_set() and therefore writes any public property, including properties marked `#[Locked]`, and supports dotted paths that reach into hydrated Eloquent models.\nThis was a piece of dead code and has been removed\n\n### Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker could invoke arbitrary public methods exposed by any client-facing Livewire component through the `executeConfirmedAction` action.\n\nDepending on the properties and methods exposed by an individual component, this could allow an attacker to bypass intended authorization and data-integrity protections and modify server-side state that was intended to be immutable or protected from client-side manipulation.\n\nAffected packages: composer:paymenter/paymenter\nPatched: paymenter/paymenter 1.5.7","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-prhx-9q2h-ph2x","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:56:03Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:56:04Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416734Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.1,"epss":0.00364,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"php","product":"paymenter/paymenter","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-103026","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-103026","GHSA-PRHX-9Q2H-PH2X"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-470","CWE-749","CWE-915"],"cluster_id":2023,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2302","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2302"}},{"id":2303,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg / CVE-2026-115565: storyblok-backup: Stored path traversal via unsanitized Storyblok component names in backup output","summary":"storyblok-backup: Stored path traversal via unsanitized Storyblok component names in backup output\n\n### Summary\nstoryblok-backup writes files using unsanitized names for Storyblok components, which are content type or schema definitions. This allows a component name containing path traversal sequences to cause backup files to be written outside the intended backup directory. Anyone with component management access in the source Storyblok space, not server access, can plant a malicious component name that causes arbitrary file writes on the machine of anyone who later runs a backup against that space.\n\n### Details\nThe writeJson function, which takes a folder, a file name, and content, builds the output file path by directly concatenating the backup directory, the folder, and the file name as strings, with no path sanitization or containment check.\n\nFor the components resource type specifically, the file name used is the component's own name field, which is free text and editable by anyone with component management access in the Storyblok CMS.\n\nOther resource types are not affected by this same issue. Stories and datasources use their numeric IDs as filenames, and assets have their filename derived by splitting on the slash character and taking the last segment, which strips path separators. This issue is scoped specifically to components.\n\nSince the component name is stored in Storyblok and only read back later when the backup tool runs, this is a stored, second order vulnerability. The malicious value is planted once, then triggers on every subsequent backup run performed by anyone using this tool against that Storyblok space.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Step 1 — plant the malicious component name via Storyblok's Management API:**\n\ncurl -X POST \"https://mapi.storyblok.com/v1/spaces/\n/components/\" \\\n-H \"Authorization:\n\" \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d '{\n\"component\": {\n\"name\": \"../../../../tmp/evil-storyblok-backup\",\n\"schema\": {}\n}\n}'\n\nAny Storyblok user with component-management permission in the space (not server access to wherever backups run) can do this through the Storyblok UI just as easily, by naming a new component with this value in the component name field.\n\n**Step 2 — run storyblok-backup against this space, exactly as a normal user would:**\n\nnpx storyblok-backup \\\n--space\n\\\n--token\n\\\n--path ./backup \\\n--types \"components\"\n\n**Step 3 — observe the actual file write location:**\n\nWith the malicious component name above, the tool's writeJson() function builds the output path as:\n\nbackupDir + \"/components\" + \"/../../../../tmp/evil-storyblok-backup\" + \".json\"\n\nwhich resolves outside ./backup entirely. Confirm with:\n\nls -la /tmp/evil-storyblok-backup.json\n\nThe file exists there, outside the --path ./backup directory that was configured, containing the full JSON definition of the malicious component.\n\n**Step 4 — for comparison, confirm assets and stories are NOT affected:**\n\nThe same defaultFetch() pattern is used for stories and datasources (\n\nAffected packages: npm:storyblok-backup\nPatched: storyblok-backup 0.7.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:55:18Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:55:19Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416734Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.7,"epss":0.00359,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"storyblok-backup","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115565","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-115565","GHSA-VCX7-PFRH-MCFG"],"tags":["ghsa","npm","CWE-22"],"cluster_id":2025,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2303","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2303"}},{"id":2304,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-wcqj-wx85-c75p / CVE-2026-130176: aMQTT: Denial of Service (DoS) via Memory Leak in Unmanaged QoS 2 Session Handshakes","summary":"aMQTT: Denial of Service (DoS) via Memory Leak in Unmanaged QoS 2 Session Handshakes\n\n### Impact\n\n`amqtt` is vulnerable to a remote denial of service caused by incomplete MQTT QoS 2 transactions remaining allocated after the associated client disconnects.\n\nMQTT QoS 2 uses a four-step handshake to provide exactly-once delivery. If a client begins a QoS 2 transaction but disconnects before the handshake completes, `amqtt` retains the associated transaction state and packet identifier without an expiration mechanism to remove it.\n\nQoS 1 transactions are protected by a timeout mechanism, which defaults to 5 seconds, allowing abandoned state to be released. Equivalent timeout handling was not applied to incomplete QoS 2 transactions.\n\nAn attacker can repeatedly connect to the broker, initiate QoS 2 transactions, and disconnect before completing the handshake. Each incomplete transaction leaves state allocated in memory. Repeating this process causes broker memory consumption to grow continuously.\n\nSuccessful exploitation can cause:\n\n* Unbounded growth in broker memory usage\n* Accumulation of incomplete QoS 2 transaction state\n* Increasing memory pressure on the host system\n* Termination of the broker process when available memory is exhausted\n* Operating-system Out-Of-Memory (OOM) intervention\n* Complete loss of availability for the affected broker process\n\nExploitation does not require maintaining long-lived connections. An attacker can create incomplete QoS 2 transactions and disconnect, leaving the broker to retain the associated state after the network connection has closed.\n\nUnder the default configuration, anonymous clients can exploit the vulnerability without credentials. When authentication is enabled, any authenticated client permitted to initiate QoS 2 message flows may still be able to exploit it. Authentication alone is therefore not a sufficient mitigation.\n\n* Ecosystem: `pip`\n* Package: `amqtt`\n* Affected versions: `>= 0.11.0, <= 0.12.0`\n\nThe vulnerable code is present in the v0.11.0 release commit, 352678c87e50e501a8a5bb91fab73c9400fa046c, and remained present on the main branch as of 5ebbf366f6b79ab12a06f426ffd18ff28954e4ea. Versions before 0.11.0 were not evaluated.\n\nThis is a denial-of-service vulnerability only. No confidentiality or integrity impact has been identified. Successful exploitation causes degradation and eventual loss of availability through memory exhaustion.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue will be been patched in the `v0.12.1` released version; all users should upgrade.\n\nThe completed fix:\n\n* Apply transaction expiration handling consistently to incomplete QoS 1 and QoS 2 message flows\n* Expire abandoned QoS 2 state when the associated transaction does not complete within the configured timeout\n* Release the associated message state and packet identifiers when the transaction expires\n* Prevent disconnected clients from leaving incomplete QoS 2 transactions resident in broker memory indefinitely\n\nThe fixing commit is [`2755fd801a6f95e9b73e11116948b57a95348466`](https://github.com/Yakifo/amqtt/commit/2755fd801a\n\nAffected packages: pip:amqtt\nPatched: amqtt 0.12.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wcqj-wx85-c75p","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:54:50Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:54:52Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416735Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.5,"epss":0.00623,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"amqtt","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-130176","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-130176","GHSA-WCQJ-WX85-C75P"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-401","CWE-772"],"cluster_id":2027,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2304","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2304"}},{"id":2305,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-9657-8vc2-7g2p / CVE-2026-115463: Poweradmin: The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout, so an attacker holding the password can brute-force it within the validity window","summary":"Poweradmin: The email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout, so an attacker holding the password can brute-force it within the validity window\n\n### Summary\n\nThe email second factor is an mt_rand() six-digit code verified with no attempt limit or lockout\n\nThe email second factor is a six-digit code drawn from `mt_rand()` and verified with no attempt limit, so an attacker who already has the password can brute-force it inside its validity window.\n\n`lib/Domain/Service/MfaService.php`, in `generateEmailVerificationCode()`:\n\n```php\n$numericCode = mt_rand(100000, 999999);\n```\n\nThat is a 900,000-value space, and `mt_rand()` is a Mersenne Twister rather than a CSPRNG, so it is not appropriate for a security token in the first place. PHP provides `random_int()` for exactly this.