{"vuln_id":"CVE-2025-31135","aliases":[],"description":"Go-Guerrilla SMTP Daemon is a lightweight SMTP server written in Go. Prior to 1.6.7, when ProxyOn is enabled, the PROXY command will be accepted multiple times, with later invocations overriding earlier ones. The proxy protocol only supports one initial PROXY header; anything after that is considered part of the exchange between client and server, so the client is free to send further PROXY commands with whatever data it pleases. go-guerrilla will treat these as coming from the reverse proxy, allowing a client to spoof its IP address. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.6.7.","published_at":"2025-04-01T22:15:21.437000Z","modified_at":"2026-06-17T09:09:55.100000Z","first_seen_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:19.288727Z","severity":"medium","severity_source":"nvd","cvss_score":5.3,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","cwe":["CWE-20"],"vendor":null,"product":null,"kev":{"is_kev":false,"date_added":null,"due_date":null,"ransomware":false},"epss":0.00382,"epss_percentile":0.33012,"nvd_status":"Deferred","enriched_at":"2026-11-22T18:08:27.734298Z","links":{"nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31135"},"matched_alias":null,"items":[{"id":10958,"source":{"id":"osv","name":"OSV.dev"},"title":"GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582: go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)","summary":"go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)\n\nThe defect\n----------\nConfirmed at HEAD. server.go: cmdXCLIENT = []byte(\"XCLIENT\") is 7 bytes (line 78), so the dispatch match cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd) only guarantees len(input) >= 7. The handler then slices input[8:] (line 586):\n\n    case sc.XClientOn && cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd):\n        if toks := bytes.Split(input[8:], []byte{' '}); len(toks) > 0 {   // line 586\n\nA client sending the bare command XCLIENT (exactly 7 bytes) hits input[8:7] and panics runtime error: slice bounds out of range [8:7]. handleClient runs in the per-connection goroutine (server.go:391) which has no recover(); the only recover() calls are in the backend mail-processing workers (a different goroutine never reached during command parsing), so the unrecovered panic crashes the whole SMTP daemon.\n\nInput and attacker\n-------------------\nConnect to the SMTP port, then send XCLIENT\\r\\n (a bare LF also works; no HELO needed). Precondition: xclient_on: true (off by default, but a documented nginx-fronted deployment; go-guerrilla does not restrict who may send XCLIENT). Attacker model: any unauthenticated client on the SMTP port.\n\nVerification level\n------------------\nEXECUTED with a negative control (agent-run, driving the real server.handleClient with XClientOn=true over the suite's mock net.Conn). The bare XCLIENT panics with the exact OOB; the negative control XCLIENT with a trailing space (8 bytes) does not panic and returns 250. The upstream TestXClient tests XCLIENT ADDR=... and XCLIENT c but never the bare 7-byte form (the missing regression case). I independently re-confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes (server.go:78), that the handler slices input[8:] (server.go:586), and that handleClient (server.go:391) has no recover. NOT verified: did not stand up a standalone daemon on a real socket to observe OS-level process exit (used the mock net.Conn plus the traced absence of recover; crash-to-exit is standard Go runtime behavior).\n\nSuggested fix\n-------------\nGuard the slice against the exact-verb-length case: require len(input) > len(cmdXCLIENT)+1 (or slice at the verb length and trim) before input[8:]. A recover in the per-connection handleClient loop would also contain any residual command-parse panic to the single connection.\n\nAlso checked and SOUND\n----------------------\nThe rfc5321 recursive-descent parser (MAIL/RCPT/HELO/EHLO/address) is bounds-safe (next()/peek() return 0 at EOF), and the line/size/recipient caps are enforced. XCLIENT is the only off-by-one; every other command arm slices exactly at its verb length.\n\nAdvisory-source note\n--------------------\nFive-source enumeration (repo advisories, OSV, NVD, the global GitHub DB, no vendor CNA) shows the PROXY-header IP-spoof bug (CVE-2025-31135, fixed v1.6.7) is the only published advisory; this XCLIENT panic is undisclosed and not contested.\n\nDedup\n-----\nDedup gate clean: no phires/go-guerrilla blocking verdict in COVERED-INDEX, DISCLOSURE-INDEX or SCOUT-EXCLUDE.