{"vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115565","aliases":["GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg"],"description":"storyblok-backup: Stored path traversal via unsanitized Storyblok component names in backup output","published_at":"2026-11-19T19:17:18.167000Z","modified_at":"2026-11-20T15:15:03.372383Z","first_seen_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:19.274697Z","severity":"medium","severity_source":"nvd","cvss_score":5.7,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N","cwe":["CWE-22"],"vendor":null,"product":null,"kev":{"is_kev":false,"date_added":null,"due_date":null,"ransomware":false},"epss":0.00359,"epss_percentile":0.3029,"nvd_status":"Received","enriched_at":null,"links":{"nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115565"},"matched_alias":null,"items":[{"id":10874,"source":{"id":"osv","name":"OSV.dev"},"title":"GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg: storyblok-backup: Stored path traversal via unsanitized Storyblok component names in backup output","summary":"storyblok-backup: Stored path traversal via unsanitized Storyblok component names in backup output\n\n### Summary\nstoryblok-backup writes files using unsanitized names for Storyblok components, which are content type or schema definitions. This allows a component name containing path traversal sequences to cause backup files to be written outside the intended backup directory. Anyone with component management access in the source Storyblok space, not server access, can plant a malicious component name that causes arbitrary file writes on the machine of anyone who later runs a backup against that space.\n\n### Details\nThe writeJson function, which takes a folder, a file name, and content, builds the output file path by directly concatenating the backup directory, the folder, and the file name as strings, with no path sanitization or containment check.\n\nFor the components resource type specifically, the file name used is the component's own name field, which is free text and editable by anyone with component management access in the Storyblok CMS.\n\nOther resource types are not affected by this same issue. Stories and datasources use their numeric IDs as filenames, and assets have their filename derived by splitting on the slash character and taking the last segment, which strips path separators. This issue is scoped specifically to components.\n\nSince the component name is stored in Storyblok and only read back later when the backup tool runs, this is a stored, second order vulnerability. The malicious value is planted once, then triggers on every subsequent backup run performed by anyone using this tool against that Storyblok space.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Step 1 — plant the malicious component name via Storyblok's Management API:**\n\ncurl -X POST \"https://mapi.storyblok.com/v1/spaces/\n/components/\" \\\n-H \"Authorization:\n\" \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d '{\n\"component\": {\n\"name\": \"../../../../tmp/evil-storyblok-backup\",\n\"schema\": {}\n}\n}'\n\nAny Storyblok user with component-management permission in the space (not server access to wherever backups run) can do this through the Storyblok UI just as easily, by naming a new component with this value in the component name field.\n\n**Step 2 — run storyblok-backup against this space, exactly as a normal user would:**\n\nnpx storyblok-backup \\\n--space\n\\\n--token\n\\\n--path ./backup \\\n--types \"components\"\n\n**Step 3 — observe the actual file write location:**\n\nWith the malicious component name above, the tool's writeJson() function builds the output path as:\n\nbackupDir + \"/components\" + \"/../../../../tmp/evil-storyblok-backup\" + \".json\"\n\nwhich resolves outside ./backup entirely. Confirm with:\n\nls -la /tmp/evil-storyblok-backup.json\n\nThe file exists there, outside the --path ./backup directory that was configured, containing the full JSON definition of the malicious component.\n\n**Step 4 — for comparison, confirm assets and stories are NOT affected:**\n\nThe same defaultFetch() pattern is used for stories and datasources (\n\nAffected: npm:storyblok-backup\n\nFixed in: 0.7.1\n\nReferences:\nhttps://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/security/advisories/GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115565\nhttps://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/commit/f4e4bb1979832abd7e4eb1666e2b3cfc767f587a\nhttps://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup\nhttps://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/releases/tag/v0.7.1","url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:55:18Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T15:15:03.372383Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:55.946237Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.7,"epss":0.00359,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"storyblok-backup","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115565","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-115565","GHSA-VCX7-PFRH-MCFG"],"tags":["osv","npm","fix-available"],"cluster_id":2025,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/10874","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/10874"}},{"id":2303,"source":{"id":"ghsa","name":"GitHub Security Advisories"},"title":"GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg / CVE-2026-115565: storyblok-backup: Stored path traversal via unsanitized Storyblok component names in backup output","summary":"storyblok-backup: Stored path traversal via unsanitized Storyblok component names in backup output\n\n### Summary\nstoryblok-backup writes files using unsanitized names for Storyblok components, which are content type or schema definitions. This allows a component name containing path traversal sequences to cause backup files to be written outside the intended backup directory. Anyone with component management access in the source Storyblok space, not server access, can plant a malicious component name that causes arbitrary file writes on the machine of anyone who later runs a backup against that space.