\n\nThe bigger problem is that nothing limits guesses. `lib/Application/Controller/MfaVerifyController.php` calls:\n\n```php\n$isValid = $this->mfaService->verifyCode($userId, $code);\n```\n\nand on failure the only action taken is:\n\n```php\n$this->logger->warning('[MfaVerifyController] Verification failed for user ID: {user_id}', ['user_id' => $userId]);\n```\n\nI grepped that controller for any counter, lockout, throttle or rate limit and found nothing beyond log statements. So an attacker holding valid credentials submits codes until one lands. Against 900,000 values with no ceiling on attempts, the only thing standing in the way is the code's validity window and however fast requests can be issued.\n\nThat defeats the purpose of the second factor: it is meant to hold even when the password is known, and here it reduces to a race the attacker is likely to win with sustained requests.\n\nTwo separate fixes, and I would treat the second as the urgent one:\n\n1. Generate the code with `random_int(100000, 999999)` so it is not predictable from RNG state.\n2. Enforce a failed-attempt counter tied to the user and the pending MFA session, invalidating the code and requiring a fresh one after a small number of wrong guesses, plus a per-account and per-IP rate limit on the verify endpoint.\n\nScope: source-verified at `master`. I confirmed the generator, the verify call site, the log-only failure handling and the absence of any throttling construct in that controller. I did not stand up a Poweradmin instance and run a brute-force against a live code, so the rate at which the space can be covered in practice is not something I measured. If throttling is applied at a layer I did not look at, such as a web-server or reverse-proxy rule shipped with your deployment docs, then the second half of this weakens considerably and I would want to know that.\n\nI used AI assistance while reading the code and preparing this report.\n\n---\n\nConfirmed, and thanks for the detail. I've widened the affected range: this reaches back to 4.0.0, where MFA was first added, and 4.4.0 still ships it, so the original <= 4.3.4 was too narrow. The 3.x line has no MFA at all and is unaffected. Fixes are in for 4.2.x, 4.3.x, 4.4.x and the development branch.\n\nTo answer your question about other layers, there is nothing. No middleware runs in front of that controller, so what you foun\n\nAffected packages: composer:poweradmin/poweradmin\nPatched: poweradmin/poweradmin 4.2.6, poweradmin/poweradmin 4.3.5, poweradmin/poweradmin 4.4.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9657-8vc2-7g2p","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:52:33Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:52:33Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416736Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.4,"epss":0.009,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"poweradmin/poweradmin","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115463","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-115463","GHSA-9657-8VC2-7G2P"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-307","CWE-338"],"cluster_id":2029,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2305","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2305"}},{"id":2306,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-4hrh-34w3-5ww8 / CVE-2026-104099: Fabio: Access-control bypass through unnormalized request paths","summary":"Fabio: Access-control bypass through unnormalized request paths\n\n## Summary\n\nRoute selection uses the raw un-normalized request path, and the per-route ACL and basic-auth gates hang off that selection, so a dot-segment, encoded-dot, or double-slash variant of a protected path selects a different route, skips both gates, and is forwarded to the backend which normalizes and serves the protected resource. Unauthenticated; complete bypass of the access control the operator configured. Confirmed at HEAD b841544. Direct peers: Traefik CVE-2023-47106, Envoy CVE-2019-9901.\n\n## The defect\n\nfabio never normalizes the request path. A repository-wide search for path.Clean returns zero results. Route selection uses the raw path (route/table.go line 487: `if target = t.lookup(h, req.URL.Path, pick, match); target != nil {`). Both access-control gates are properties of the target that lookup returned:\n\n```go\n// proxy/http_proxy.go\nif t.AccessDeniedHTTP(r) {                      // line 111, per-route allow / deny:ip ACL\n    http.Error(w, \"access denied\", http.StatusForbidden)\n    return\n}\nif !t.Authorized(r, w, p.AuthSchemes) {          // line 116, per-route auth= basic auth\n    http.Error(w, \"authorization failed\", http.StatusUnauthorized)\n    return\n}\n```\n\nand the same raw path is forwarded verbatim (`Path: r.URL.Path` at line 142). So /./admin/, /%2e/admin/, //admin/ and /x/../admin/ do not match the protected /admin route. They fall through to the catch-all / route, which carries no ACL and no auth, and fabio forwards the un-normalized path to the origin, which normalizes it and serves the protected resource.\n\n## Verification\n\nVerified end to end against the real binary at HEAD, not a synthetic unit test. fabio was built and run with static routes against a `python3 -m http.server` origin, driven with curl --path-as-is: on a basic-auth route, /admin/ returned 401 without credentials and 200 with valid credentials (controls correct), while all four crafted paths returned 200 with the protected page and NO credentials; on an ACL route, /admin/ returned 403 and all four crafted variants returned 200.\n\nPrecondition, stated honestly: a less restrictive route must reach the same backend so the crafted path has somewhere to fall through to. That is exactly the two-tag urlprefix- shape fabio's own access-control documentation instructs operators to configure. Where no fallback route exists the request 404s instead.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nNormalize the path before route lookup: decode percent-encoded dot segments and apply path.Clean, then match. Whether the normalized or original path is forwarded upstream is a separate decision, but the LOOKUP must run on the normalized form, because the ACL and auth decisions are derived from it. Also lowercase and strip the port and any trailing dot from the request host before host matching. Secondary observations: X-Forwarded-Prefix is passed through from the client on non-strip routes; the gRPC proxy path never calls either authorization gate, so allow=/auth= on a proto=grpc route are silentl\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/fabiolb/fabio\nPatched: github.com/fabiolb/fabio 1.7.3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4hrh-34w3-5ww8","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:51:25Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:51:28Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416737Z","severity":"critical","cvss_score":10.0,"epss":0.04951,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/fabiolb/fabio","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104099","vuln_ids":["CVE-2019-9901","CVE-2023-47106","CVE-2026-104099","GHSA-4HRH-34W3-5WW8"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-41","CWE-289","CWE-863"],"cluster_id":2030,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2306","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2306"}},{"id":2307,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-x7xj-4j4f-88xr / CVE-2026-69261: Git LFS may leak HTTP headers after redirections","summary":"Git LFS may leak HTTP headers after redirections\n\n### Impact\n\nAfter receiving an HTTP redirection, Git LFS may forward certain HTTP headers to a host other than the one for which they were intended.  While `Authorization` headers are never forwarded to inappropriate hosts, `Cookie` headers may be forwarded incorrectly.\n\nGit LFS has resolved this issue by never forwarding `Cookie` headers to hosts other than the ones for which they were intended.  In particular, after an HTTP redirection is received to a URL with a different scheme, host, or port than found in the URL of the current request, any `Authorization` and `Cookie` headers from the current request will not be sent in the redirected request.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis problem exists in all versions since 0.5.0 and is patched in v3.8.1. All users should upgrade to v3.8.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo single workaround exists.  As far as possible, users and administrators should review their systems to confirm no unnecessary HTTP redirections are performed, and that HTTP headers other than `Authorization` do not contain privileged or confidential information.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* For general questions, start a discussion in the Git LFS [discussion forum](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/discussions).\n* For reports of additional vulnerabilities, please follow the Git LFS [security reporting policy](https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/blob/main/SECURITY.md).\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs, go:github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/v3\nPatched: github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/v3 3.8.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x7xj-4j4f-88xr","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:49:47Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:49:48Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416737Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.6,"epss":0.00451,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-69261","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-69261","GHSA-X7XJ-4J4F-88XR"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-522"],"cluster_id":2034,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2307","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2307"}},{"id":2308,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-w3f2-pr6x-wwjc / CVE-2026-69260: Git LFS may attempt arbitrary remote commands via crafted SSH URLs","summary":"Git LFS may attempt arbitrary remote commands via crafted SSH URLs\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen Git LFS makes object transfer or authentication requests to a remote host via SSH, it passes the path component of the remote's SSH URL as part of a command to be executed, but does not properly format the URL's path component as a single argument.  By inserting shell meta-characters into the SSH URL, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary commands on the remote host, if the host passes the commands to a shell without sanitizing them first.\n\nGit LFS has resolved this problem by fully quoting the arguments of the remote commands it sends via SSH.\n\nAs well, Git LFS has resolved a problem with the default HTTPS URLs used when an SSH URL is configured for a remote host and the host either does not support Git LFS remote commands sent via SSH or supports HTTP authentication via SSH for Git LFS but does not return an explicit HTTP URL in response to a `git-lfs-authenticate` remote command.  