\n\nTooling\n-------\nAI assistance was used while inv\n\nAffected: Go:github.com/phires/go-guerrilla\n\nFixed in: 1.6.7-1\n\nReferences:\nhttps://github.com/phires/go-guerrilla/security/advisories/GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115578\nhttps://github.com/phires/go-guerrilla/commit/b6deed97ff70f52bf34c386d33967694e7330d33\nhttps://github.com/phires/go-guerrilla/commit/f0d0f2c40dcacf212e3a6a055ae67f7b412affc4\nhttps://github.com/phires/go-guerrilla\nhttps://github.com/phires/go-guerrilla/releases/tag/v1.6.7-1","url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:42:18Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T15:00:07.726946Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:55.946330Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.5,"epss":0.00623,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/phires/go-guerrilla","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115578","vuln_ids":["CVE-2025-31135","CVE-2026-115578","GHSA-HGHQ-53P7-C582"],"tags":["osv","go","fix-available"],"cluster_id":2040,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/10958","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/10958"}},{"id":2311,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582 / CVE-2026-115578: go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)","summary":"go-guerrilla crashes on a bare XCLIENT command (7-byte slice off-by-one panic)\n\nThe defect\n----------\nConfirmed at HEAD. server.go: cmdXCLIENT = []byte(\"XCLIENT\") is 7 bytes (line 78), so the dispatch match cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd) only guarantees len(input) >= 7. The handler then slices input[8:] (line 586):\n\n    case sc.XClientOn && cmdXCLIENT.match(cmd):\n        if toks := bytes.Split(input[8:], []byte{' '}); len(toks) > 0 {   // line 586\n\nA client sending the bare command XCLIENT (exactly 7 bytes) hits input[8:7] and panics runtime error: slice bounds out of range [8:7]. handleClient runs in the per-connection goroutine (server.go:391) which has no recover(); the only recover() calls are in the backend mail-processing workers (a different goroutine never reached during command parsing), so the unrecovered panic crashes the whole SMTP daemon.\n\nInput and attacker\n-------------------\nConnect to the SMTP port, then send XCLIENT\\r\\n (a bare LF also works; no HELO needed). Precondition: xclient_on: true (off by default, but a documented nginx-fronted deployment; go-guerrilla does not restrict who may send XCLIENT). Attacker model: any unauthenticated client on the SMTP port.\n\nVerification level\n------------------\nEXECUTED with a negative control (agent-run, driving the real server.handleClient with XClientOn=true over the suite's mock net.Conn). The bare XCLIENT panics with the exact OOB; the negative control XCLIENT with a trailing space (8 bytes) does not panic and returns 250. The upstream TestXClient tests XCLIENT ADDR=... and XCLIENT c but never the bare 7-byte form (the missing regression case). I independently re-confirmed at HEAD that cmdXCLIENT is 7 bytes (server.go:78), that the handler slices input[8:] (server.go:586), and that handleClient (server.go:391) has no recover. NOT verified: did not stand up a standalone daemon on a real socket to observe OS-level process exit (used the mock net.Conn plus the traced absence of recover; crash-to-exit is standard Go runtime behavior).\n\nSuggested fix\n-------------\nGuard the slice against the exact-verb-length case: require len(input) > len(cmdXCLIENT)+1 (or slice at the verb length and trim) before input[8:]. A recover in the per-connection handleClient loop would also contain any residual command-parse panic to the single connection.\n\nAlso checked and SOUND\n----------------------\nThe rfc5321 recursive-descent parser (MAIL/RCPT/HELO/EHLO/address) is bounds-safe (next()/peek() return 0 at EOF), and the line/size/recipient caps are enforced. XCLIENT is the only off-by-one; every other command arm slices exactly at its verb length.\n\nAdvisory-source note\n--------------------\nFive-source enumeration (repo advisories, OSV, NVD, the global GitHub DB, no vendor CNA) shows the PROXY-header IP-spoof bug (CVE-2025-31135, fixed v1.6.7) is the only published advisory; this XCLIENT panic is undisclosed and not contested.\n\nDedup\n-----\nDedup gate clean: no phires/go-guerrilla blocking verdict in COVERED-INDEX, DISCLOSURE-INDEX or SCOUT-EXCLUDE.\n\nTooling\n-------\nAI assistance was used while inv\n\nAffected packages: go:github.com/phires/go-guerrilla\nPatched: github.com/phires/go-guerrilla 1.6.7-1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hghq-53p7-c582","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:42:18Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:42:22Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416741Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":7.5,"epss":0.00623,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"github.com/phires/go-guerrilla","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115578","vuln_ids":["CVE-2025-31135","CVE-2026-115578","GHSA-HGHQ-53P7-C582"],"tags":["ghsa","go","CWE-129","CWE-193","CWE-248"],"cluster_id":2040,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2311","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2311"}}]}