{"vuln_id":"CVE-2026-43911","aliases":["GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx"],"description":"Refresh tokens not invalidated on security stamp rotation","published_at":"2026-04-25T20:49:19Z","modified_at":"2026-05-04T17:50:06Z","first_seen_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.284013Z","severity":"medium","severity_source":"ghsa","cvss_score":6.8,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","cwe":["CWE-613"],"vendor":null,"product":null,"kev":{"is_kev":false,"date_added":null,"due_date":null,"ransomware":false},"epss":0.00216,"epss_percentile":0.12011,"nvd_status":null,"enriched_at":null,"links":{"nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43911"},"matched_alias":null,"items":[{"id":12059,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx / CVE-2026-43911: Refresh tokens not invalidated on security stamp rotation","summary":"Refresh tokens not invalidated on security stamp rotation ### Summary Refresh tokens are not invalidated when the user's `security_stamp` is rotated by some security-sensitive operations (password change, KDF change, key rotation, email change, org admin password reset, emergency access takeover). This allows an attacker holding a previously obtained refresh token to maintain session access even after the user has taken action to secure their account. ### Details #### How access tokens are validated When a client makes an API request with an access token, `Headers::from_request` in `src/auth.rs` (line ~626) checks that the `sstamp` claim embedded in the JWT matches the user's current `security_stamp` in the database. If they don't match, the request is rejected (unless a temporary stamp exception applies). This correctly invalidates access tokens after stamp rotation. #### How refresh tokens bypass the sstamp check The refresh token flow (`refresh_tokens` in `src/auth.rs`, line ~1205) works as follows: ```rust pub async fn refresh_tokens( ip: &ClientIp, refresh_token: &str, client_id: Option, conn: &DbConn, ) -> ApiResult<(Device, AuthTokens)> { let refresh_claims = decode_refresh(refresh_token)?; let mut device = Device::find_by_refresh_token(&refresh_claims.device_token, conn).await .ok_or(\"Invalid refresh token\")?; device.save(true, conn).await?; let user = User::find_by_uuid(&device.user_uuid, conn).await .ok_or(\"Impossible to find user\")?; // No security stamp validation here let auth_tokens = AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, refresh_claims.sub, client_id); Ok((device, auth_tokens)) } ``` The `RefreshJwtClaims` struct does not contain a `security_stamp` field: ```rust pub struct RefreshJwtClaims { pub nbf: i64, pub exp: i64, pub iss: String, pub sub: AuthMethod, pub device_token: String, pub token: Option, // No sstamp / security_stamp field } ``` Since the refresh flow only looks up the Device by `device_token` and never checks the security stamp, any refresh token issued before a stamp rotation remains valid as long as the Device record exists in the database. #### Comparison with upstream Bitwarden The upstream Bitwarden server (`bitwarden/server`) persists the `SecurityStamp` claim into the grant when issuing a refresh token. On every refresh, `ProfileService.IsActiveAsync` validates this: ```csharp // From bitwarden/server src/Identity/IdentityServer/ProfileService.cs public async Task IsActiveAsync(IsActiveContext context) { var securityTokenClaim = context.Subject?.Claims .FirstOrDefault(c => c.Type == Claims.SecurityStamp); var user = await _userService.GetUserByPrincipalAsync(context.Subject); if (user != null && securityTokenClaim != null) { context.IsActive = string.Equals( user.SecurityStamp, securityTokenClaim.Value, StringComparison Affected packages: rust:Vaultwarden Patched: Vaultwarden 1.35.5","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx","published_at":"2026-04-25T20:49:19Z","updated_at":"2026-05-04T17:50:06Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224736Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":6.8,"epss":0.00216,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"Vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-43911","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-43911","GHSA-6J4W-G4JH-XJFX"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-613","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11378,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12059","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12059"}},{"id":12715,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.35.5","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-937x-3j8m-7w7p, GHSA-569v-845w-g82p, GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx, GHSA-jjxg-p3v6-52ww, GHSA-x7g7-cgx5-jhx2\n\nSecurity keywords: security, GHSA-937X-3J8M-7W7P, GHSA-569V-845W-G82P, GHSA-6J4W-G4JH-XJFX\n\n## Security Fixes\r\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advice to update as soon as possible.\r\n- [GHSA-937x-3j8m-7w7p](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-937x-3j8m-7w7p) Unconfirmed Owner Can Purge Entire Organization Vault.\r\n- [GHSA-569v-845w-g82p](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-569v-845w-g82p) Cross-Org Group Binding Enables Unauthorized Read And Write Access Into Another Organization\r\n- [GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-6j4w-g4jh-xjfx) Refresh tokens not invalidated on security stamp rotation\r\n\r\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment.\r\n\r\n## Notes\r\n- The admin templates have changed, please update them if you override these via templates.\r\n- Two Factor Remember Tokens are now valid for max 30 days. Old tokens are invalid directly after upgrading.\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* apply policies only to confirmed members by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6892\r\n* Feat(config): add feature flag for Safari account switching by @DerPlayer2001 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6891\r\n* fix: add ForcePasswordReset to api key login by @montdidier in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6904\r\n* Add Webauthn related origins flag to known flags. by @pasarenicu in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6900\r\n* Add 30s cache to SSO exchange_refresh_token by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6866\r\n* Add cxp-import-mobile and cxp-export-mobile: feature flags on mobile by @phoeagon in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6853\r\n* Misc updates and fixes by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6910\r\n* Support new desktop origin on CORS by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6920\r\n* Fix `checkout` action version by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6921\r\n* Fix apikey login by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6922\r\n* Fix email header base64 padding by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6961\r\n* Update Feature Flags by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6981\r\n* Update crates and GHA by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6980\r\n* Use protected CI environment by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7004\r\n* Fix 2FA Remember to actually be 30 days by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6929\r\n* Misc Updates by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7027\r\n* Switch to `attest` action by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7017\r\n* Rotate refresh-tokens on sstamp reset by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7031\r\n* Misc org fixes by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7032\r\n* Fix empty string FolderId by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7048\r\n* Disable deployments for release env by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7033\r\n* Fix Send icons by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7051\r\n* prevent managers from creating collections by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6890\r\n* Change SQLite backup to use VACUUM INTO query by @getaaron in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6989\r\n* Handle `SIGTERM` and `SIGQUIT` shutdown signals. by @0x484558 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7008\r\n* Do not display unavailable 2FA options by @0x484558 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7013\r\n* Fix logout push identifiers and send logout before clearing devices by @qaz741wsd856 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7047\r\n* Fix windows build issues by @idontneedonetho in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7065\r\n* Crat","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.35.5","published_at":"2026-04-12T15:59:21Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135285Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.7,"epss":0.00289,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-43913","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-31835","CVE-2026-33420","CVE-2026-43911","CVE-2026-43912","CVE-2026-43913","GHSA-569V-845W-G82P","GHSA-6J4W-G4JH-XJFX","GHSA-937X-3J8M-7W7P","GHSA-JJXG-P3V6-52WW","GHSA-X7G7-CGX5-JHX2"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11374,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12715","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12715"}}]}