In these cases, Git LFS now correctly encodes the HTTPS URL used to contact the remote host.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis problem exists in all versions since 0.5.0 and is patched in v3.8.1. All users should upgrade to v3.8.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers may set the `lfs.sshTransfer` Git configuration option to `never`, after which Git LFS will not attempt any object transfers over SSH.  However, Git LFS will still make authentication requests to SSH URLs, so administrators of Git LFS services should ensure their systems sanitize all commands received over SSH before executing them.\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs, go:github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/v3\nPatched: github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/v3 3.8.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w3f2-pr6x-wwjc","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:47:01Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:47:03Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416738Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.6,"epss":0.00871,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-69260","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-69260","GHSA-W3F2-PR6X-WWJC"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-78"],"cluster_id":2035,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2308","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2308"}},{"id":2309,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-66q9-mxf2-xqw6 / CVE-2026-103035: TeamPass folder re-parenting authorization bypass","summary":"TeamPass folder re-parenting authorization bypass\n\n## Summary\n\nMissing authorization in the update_folder action: any authenticated non-read-only user can rename, re-parent and convert to personal any folder in the instance, moving another team's credential subtree into their own personal space and removing it from the organization. Confirmed at HEAD 2f271cdd (3.2.1.1), and present at 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.7.6.\n\n## The defect\n\nThe folder-management endpoint dispatches an update_folder action that renames and re-parents a folder. Unlike its sibling actions in the same file, it never checks the edited folder id or the submitted parent id against the caller's accessible-folder set, and the file itself performs no session/authorization gate at all. By pointing the new parent at their own personal folder, an authenticated low-privilege user takes ownership of any folder in the instance.\n\napp/sources/folders.queries.php:\n- The file never calls the session/authorization helpers: a grep for checkSession and userAccessPage across the whole file returns zero hits.\n- case 'update_folder' (lines 294-662) contains no reference to the caller's user-accessible_folders set. The only access-related logic is the personal-folder computation at lines 428-468 and the guard at line 503, which short-circuits on `(int) $isPersonal === 1`.\n- The sibling actions do carry the check: case 'add_folder' validates against user-accessible_folders at line 743, case 'delete_folders' at line 904, and case 'copy_folder' applies the equivalent parent check.\n\nSo update_folder is the one folder-mutating action in the file without an authorization predicate on either the target folder id or the new parent id.\n\n## Attacker model and trace\n\nAn authenticated TeamPass user who is not read-only (no administrative role required). The attacker submits update_folder with the victim folder's id and a parentId pointing at their own personal folder. Because the new parent is personal, the personal-folder computation sets $isPersonal = 1, which satisfies the line 503 guard, and the update writes the new parent and personal_folder = 1 for the target folder.\n\nConsequences: the stolen subtree is added to the attacker's accessible set on their next login, so the item list renders for them, and do_items_list_in_folder exposes the plaintext label, login, url, email and description of every credential in that subtree (item passwords stay sharekey-protected, hence C:L). Because the folder is now flagged personal, it disappears from the organization view for everyone else including administrators (the admin listing selects only personal_folder = 0), so this is also a denial of access to the real owners.\n\n## Verification\n\nSource-verified at HEAD: no session/authorization helper anywhere in the file; the update_folder case contains no accessible-folders predicate while add_folder, delete_folders and copy_folder do; the personal-folder short-circuit at line 503. A live TeamPass instance was not stood up.\n\nSecondary (needs a live confirmation before filing): there a\n\nAffected packages: composer:nilsteampassnet/TeamPass\nPatched: nilsteampassnet/TeamPass 3.2.2.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-66q9-mxf2-xqw6","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:45:04Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:45:06Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416739Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.3,"epss":0.00354,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"nilsteampassnet/TeamPass","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-103035","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-103035","GHSA-66Q9-MXF2-XQW6"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-639","CWE-862"],"cluster_id":2036,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2309","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2309"}},{"id":2310,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-2hjf-7455-w946 / CVE-2026-104199: aMQTT: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption and Improper Input Validation","summary":"aMQTT: Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity and Uncontrolled Resource Consumption and Improper Input Validation\n\n### Impact\n\n`amqtt` is vulnerable to a remote denial of service caused by improper MQTT topic-filter validation combined with catastrophic regular-expression backtracking.\n\nA single client can freeze the entire broker by sending one specially crafted `SUBSCRIBE` packet followed by one `PUBLISH` packet.\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by two defects:\n\n1. `add_subscription()` validates the placement of the single-level wildcard `+` using substring checks for `/+` and `+/`, rather than verifying that each `/`-delimited level containing `+` is exactly `+`. This allows malformed filters such as `\"+/\" + \"+\" * 60` to be accepted instead of rejected with return code `0x80`, as required by MQTT-4.7.1-3.\n2. `_matches()` converts every `+` character into the greedy regular-expression fragment `[^/]*` and evaluates the resulting expression with `re.fullmatch()`. A filter containing many adjacent `+` characters can cause catastrophic backtracking when matched against a topic that partially matches but ultimately fails.\n\nTopic matching runs synchronously inside the broker’s global broadcast loop. When the malicious match is evaluated, it blocks the asyncio event loop and prevents the broker from processing any other work.\n\nThe issue was reproduced using a single raw MQTT 3.1.1 TCP connection with no third-party client dependencies.\n\nSuccessful exploitation causes:\n\n- Existing message delivery to stop\n- New MQTT connections to receive no `CONNACK`\n- Keepalive processing to stop\n- Broadcast processing to stop\n- The broker to remain unavailable until the process is restarted\n\nUnder the default configuration, anonymous clients can exploit the vulnerability without credentials. When authentication is enabled, any authenticated client permitted to create arbitrary subscriptions and publish messages may still exploit it. Authentication alone is therefore not a sufficient mitigation.\n\n- Ecosystem: `pip`\n- Package: `amqtt`\n- Affected versions: `>= 0.11.0, <= 0.11.3`\n\nThe vulnerable code is present in the `v0.11.0` release commit, `352678c87e50e501a8a5bb91fab73c9400fa046c`, and remained present on the main branch as of `eeb1e254da9a1e8d9cc68ae754fcedac652e8fc0`. Versions before 0.11.0 were not evaluated.\n\nThis is a denial-of-service vulnerability only. `re.escape()` prevents arbitrary regular-expression injection, and there is no known path to remote code execution.\n\nNo confidentiality or integrity impact has been identified. Successful exploitation causes a complete loss of availability for the affected broker process.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in the `v0.11.4` released version; all users should upgrade.\n\nThe completed fix:\n\n- Validate topic filters one level at a time\n- Require any level containing `+` to be exactly `+`\n- As part of comprehensive MQTT topic-filter validation, require `#` to occupy an entire level and appear only as the final level\n- Replace the regular-expression matcher with deterministic, level-by-level MQTT topic matching\n\nSimply changi\n\nAffected packages: pip:amqtt\nPatched: amqtt 0.11.4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2hjf-7455-w946","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:43:41Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:43:42Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416740Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.7,"epss":0.00659,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"amqtt","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104199","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-104199","GHSA-2HJF-7455-W946"],"tags":["ghsa","pip","CWE-20","CWE-400","CWE-1333"],"cluster_id":2038,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2310","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2310"}},{"id":2311,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582 / CVE-2026-115578: go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)","summary":"go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)\n\nThe defect\n----------\nConfirmed at HEAD. server.go: cmdXCLIENT = []byte(\"XCLIENT\") is 7 bytes (line 78), so the dispatch match cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd) only guarantees len(input) >= 7. The handler then slices input[8:] (line 586):\n\n    case sc.XClientOn && cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd):\n        if toks := bytes.Split(input[8:], []byte{' '}); len(toks) > 0 {   // line 586\n\nA client sending the bare command XCLIENT (exactly 7 bytes) hits input[8:7] and panics runtime error: slice bounds out of range [8:7]. handleClient runs in the per-connection goroutine (server.go:391) which has no recover(); the only recover() calls are in the backend mail-processing workers (a different goroutine never reached during command parsing), so the unrecovered panic crashes the whole SMTP daemon.