\n\n### Details\nThe writeJson function, which takes a folder, a file name, and content, builds the output file path by directly concatenating the backup directory, the folder, and the file name as strings, with no path sanitization or containment check.\n\nFor the components resource type specifically, the file name used is the component's own name field, which is free text and editable by anyone with component management access in the Storyblok CMS.\n\nOther resource types are not affected by this same issue. Stories and datasources use their numeric IDs as filenames, and assets have their filename derived by splitting on the slash character and taking the last segment, which strips path separators. This issue is scoped specifically to components.\n\nSince the component name is stored in Storyblok and only read back later when the backup tool runs, this is a stored, second order vulnerability. The malicious value is planted once, then triggers on every subsequent backup run performed by anyone using this tool against that Storyblok space.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Step 1 — plant the malicious component name via Storyblok's Management API:**\n\ncurl -X POST \"https://mapi.storyblok.com/v1/spaces/\n/components/\" \\\n-H \"Authorization:\n\" \\\n-H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n-d '{\n\"component\": {\n\"name\": \"../../../../tmp/evil-storyblok-backup\",\n\"schema\": {}\n}\n}'\n\nAny Storyblok user with component-management permission in the space (not server access to wherever backups run) can do this through the Storyblok UI just as easily, by naming a new component with this value in the component name field.\n\n**Step 2 — run storyblok-backup against this space, exactly as a normal user would:**\n\nnpx storyblok-backup \\\n--space\n\\\n--token\n\\\n--path ./backup \\\n--types \"components\"\n\n**Step 3 — observe the actual file write location:**\n\nWith the malicious component name above, the tool's writeJson() function builds the output path as:\n\nbackupDir + \"/components\" + \"/../../../../tmp/evil-storyblok-backup\" + \".json\"\n\nwhich resolves outside ./backup entirely. Confirm with:\n\nls -la /tmp/evil-storyblok-backup.json\n\nThe file exists there, outside the --path ./backup directory that was configured, containing the full JSON definition of the malicious component.\n\n**Step 4 — for comparison, confirm assets and stories are NOT affected:**\n\nThe same defaultFetch() pattern is used for stories and datasources (\n\nAffected packages: npm:storyblok-backup\nPatched: storyblok-backup 0.7.1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg","published_at":"2026-11-20T14:55:18Z","updated_at":"2026-11-20T14:55:19Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:18.416734Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.7,"epss":0.00359,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":"storyblok-backup","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115565","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-115565","GHSA-VCX7-PFRH-MCFG"],"tags":["ghsa","npm","CWE-22"],"cluster_id":2025,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/2303","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/2303"}},{"id":9061,"source":{"id":"nvd","name":"NVD CVE API 2.0"},"title":"CVE-2026-115565: storyblok-backup is an npx CLI tool to create backups of a Storyblok space and restore individual resources. Prior to 0.7.1, the writeJson function used the ed…","summary":"storyblok-backup is an npx CLI tool to create backups of a Storyblok space and restore individual resources. Prior to 0.7.1, the writeJson function used the editable Storyblok component name field as a filename without path containment. A person with component-management access in a Storyblok space could store a component name containing path traversal sequences; when another user later ran a backup for that space, the stored name escaped the configured backup directory and caused a JSON file to be written outside it on the backup host. Depending on the path chosen and the backup process's permissions, this could overwrite existing files at attacker-chosen locations. The vulnerability is specific to components: stories and datasources use numeric identifiers, and asset names are reduced to a final path segment. This issue is fixed in version 0.7.1.\n\nReferences:\nhttps://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/commit/f4e4bb1979832abd7e4eb1666e2b3cfc767f587a\nhttps://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/releases/tag/v0.7.1\nhttps://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/security/advisories/GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg\nhttps://github.com/webflorist/storyblok-backup/security/advisories/GHSA-vcx7-pfrh-mcfg","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115565","published_at":"2026-11-19T19:17:18.167000Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T20:17:19.683000Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-21T19:15:31.484709Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.7,"epss":0.00359,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":null,"product":null,"vuln_id":"CVE-2026-115565","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-115565","GHSA-VCX7-PFRH-MCFG"],"tags":["CWE-22"],"cluster_id":2026,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/9061","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/9061"}}]}