\n\nInput and attacker\n-------------------\nConnect to the SMTP port, then send XCLIENT\\r\\n (a bare LF also works; no HELO needed). Precondition: xclient_on: true (off by default, but a documented nginx-fronted deployment; go-guerrilla does not restrict who may send XCLIENT). Attacker model: any unauthenticated client on the SMTP port.\n\nVerification level\n------------------\nEXECUTED with a negative control (agent-run, driving the real server.handleClient with XClientOn=true over the suite's mock net.Conn). The bare XCLIENT panics with the exact OOB; the negative control XCLIENT with a trailing space (8 bytes) does not panic and returns 250. The upstream TestXClient tests XCLIENT ADDR=... and XCLIENT c but never the bare 7-byte form (the missing regression case). I independently re-confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes (server.go:78), that the handler slices input[8:] (server.go:586), and that handleClient (server.go:391) has no recover. NOT verified: did not stand up a standalone daemon on a real socket to observe OS-level process exit (used the mock net.Conn plus the traced absence of recover; crash-to-exit is standard Go runtime behavior).\n\nSuggested fix\n-------------\nGuard the slice against the exact-verb-length case: require len(input) > len(cmdXCLIENT)+1 (or slice at the verb length and trim) before input[8:]. A recover in the per-connection handleClient loop would also contain any residual command-parse panic to the single connection.\n\nAlso checked and SOUND\n----------------------\nThe rfc5321 recursive-descent parser (MAIL/RCPT/HELO/EHLO/address) is bounds-safe (next()/peek() return 0 at EOF), and the line/size/recipient caps are enforced. XCLIENT is the only off-by-one; every other command arm slices exactly at its verb length.\n\nAdvisory-source note\n--------------------\nFive-source enumeration (repo advisories, OSV, NVD, the global GitHub DB, no vendor CNA) shows the PROXY-header IP-spoof bug (CVE-2025-31135, fixed v1.6.7) is the only published advisory; this XCLIENT panic is undisclosed and not contested.\n\nDedup\n-----\nDedup gate clean: no phires/go-guerrilla blocking verdict in COVERED-INDEX, DISCLOSURE-INDEX or SCOUT-EXCLUDE.\n\nTooling\n-------\nAI assistance was used while inv\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/phires/go-guerrilla\nPatched: github.com/phires/go-guerrilla 1.6.7-1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:42:18Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:42:22Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416741Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.5,"epss":0.00623,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/phires/go-guerrilla","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115578","vuln_ids":["CVE-2025-31135","CVE-2026-115578","GHSA-HGHQ-53P7-C582"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-129","CWE-193","CWE-248"],"cluster_id":2040,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2311","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2311"}},{"id":2312,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-v9v2-98xq-627c / CVE-2026-104129: pREST _groupby function-expression SQL injection (incomplete fix of CVE-2025-58450)","summary":"pREST _groupby function-expression SQL injection (incomplete fix of CVE-2025-58450)\n\nWhat the fix did and the gap\n----------------------------\nThe v2.3.0 fix (commit e88dabb) routed the _select field through a strict new gate, sanitizeSelectField (postgres.go:947/1003/2097). The sibling _groupby path was left on the far weaker isSafeSQLExpression. adapters/postgres/postgres.go, GroupByClause (line 1946): a _groupby field that contains balanced parens takes the raw-SQL-expression branch (around lines 1999-2006), gated only by isSafeSQLExpression (line 2001, defined at 2043). That gate validates only the OUTERMOST function name against a 13-entry allowlist and uses a character allowlist that permits spaces, single quotes and parens. It blocks ;, --, /* , unbalanced parens and an outer pg_ prefix, but NOT a trailing UNION SELECT ..., a nested (SELECT ...) subquery, or an inner pg_ function. sanitizeSelectField (the CVE fix) rejects exactly those.\n\nInput and attacker\n-------------------\nGET /{database}/{schema}/{table}?_select=id&_groupby=upper((SELECT+1))+UNION+SELECT+current_user. Sink trace: controllers/crud.go:131 calls GroupByClause unconditionally, concatenates it into sqlSelect (crud.go:133), executed at crud.go:176 with only the WHERE values parameterized. Reached after only a table read-permission check, passable unauthenticated in the default config (the same pipeline and attacker model as the anchor).\n\nVerification level\n------------------\nEXECUTED with negative controls (agent-run go test ./adapters/postgres/, PASS): isSafeSQLExpression wrongly accepts four payloads and GroupByClause emits them raw (e.g. GROUP BY upper((SELECT 1)) UNION SELECT current_user, and GROUP BY abs((SELECT 1 FROM pg_sleep(3)))); negative controls with ; and -- are rejected; and sanitizeSelectField (the CVE fix) rejects the exact UNION payload the sibling gate accepts. I independently re-confirmed at HEAD that _groupby is gated by isSafeSQLExpression (postgres.go:2001) while _select uses sanitizeSelectField (postgres.go:947). NOT verified: end-to-end UNION exfiltration against a live Postgres (needs column/type alignment, Postgres-gated). The pg_sleep DoS primitive is unconditional and needs no alignment; char-by-char blind extraction is constrained (commas are pre-split, and =/ are blocked).\n\nSuggested fix\n-------------\nRoute _groupby through the same strict gate as _select (sanitizeSelectField-style: reject nested subqueries, UNION, inner pg_ functions, and anything past a single allowlisted function call), or parameterize/whitelist the group-by columns.\n\nAlso checked and SOUND\n----------------------\nThe other builders (WhereByRequest, OrderByRequest, JoinByRequest, CountByRequest, the jsonb/tsquery paths, ->>having, ident.IsValid) are sound; only the _groupby non-having function branch is the weak sibling.\n\nAdvisory-source note\n--------------------\nFive-source enumeration: CVE-2025-58450 (GHSA-p46v-f2x8-qp98, \"Systemic SQL Injection\", GO-2025-3941) and the newer GHSA-qvx3-q8vx-9q3c (which covers _select, fixed v2.3.0). Neither mentions _grou\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/prest/prest, go:github.com/prest/prest/v2\nPatched: github.com/prest/prest/v2 2.4.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v9v2-98xq-627c","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:41:42Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:41:43Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416741Z","severity":"critical","cvss_score":9.3,"epss":0.00442,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/prest/prest","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-104129","vuln_ids":["CVE-2025-58450","CVE-2026-104129","GHSA-P46V-F2X8-QP98","GHSA-QVX3-Q8VX-9Q3C","GHSA-V9V2-98XQ-627C"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-89"],"cluster_id":2043,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2312","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2312"}},{"id":2313,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5 / CVE-2026-63386: js-toml allows uncontrolled recursion in `load()` leading `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested input","summary":"js-toml allows uncontrolled recursion in `load()` leading `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested input\n\n## Summary\n\n`load()` parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a\nrecursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a\nmaximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting\n(arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack\nlimit, and `load()` throws an **uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`**.\n\nThis is a problem for two reasons:\n\n1. **Denial of Service.** A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any\n   service that parses user-supplied TOML, an unhandled `RangeError` can crash the\n   worker/process (500 / restart loop).\n2. **Error-contract violation.** The library signals invalid input via\n   `SyntaxParseError` (see `src/load/exception.ts`; the entire test suite asserts\n   `SyntaxParseError`). Consumers that follow this contract —\n\n   ```js\n   try { load(input); }\n   catch (e) {\n     if (e instanceof SyntaxParseError) return badRequest();\n     throw e; // unexpected -> propagates\n   }\n   ```\n\n   — will **re-throw** the `RangeError` instead of treating the input as malformed,\n   turning malformed input into an unexpected fatal error.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Unauthenticated attacker who can supply a TOML string to an application using\n  `js-toml` can force `load()` to throw a non-`SyntaxParseError` error.\n- If the error is not caught by a generic handler, the Node.js process terminates\n  (availability impact).\n- Even when caught generically, the documented/expected error type contract is broken,\n  which can bypass input-validation branches that key off `SyntaxParseError`.\n\nNo confidentiality or integrity impact. The error is thrown synchronously and is\ncatchable, so a consumer that catches *all* exceptions is not crashed — this is why the\nseverity is assessed Low–Medium rather than High.\n\n## Affected code / root cause\n\nThere is no depth bound anywhere in the parse pipeline. Recursion occurs in (at least)\ntwo independent places:\n\n1. **Parser (recursive descent).** `src/load/parser.ts` — `array` / `inlineTable`\n   rules recurse through `value` for each nesting level.\n2. **Interpreter (tree walk).** `src/load/interpreter.ts` —\n   `assignValue`, `createTable`, `getOrCreateArray` recurse per dotted-key segment, and\n   `cleanInternalProperties` recurses per object depth.\n\nBecause there is no configurable or hard limit, the recursion depth is bounded only by\nthe V8 stack, and overflow surfaces as a raw `RangeError`.\n\n## Steps to reproduce (PoC)\n\nEnvironment used: Node.js v20, `js-toml@1.1.2`.\n\n```js\nimport { load, SyntaxParseError } from 'js-toml';\n\nfunction probe(label, toml) {\n  try {\n    load(toml);\n    console.log(`[OK]            ${label}`);\n  } catch (e) {\n    const expected = e instanceof SyntaxParseError;\n    console.log(`[${e.constructor.name}${expected ? '' : ' (UNEXPECTED)'}] ${label}: ${String(e.message).split('\\n')[0]}`);\n  }\n}\n\n// 1) Deeply nested arrays  (~2 KB payload)\nprobe('nested array depth \n\nAffected packages: npm:js-toml\nPatched: js-toml 1.1.3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:40:45Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:40:46Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416742Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":0.00361,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"js-toml","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-63386","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-63386","GHSA-3G82-77XR-68X5"],"tags":["ghsa","npm","CWE-400","CWE-674"],"cluster_id":2048,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2313","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2313"}},{"id":2314,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-x6w4-f264-3vvr / CVE-2026-63184: Refitter: Unrestricted OpenAPI references permit build-host SSRF and file inclusion","summary":"Refitter: Unrestricted OpenAPI references permit build-host SSRF and file inclusion\n\n### Summary\n\nRefitter (the `refitter` dotnet tool, built on NJsonSchema for `$ref` resolution) fetches remote\n`http(s)` URLs and reads local files (including absolute paths and `../` traversal outside the input\ndirectory), inlining the referenced schema into the generated Refit interface/contracts. Running\n`refitter\n--output Out.cs` on a spec whose `$ref` points at an attacker/internal URL or an\narbitrary local file yields SSRF, remote file inclusion, and local file inclusion. Verified on\nRefitter 2.0.0.\n\n### Details\n\n- `$ref: http://attacker-or-internal/evil.json#/...` -> build host fetches (SSRF) and inlines the\nremote schema (RFI); confirmed property `REMOTE_REFIT_PROP`.\n- `$ref: /abs/path.json#/...` or `../../secret.json#/...` -> out-of-tree local file read + inlined\n(LFI); confirmed property `REFIT_LFI_MARKER`. Both absolute and relative traversal work.\n\nNo RCE: Refitter emits Refit interfaces with no baseUrl string literal (Refit sets the base address at\nruntime), enum values use C# verbatim-string doubling, and string defaults are escaped. The chain\nstops at SSRF + RFI + LFI.\n\nThe `$ref` resolution is performed by Refitter's NJsonSchema dependency, which Refitter ships and\ninvokes with these unsafe defaults.\n\n### PoC\n\n`reproduce.sh` (+ `make_spec.py`, `listener.py`) attached: installs the .NET SDK + Refitter if needed,\nconfirms LFI (out-of-tree read), SSRF (listener hit during generation), and RFI (remote schema\ninlined). Verified on 2.0.0.\n\n### Impact\n\nBuild-time SSRF (CWE-918) from the developer or CI host, disclosure of arbitrary local files\n(CWE-22), and inclusion of untrusted remote content (CWE-829), from running Refitter on an\nattacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description. No code execution. Estimated\nMedium-High, e.g. `[reproduce.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29395269/reproduce.sh)` (the CNA sets the final score).\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nDon't resolve remote `$ref`s by default (opt-in + host allowlist); confine local `$ref` resolution to\nthe input directory tree (reject absolute paths and `../` escapes). Apply at all nesting levels.\nCoordinate with NJsonSchema, where the resolver lives.\n[maintainer-report.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29395271/maintainer-report.txt)\n[advisory.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29395272/advisory.md)\n[reproduce.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29395283/reproduce.sh)\n[maintainer-report.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29395284/maintainer-report.txt)\n[advisory.md](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29395285/advisory.md)\n[listener.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29395286/listener.py)\n[make_spec.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29395288/make_spec.py)\n\nAffected packages: nuget:Refitter\nPatched: Refitter 2.1.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x6w4-f264-3vvr","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:35:29Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:35:31Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416743Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.1,"epss":0.00411,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"Refitter","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-63184","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-63184","GHSA-X6W4-F264-3VVR"],"tags":["ghsa","nuget","CWE-829","CWE-918"],"cluster_id":2050,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2314","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2314"}},{"id":2315,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr / CVE-2026-58192: appium allows unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin","summary":"appium allows unauthenticated arbitrary file/directory deletion in @appium/storage-plugin\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Appium storage plugin exposes an HTTP endpoint `POST /storage/delete` that takes a user-supplied `name` and deletes it from the server storage folder. The handler passes `name` straight into `path.join(storageRoot, name)` and then `fs.rimraf()` **without any path sanitization**. By sending a `name` containing `../` sequences, an unauthenticated remote client can escape the storage root and **recursively delete arbitrary files and directories** that the Appium process user can write, anywhere on the host filesystem.\n\nThe same plugin's *upload* path validates the name via `fs.sanitizeName` (`requireValidItemOptions`), but the *delete* path does not an asymmetry that makes the missing validation unambiguous.\n\n### Details\n\nPublished build (`node_modules/@appium/storage-plugin/build/lib/storage.js`), and source (`packages/storage-plugin/lib/`):\n\n- `packages/storage-plugin/lib/storage.ts:65-75` — `Storage.delete()`:\n```ts\nasync delete(name: string): Promise\n{\nif (name.toLowerCase().endsWith(TMP_EXT)) {\nreturn false;\n}\nconst destinationPath = path.join(this._root, name); // <-- no sanitization\nif (!(await fs.exists(destinationPath))) {\nreturn false;\n}\nawait fs.rimraf(destinationPath); // <-- recursive delete\nreturn true;\n}\n```\n- `packages/storage-plugin/lib/plugin.ts:77-83` — handler passes raw body:\n```ts\nSTORAGE_HANDLERS.deleteStorageItem = async function deleteStorageItem(req) {\nreturn await executeStorageMethod(\nasync (storage) => await storage.delete(parseRequestArgs(req, ['name']).name),\n);\n};\n```\n`parseRequestArgs` (`plugin.ts:94-106`) only checks that the key exists; it does **not** validate the value.\n- Contrast — the upload path *does* sanitize: `storage.ts:53-54` `add()` →\n`requireValidItemOptions()` (`storage.ts:236-256`) rejects any `name` that differs from `fs.sanitizeName(name)`. `delete()` skips this entirely.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Install and start the server with the storage plugin:\n```sh\nnpm install appium@3.5.0\n./node_modules/.bin/appium plugin install --source=npm @appium/storage-plugin\n./node_modules/.bin/appium --use-plugins=storage --address 127.0.0.1 --port 4723\n```\n(Default `--address` is `0.0.0.0`; `127.0.0.1` used here for a contained test.)\n\n2. Plant a victim file/dir outside the storage root, then delete via traversal:\n```sh\nmkdir -p /tmp/pv_dir && echo SECRET > /tmp/pv_dir/important.txt\necho single > /tmp/pv_file.txt\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \\\n-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n-d '{\"name\":\"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_file.txt\"}'\n# -> {\"value\":true}\n\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:4723/storage/delete \\\n-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n-d '{\"name\":\"../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pv_dir\"}'\n# -> {\"value\":true}\n```","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jwgx-mp9m-jwcr","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:34:30Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:34:30Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416744Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.6,"epss":0.00523,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"@appium/storage-plugin","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-58192","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-58192","GHSA-JWGX-MP9M-JWCR"],"tags":["ghsa","npm","CWE-22","CWE-73"],"cluster_id":2052,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2315","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2315"}},{"id":2319,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-mc8w-wjhw-45x5 / CVE-2026-114516: Etherpad: Pre-auth arbitrary file read","summary":"Etherpad: Pre-auth arbitrary file read\n\n### Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated path‑traversal / arbitrary file read vulnerability in Etherpad's /static/* handler allows any remote, unauthenticated user to read any file on the server's filesystem (e.g. GET /static/plugins/ep_etherpad-lite/static/..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5Cetc/passwd returns /etc/passwd) available to the user running the etherpad software. Because the endpoint is mounted before the authentication middleware, no credentials, session, or configuration change are required. The read primitive could escalate to a full server compromise: on a typical deployment by disclosing settings.json / credentials.json / /proc/self/environ, which contain the admin password, giving an attacker an admin session and, through the admin plugin installer, remote code execution.\n\n### Details\n\nEtherpad serves plugin static assets through src/node/utils/Minify.ts. The request path is first passed through the canonical sanitizer src/node/utils/sanitizePathname.ts, which is careful to convert backslashes to forward slashes only on Windows:\n\n```\n// src/node/utils/sanitizePathname.ts:11-20\np = pathApi.normalize(p);\nif (pathApi.isAbsolute(p)) throw new Error(`absolute paths are forbidden: ${p}`);\nif (p.split(pathApi.sep)[0] === '..') throw new Error(`directory traversal: ${p}`);\n// THIS CONVERSION MUST ONLY BE DONE ON WINDOWS, otherwise on POSIXish systems '..\\\\' in the input\n// pathname would not be normalized away before being converted to '../'.\nif (pathApi.sep === '\\\\') p = p.replace(/\\\\/g, '/');\n```\n\nOn Linux a backslash is an ordinary filename byte, so an input segment like ..\\..\\..\\test contains no ./.. path components and passes every check in sanitizePathname unchanged. The project's own test suite confirms this: src/tests/backend-new/specs/sanitizePathname.ts:62 lists ['posix', '..\\\\foo'] among the accepted paths (returned unchanged).\n\nThe vulnerability is that Minify.ts then performs that Windows‑only conversion unconditionally, after the sanitizer has run, justified by a comment asserting the opposite of the invariant above:\n\n```\n// src/node/utils/Minify.ts:171-186\nconst match = filename.match(/^plugins\\/([^/]+)(\\/(?:(static\\/.*)|.*))?$/);\nif (match) {\nconst library = match[1];\nconst libraryPath = match[2] || '';\nif (plugins.plugins[library] && match[3]) {\nconst plugin = plugins.plugins[library];\nconst pluginPath = plugin.package.realPath; // for 'ep_etherpad-lite' ==\n/src\nfilename = path.join(pluginPath, libraryPath); // -> absolute path, backslashes preserved\n// ... \"This conversion does not introduce a directory\n// traversal vulnerability because all '..\\\\' substrings have already been removed by\n// sanitizePathname.\" // <-- FALSE on POSIX\nfilename = filename.replace(/\\\\/g, '/'); // <-- reintroduces ../ AFTER the check\n}\n```\n\nAfter line 186 the string becomes a real traversal (\n/src/static/../../../../etc/passwd) with no re‑normalization and no containment check\nbefore the filesyst\n\nAffected packages: npm:ep_etherpad-lite\nPatched: ep_etherpad-lite 3.3.3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mc8w-wjhw-45x5","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:23:45Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:23:46Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416747Z","severity":"critical","cvss_score":9.8,"epss":0.01163,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"ep_etherpad-lite","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-114516","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-114516","GHSA-MC8W-WJHW-45X5"],"tags":["ghsa","npm","CWE-22","CWE-200","CWE-306"],"cluster_id":2060,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2319","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2319"}},{"id":2320,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-gfwj-45pc-w6r5 / CVE-2026-103033: ALTCHA: Nil-map panic (pre-verification DoS) in v1 parseServerSignature on malformed VerificationData","summary":"ALTCHA: Nil-map panic (pre-verification DoS) in v1 parseServerSignature on malformed VerificationData\n\n### Summary\n\n`parseServerSignature` in the v1 module only initializes `ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra` inside the `if err == nil` branch after `url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData)`. Go's `url.ParseQuery` returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into `Extra`, regardless of `err`, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a `VerificationData` string with a bad %-escape (e.g. `x=1&%zz=2`).\n\nThis is reachable pre-authentication: `parseServerSignature` is called by the exported `VerifyServerSignature` / `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` before any HMAC/signature check, and `VerificationData` is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application calling `VerifyServerSignature` or `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework.\n\n### Proof Of Concept\n\n```go\npayload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{\n    Algorithm:        SHA256,\n    VerificationData: \"x=1&%zz=2\",\n    Signature:        \"irrelevant\",\n    Verified:         true,\n})\nencoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(payload)\nVerifyServerSignature(encoded, \"some-secret\") // panics: assignment to entry in nil map\n\n```\n\n### Patch\n\n`Extra` is now initialized unconditionally before the `url.ParseQuery` error check, so it's always safe to write into regardless of parse errors.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRecover from panics around calls to `VerifyServerSignature`/`VerifyServerSignatureSafe`, or reject/sanitize `VerificationData` before calling them, until upgrading.\n\n### Patch\n\nPatch commit: 2c4fc27\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Arpit Jain (@arpitjain099) via private disclosure.\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2\nPatched: github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2 2.1.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfwj-45pc-w6r5","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:21:19Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:21:20Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416748Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":0.00407,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-103033","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-103033","GHSA-GFWJ-45PC-W6R5"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-248","CWE-476"],"cluster_id":2062,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2320","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2320"}},{"id":2321,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-7hvw-3c2q-45qg / CVE-2026-103025: bep/imagemeta: Unbounded memory allocation decoding PNG `zTXt` \"Raw profile type iptc\" chunks","summary":"bep/imagemeta: Unbounded memory allocation decoding PNG `zTXt` \"Raw profile type iptc\" chunks\n\nA crafted PNG can make `imagemeta.Decode` allocate memory far in excess of the input file's size, leading to memory exhaustion. Two separate paths in the `zTXt` \"Raw profile type iptc\" branch are affected: the declared chunk length drives an allocation directly, and the embedded zlib stream is decompressed without an output bound. A 42-byte file allocated 256 MB, and a 127 KB file allocated 460 MB.\n\n### Impact\n\nDenial of service by memory exhaustion against any application that decodes untrusted PNG images with this library. The decompression bomb is the more reliable vector, since it produces genuinely resident memory; the effect of the oversized `make` depends on the platform's overcommit behavior and any configured `GOMEMLIMIT` or cgroup limit.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in v0.17.3. \n\n### Workarounds\n\nReject or bound PNG input size before calling `Decode`, or clear `IPTC` from `Options.Sources` if IPTC metadata is not required.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Arpit Jain ([@arpitjain099](https://github.com/arpitjain099)).\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/bep/imagemeta\nPatched: github.com/bep/imagemeta 0.17.3","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7hvw-3c2q-45qg","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:20:52Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:20:53Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416748Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.7,"epss":0.0056,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/bep/imagemeta","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-103025","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-103025","GHSA-7HVW-3C2Q-45QG"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-409","CWE-789"],"cluster_id":2064,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2321","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2321"}},{"id":2322,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8 / CVE-2026-102945: Aether Project amf: panic on an unrecovered NGAP goroutine","summary":"Aether Project amf: panic on an unrecovered NGAP goroutine\n\n## Summary\n\nHandlePathSwitchRequest guards the UESecurityCapabilities IE for presence but never for length, and the extensible APER type silently yields an empty bit string, so six unguarded index-zero reads panic on an unrecovered goroutine and terminate the AMF. The AMF is the control-plane entry point for a 5G core, so terminating it drops mobility management for every subscriber. Confirmed at HEAD daed5a2 (present in v3.1.5).\n\n## The defect\n\nngap/handler.go:\n\n```go\nif uESecurityCapabilities != nil {                                                                              // line 3267, PRESENCE only\n    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)   // line 3268\n    ... (five more Bytes[0] reads, lines 3269-3273)\n}\n```\n\nSix index-zero reads, all guarded only by a nil check on the containing IE. Why the bit string can be empty: the field is declared `aper:\"sizeExt,sizeLB:16,sizeUB:16\"`. Because the type is EXTENSIBLE, parseBitString DISCARDS the SIZE(16) constraint when the peer sets the extension bit, and then `if rawLength == 0 { return bitString, nil }` returns a bit string with an empty Bytes slice and NO ERROR. So the decoder hands the handler a well-formed, error-free value whose Bytes has length zero, and the handler indexes it. The length guarantee the maintainers rely on comes from an ASN.1 SIZE constraint that the encoder rules legitimately waive on the extension path.\n\n## Verification\n\nProven dynamically, not by reading. Eight crafted bytes (40 00 80 00 80 00 80 00) decode cleanly through the REAL APER decoder, and the handler's exact expression then panics with \"index out of range [0] with length 0\". Panic discipline was checked first: the NGAP receive path has NO recover() (the only recover in the package is on SendToRan, the transmit path), so this is a genuine process kill and the AMF terminates.\n\nAttacker model, stated conservatively: a rogue or compromised gNB on the N2 interface, which additionally needs one registered UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID. This is NOT reachable by a bare over-the-air UE; the realistic scenario is a compromised or malicious base station, the threat model N2 security exists to address.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nCheck the length of Bytes before indexing, in all six places, and treat a short or empty bit string as a malformed IE with a PathSwitchRequestFailure rather than proceeding. More durably: since the SIZE constraint is waived on the extension path by design, no aper-decoded bit string can be assumed non-empty, so the same check is needed anywhere else a decoded bit string is indexed. Deduplicated against all eleven existing omec advisories and against hardening commit 030fe7c, which enumerated its sites and MISSED this handler.\n\n## Tooling\n\nAI assistance was used while investigating. The panic was reproduced by driving the real APER decoder with crafted bytes and then the handler's exact expression, and the absence of recover() on the rece\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/omec-project/amf\nPatched: github.com/omec-project/amf 1.7.1-0.20260725031321-d28042aaaea0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:20:38Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:20:39Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416749Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":4.9,"epss":0.00361,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/omec-project/amf","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-102945","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-102945","GHSA-V6W5-38CF-PCV8"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-125","CWE-248","CWE-1284"],"cluster_id":2066,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2322","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2322"}},{"id":2323,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-wgvx-x5g3-9v29 / CVE-2026-63012: baserCMS administrative API authorization bypass through session fallback","summary":"baserCMS administrative API authorization bypass through session fallback\n\n### Summary\n\nAn authorization bypass occurs against the API endpoint `/baser/api/admin/` by abusing the session authentication fallback.\n\n### Details\n\nThe mail settings are used here as an example.\n\nAdmin side:\n\nhttps://github.com/baserproject/basercms/blob/master/plugins/baser-core/config/permission.php#L100\nWith `auth => false`, it is not accessible with operator privileges.\n\nAPI side:\n\nhttps://github.com/baserproject/basercms/blob/master/plugins/baser-core/config/permission.php#L286\nWith `auth => true`, it is accessible even with operator privileges.\n\n---\n\nFirst, the default group for operators has `auth_prefix = 'Admin'`, which does not include `Api/Admin`.\n\nhttps://github.com/baserproject/basercms/blob/master/plugins/baser-core/src/Model/Table/UsersTable.php#L389\n\nBecause of this condition, when trying to access the `Api/Admin` API with a JWT, operators have `auth_prefix = 'Admin'`, so they cannot obtain a JWT and should not be able to access it.\n\nHowever, there is a problem in `getAuthenticationService`.\n\nhttps://github.com/baserproject/basercms/blob/master/plugins/baser-core/src/BaserCorePlugin.php#L507\n\nHere, session authentication is enabled even for the `Api/Admin` prefix.\nBy accessing the API with a Referer header, session authentication becomes active, allowing access to the API without holding a JWT.\n\nAs a result, all APIs configured with `auth => true` in `permission.php` become accessible by operators.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Log in with a site operator (operator) privileged account.\n2. Run the following code in DevTools:\n\n```javascript\nfetch('/baser/api/admin/baser-core/site_configs/view.json', {\nheaders: {\n'Referer': location.origin + '/baser/admin/'\n}\n})\n.then(r => r.json())\n.then(d => {\nconsole.table(d.siteConfig);\n})\n```\n\nAffected packages: composer:baserproject/baser-core\nPatched: baserproject/baser-core 5.3.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wgvx-x5g3-9v29","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:18:35Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:18:36Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416750Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.5,"epss":0.00466,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"php","product":"baserproject/baser-core","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-63012","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-63012","GHSA-WGVX-X5G3-9V29"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-290"],"cluster_id":2068,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2323","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2323"}},{"id":2324,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-2pj4-v76f-wjvx / CVE-2026-62955: baserCMS: Path Traversal Bypass via realpath() in BcThemeFileService (CVE-2026-30940 Patch Bypass)","summary":"baserCMS: Path Traversal Bypass via realpath() in BcThemeFileService (CVE-2026-30940 Patch Bypass)\n\n### Summary\n\nThe security patch introduced in baserCMS 5.2.3 to address CVE-2026-30940 / [GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq](https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/security/advisories/GHSA-c5c6-37vq-pjcq) is **incomplete**. The patch added a `realpath()`-based directory traversal check in `BcThemeFileService::getFullpath()`, but the check is **entirely skipped** when `realpath($baseDir)` returns `false` — which occurs whenever the target subdirectory does not physically exist on disk.\n\nAn authenticated administrator can bypass the patch by supplying a `type` value (e.g., `js`) that maps to a non-existent directory in the theme. The absence of the directory causes `realpath()` to return `false`, the validation block is skipped, and the raw `path` parameter containing `../` sequences is returned unvalidated. This enables arbitrary file write and remote code execution (RCE) — the exact same impact as the original CVE.\n\n**This vulnerability was verified exploitable on baserCMS 5.2.3 (the \"patched\" version of CVE-2026-30940).**\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `BcThemeFileService::getFullpath()` at [`plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php` lines 70–82](https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/blob/5.2.x/plugins/bc-theme-file/src/Service/BcThemeFileService.php#L70):\n\n```php\npublic function getFullpath(string $theme, string $plugin, string $type, string $path)\n{\n    // ...build $baseDir and $fullPath from $theme, $type, $path...\n    $baseDir  = $viewPath . $type . DS;      // e.g. .../BcThemeSample/webroot/js/\n    $fullPath = $baseDir  . $path;           // e.g. .../webroot/js/../../../../webroot/\n\n    $resolvedBase = realpath($baseDir);\n    if ($resolvedBase !== false) {           // ← BYPASS: entire block skipped when dir absent\n        $resolvedBase = rtrim($resolvedBase, DS) . DS;\n        $targetDir = realpath(dirname($fullPath));\n        if ($targetDir === false) {\n            $targetDir = $this->normalizePath(dirname($fullPath));\n        }\n        if (!str_starts_with(rtrim($targetDir, DS) . DS, $resolvedBase)) {\n            throw new BcException(__d('baser_core', 'パスにテーマディレクトリ外への参照が含まれています。'));\n        }\n    }\n\n    return $fullPath;   // ← Returns unvalidated path when realpath returns false\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause — the bypass condition:**\n\n| `realpath($baseDir)` result | Behavior |\n|-----------------------------|----------|\n| Valid path string (dir **exists**) | Validation runs → `../` traversal **blocked** ✓ |\n| `false` (dir does **not** exist) | Validation **skipped entirely** → `../` traversal **allowed** ✗ |\n\n**Difference from CVE-2026-30940 (original bug):**\n\n| | CVE-2026-30940 (≤ 5.2.2) | This bypass (5.2.3) |\n|--|--|--|\n| Validation | None at all | `realpath()` check — but conditional |\n| `type` needed | Any valid type (`layout`, `cell`, …) | Must map to a **non-existent** subdirectory |\n| `path` blocked | Never | Only when target dir already exists |\n| Root cause | Missing validation | `if ($resolvedBase !== false)` skips fal\n\nAffected packages: composer:baserproject/baser-core\nPatched: baserproject/baser-core 5.3.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2pj4-v76f-wjvx","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:17:47Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:17:48Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416751Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.2,"epss":0.01091,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"baserproject/baser-core","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-62955","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-30940","CVE-2026-62955","GHSA-2PJ4-V76F-WJVX","GHSA-C5C6-37VQ-PJCQ"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-22"],"cluster_id":2070,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2324","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2324"}},{"id":2325,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-25rm-9wvm-m38v / CVE-2026-77382: falcon-rust: Discrete-Gaussian sampler runs at 2^-33 precision, far below Falcon's requirement (reference KAT vectors no longer pass)","summary":"falcon-rust: Discrete-Gaussian sampler runs at 2^-33 precision, far below Falcon's requirement (reference KAT vectors no longer pass)\n\n**Reporter:** Connor Webber\n**Package:** `falcon-rust` (crates.io), repository `github.com/aszepieniec/falcon-rust`\n**Affected:** v0.1.3 and the current `master` (HEAD `cfa1b35`). Regression introduced in commit `bf2cf00`.\n**Component:** discrete-Gaussian sampler, `src/samplerz.rs` (`approx_exp`, `ber_exp`, `sampler_z`)\n**Status:** Confirmed by source review and by empirical measurement of the crate's own compiled code.\n\n## Summary\n\nfalcon-rust's discrete-Gaussian rejection sampler evaluates its `exp()` acceptance step at only 32 bits of fractional precision. Measured directly against the crate's own compiled code, `approx_exp` has a maximum relative error of 2^-33. For comparison, the Falcon reference implementation achieves about 2^-63, and the f64 code this crate replaced achieved about 2^-52. The current sampler is therefore roughly 2^19 (about 500,000x) less precise than the version it replaced, and about 2^30 less precise than the reference.\n\nFalcon's security proof relies on the sampled signatures being statistically indistinguishable from an ideal discrete Gaussian, so the signature transcript leaks nothing about the secret trapdoor. That guarantee holds only when the sampler's relative error stays small enough, over the roughly 2^64 signature budget, to keep the Renyi divergence between the real and ideal distributions negligible. The precision the security analysis relies on is cited in the literature between roughly 2^-40 and 2^-46 (for example the FACCT and isochronous-sampling analyses). At 2^-33 the sampler is below every value in that range, roughly 128x to 4096x too coarse depending on which bound you take, so the precondition the proof depends on is not met.\n\nThere is a second, bound-independent piece of evidence that removes any ambiguity: the crate's sampler can no longer reproduce Falcon's known-answer test (KAT) vectors, which are the authoritative correctness oracle. Rather than restore the precision, the maintainers loosened their own test tolerance and noted that \"rejection decisions may differ at the boundary.\" The regression is already visible in-tree; its security significance was simply not recognized.\n\nBecause the sampler's sigma is derived from the secret basis Gram-Schmidt norms, the resulting distribution deviation is secret-dependent. The `exp` function itself is public, but its inputs, and therefore the deviation, depend on secret quantities. This is the class of flaw that statistical and hidden-number-problem learning attacks on biased Gaussian samplers target.\n\nThe crate's own documentation describes this sampler as \"side-channel-hardened\" and notes that \"the sampler defines the secret-key distribution, so getting it wrong weakens the cryptography,\" which is exactly the property this defect touches.\n\n## Technical detail\n\nRoot location: `src/samplerz.rs`\n\n* `FixedPoint64 = FixedPoint\n` with `FRAC_UNIT = 1 << 32`, i.e. 32 fractional bits (`src/fixed_point.rs`). The crate already defines `FixedPoint128` with 6\n\nAffected packages: rust:falcon-rust\nPatched: falcon-rust 0.2.0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-25rm-9wvm-m38v","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:17:04Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:17:04Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416751Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.9,"epss":0.00274,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"falcon-rust","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77382","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77382","GHSA-25RM-9WVM-M38V"],"tags":["ghsa","rust","CWE-1240"],"cluster_id":2074,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2325","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2325"}},{"id":2326,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-r7h9-qx4h-77j5 / CVE-2026-77378: Bolt ListFormatHelper SQL injection","summary":"Bolt ListFormatHelper SQL injection\n\n### Impact\n\nSQL Injection in ListFormatHelper allows authenticated users with the upload permission to execute arbitrary SQL queries and exfiltrate sensitive database contents through the /async/select-options endpoint when general/caching/list_format is enabled.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been patched in Bolt 6.1.4.\n\nAffected packages: composer:bolt/core\nPatched: bolt/core 6.1.4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r7h9-qx4h-77j5","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:15:55Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:15:57Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416752Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.5,"epss":0.0029,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"bolt/core","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77378","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77378","GHSA-R7H9-QX4H-77J5"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-89"],"cluster_id":2076,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2326","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2326"}},{"id":2327,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-3xjf-9q55-vxw4 / CVE-2026-77380: Bolt: Prevent SSRF due to unchecked followed redirects","summary":"Bolt: Prevent SSRF due to unchecked followed redirects\n\n### Impact\n\nThe `/bolt/async/upload-url` and `/bolt/async/embed` endpoints validated only the **submitted** URL before fetching it server-side, but the fetch then **followed redirects to destinations that were never re-validated**. This allowed an authenticated user to bypass the SSRF guard (`UrlSafetyChecker`) and make the server issue requests to internal/cloud-metadata addresses.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been patched with Bolt 6.1.5.\n\nAffected packages: composer:bolt/core\nPatched: bolt/core 6.1.5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3xjf-9q55-vxw4","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:15:44Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:15:45Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416753Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.2,"epss":0.00366,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"bolt/core","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77380","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77380","GHSA-3XJF-9Q55-VXW4"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-918"],"cluster_id":2078,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2327","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2327"}},{"id":2328,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-6358-jg5p-hmjj / CVE-2026-77379: Bolt: Information disclosure through unfiltered public relation API endpoint","summary":"Bolt: Information disclosure through unfiltered public relation API endpoint\n\n### Impact\n\nA missing access-control filter in the public Relation API allowed unauthenticated users to discover metadata about unpublished, draft, and viewless content through REST and GraphQL endpoints.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been patched in Bolt 6.1.4.\n\nAffected packages: composer:bolt/core\nPatched: bolt/core 6.1.4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6358-jg5p-hmjj","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:15:23Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:15:23Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416754Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.3,"epss":0.00442,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"bolt/core","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77379","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77379","GHSA-6358-JG5P-HMJJ"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-402"],"cluster_id":2080,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2328","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2328"}},{"id":2329,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-2535-j2pq-qq4r / CVE-2026-77377: Bolt: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in URL-upload and embed endpoints","summary":"Bolt: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in URL-upload and embed endpoints\n\n### Impact\n\nTwo authenticated backend endpoints fetched a user-supplied URL server-side with no protection against internal targets.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been patched in Bolt 6.1.4.\n\nAffected packages: composer:bolt/core\nPatched: bolt/core 6.1.4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2535-j2pq-qq4r","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:14:42Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:14:43Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416754Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.2,"epss":0.00283,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"bolt/core","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77377","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77377","GHSA-2535-J2PQ-QQ4R"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-918"],"cluster_id":2082,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2329","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2329"}},{"id":2330,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-xr6g-7g83-j865 / CVE-2026-77376: Bolt: Open redirect enables post-authentication redirection to arbitrary domains","summary":"Bolt: Open redirect enables post-authentication redirection to arbitrary domains\n\n### Impact\n\nOpen redirect vulnerabilities in LoginFormAuthenticator allow attackers to redirect users to attacker-controlled domains after login success or login failure, enabling phishing attacks and potential token theft.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis has been patched in Bolt 6.1.4.\n\nAffected packages: composer:bolt/core\nPatched: bolt/core 6.1.4","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xr6g-7g83-j865","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:14:31Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:14:32Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416755Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.1,"epss":0.00277,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"bolt/core","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77376","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77376","GHSA-XR6G-7G83-J865"],"tags":["ghsa","composer","CWE-601"],"cluster_id":2084,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2330","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2330"}},{"id":2331,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793 / CVE-2026-77369: Daptin: Broken Access Control (IDOR) in the generic YJS collaboration endpoint","summary":"Daptin: Broken Access Control (IDOR) in the generic YJS collaboration endpoint\n\n### Summary\n\nDaptin registers a generic WebSocket endpoint, `GET /yjs/:documentName`, for real-time collaborative\ndocument editing (YJS/CRDT). Unlike its purpose-built sibling route, this generic endpoint performs\nno per-resource authorization check - it only verifies that *some* user session exists. Because the\ndocument store parses `:documentName` as `typename.referenceId.columnName` and fetches that row's\nreal column content unconditionally, any authenticated user (including a brand-new, zero-privilege,\nself-registered account) can read - and, since YJS sync is bidirectional, also write - the content\nof any `file.*`-typed column on any row of any table, including tables that are admin-only by\ndefault.\n\n### Details\n\n`InitializeYjsResources` (`server/endpoint_yjs.go`) registers two routes.\n\nThe purpose-built, correctly-secured route, registered once per `file.*`-typed column on every\ntable:\n\n```go\n// server/endpoint_yjs.go:47-113 (abridged)\npath := fmt.Sprintf(\"/live/%v/:referenceId/%v/yjs\", typename, columnInfo.ColumnName)\n...\nreturn func(ginContext *gin.Context) {\n    sessionUser := ...\n    if sessionUser == nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(403); return }\n    ...\n    object, _, getErr := cruds[typename].GetSingleRowByReferenceIdWithTransaction(typename, parsedId, nil, tx)\n    if getErr != nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(404); return }\n    ...\n    objectPermission := cruds[typename].GetRowPermission(object, tx2)\n    if !objectPermission.CanUpdate(user.UserReferenceId, user.Groups, cruds[typename].AdministratorGroupId) {\n        ginContext.AbortWithStatus(401)\n        return\n    }\n    roomName := fmt.Sprintf(\"%v%v%v%v%v\", typename, \".\", referenceId, \".\", columnInfo.ColumnName)\n    ...\n    yjsConnectionHandler(ginContext.Writer, ginContext.Request)\n}\n```\n\nThis route correctly requires a session, loads the actual row, and checks\n`objectPermission.CanUpdate(...)` for the specific requesting user before allowing the WebSocket\nupgrade.\n\nA second, generic route is registered right above it, with none of those checks:\n\n```go\n// server/endpoint_yjs.go:27-38\ndefaultRouter.GET(\"/yjs/:documentName\", func(ginContext *gin.Context) {\n    sessionUser := ginContext.Request.Context().Value(\"user\")\n    if sessionUser == nil {\n        ginContext.AbortWithStatus(403)\n        return\n    }\n    yjsConnectionHandler(ginContext.Writer, ginContext.Request)\n})\n```\n\nThe only gate here is \"is some session present\" - there is no lookup of the referenced row, no\n`GetRowPermission`, no `CanUpdate`/`CanRead` check at all. `:documentName` is taken verbatim from\nthe URL and handed straight to `yjsConnectionHandler`.\n\nThe YJS document store's content provider parses `documentName` using exactly the\n`typename.referenceId.columnName` convention the secure route builds internally as `roomName`, and\nuses it to fetch the real row from the database with no authorization check of its own:\n\n```go\n// server/yjs_doucment_provider.go:41-115 (abridged)\nydb.WithInitialContentProvider(func(doc\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/daptin/daptin\nPatched: github.com/daptin/daptin 0.12.30","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793","published_at":"2026-11-20T00:14:14Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T00:14:15Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416756Z","severity":"critical","cvss_score":9.6,"epss":0.00397,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/daptin/daptin","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-77369","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-77369","GHSA-WJ7X-58C2-5793"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-639","CWE-862","CWE-863"],"cluster_id":2086,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2331","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2331"}}],"total":340,"has_more":true,"next_cursor":"MjAyNi0xMS0yMFQwMDoxNDoxNC4wMDAwMDB8MjMzMQ","limit":50,"page":1,"grouped":false,"filter":{"builds":"exclude","source":"ghsa"}}