{"vuln_id":"GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g","aliases":["CVE-2026-47160"],"description":"Server-side request forgery (SSRF) via Icon Endpoint Decimal/Hex/Octal IP Bypass","published_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:25Z","modified_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:25Z","first_seen_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.268101Z","severity":"medium","severity_source":"ghsa","cvss_score":5.8,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N","cwe":["CWE-918","CWE-1389"],"vendor":null,"product":null,"kev":{"is_kev":false,"date_added":null,"due_date":null,"ransomware":false},"epss":null,"epss_percentile":null,"nvd_status":null,"enriched_at":null,"links":{"nvd":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g"},"matched_alias":null,"items":[{"id":12041,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-hw4g-2v3f-74x5 / CVE-2026-116678: Icon endpoint SSRF fix bypass via second-stage favicon IP literal URLs","summary":"Icon endpoint SSRF fix bypass via second-stage favicon IP literal URLs # Vaultwarden icon endpoint SSRF fix bypass via second-stage icon URL IP literals ## Summary The Vaultwarden icon downloader in 1.36.0 and earlier validates the user-supplied icon host before fetching the target page and revalidates DNS answers through a custom `reqwest` DNS resolver. However, after parsing a controlled HTML page, it fetches discovered favicon URLs with `get_page_with_referer(&icon.href, ...)` without first applying `should_block_host()` to the favicon URL host. For IP-literal favicon URLs such as `http://127.0.0.1:PORT/favicon.ico`, `reqwest` does not call the configured DNS resolver, so the resolver-level `post_resolve()` IP allowlist is bypassed and Vaultwarden connects directly to loopback. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2026-47160 / GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g (patched in 1.36.0). The original decimal, hex, octal, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 host normalizations are covered, but the second-stage favicon fetch could still reach non-global IP literals. ## Root cause Line numbers refer to the code as tested, shortly after 1.36.0. Initial icon route validation: - `src/api/icons.rs:115-131` parses the route host with `get_valid_host()` and applies `should_block_host(&host)`. - `src/http_client.rs:137-160` blocks IP literal hosts that are not global. - `src/http_client.rs:241-282` uses the custom DNS resolver to run `post_resolve()` against DNS answers for domain names. Second-stage favicon fetch: - `src/api/icons.rs:249-295` parses attacker-controlled `` and joins it against the page URL. - `src/api/icons.rs:492-532` iterates discovered icon URLs and passes each `icon.href` to `get_page_with_referer()`. - `src/api/icons.rs:407-414` builds `CLIENT.get(url)` and sends it without parsing the URL host or calling `should_block_host()`. The custom DNS resolver only sees names that require DNS. A direct IP literal URL can be connected by `reqwest` without resolver invocation, so the resolver's `post_resolve()` check does not run. ## Reproduction evidence The reporter confirmed with a regression test that a loopback canary was reached through `get_page_with_referer()`. A separate reqwest probe with a custom DNS resolver that denies every lookup showed that IP-literal URLs bypass the resolver entirely: ```text url=http://127.0.0.1:40417/favicon.ico body=SSRFHIT! resolver_calls=0 canary_hits=1 ``` ## Attack flow 1. An attacker hosts an ordinary public web page on a globally routable domain that passes the initial icon host validation. 2. The HTML contains a favicon link such as: ```html ``` 3. A request to Vaultwarden's internal icon endpoint for the attacker domain causes Vaultwarden to fetch and parse that page. 4. Vaultwarden attempts to fetch the discovered favicon URL directly. 5. Because the favicon URL host is an IP literal and `get_page_with_referer()` does not prevalidate the URL, the DNS Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-hw4g-2v3f-74x5","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:05:28Z","updated_at":"2026-10-27T17:26:13Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224706Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.8,"epss":0.0033,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-116678","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-116678","CVE-2026-47160","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G","GHSA-HW4G-2V3F-74X5"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-918","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11350,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12041","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12041"}},{"id":12048,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-vh5m-fc9v-m84g: SSRF filter bypass (regex not applied post-resolution)","summary":"SSRF filter bypass (regex not applied post-resolution) ### Summary The internal-IP SSRF filter can be bypassed in specific non-default configuration. When an operator disables non-global-IP block (`HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_NON_GLOBAL_IPS=false`) and instead relies on `HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_REGEX` to keep the server's outbound HTTP client (icon fetching, etc.) away from internal ranges, the regex is **never applied to resolved IP addresses**. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore reach a regex-blocked internal IP by supplying a hostname that resolves to that IP but does not textually match the regex,via unauthenticated `/icons//icon.png` endpoint. Default installs are **not** affected. This is a residual gap in the same fixes implemented for CVE-2026-47160 / GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g (fixed in 1.36.0). That fix closed decimal/hex/octal IP-format bypass which affected the _default_ config. This report is a distinct gap, the regex is not applied post-resolution, that affects _regex-reliance_ config and is present in 1.36.0 and earlier. It is fixed in 1.37.0. ### Details The pre-connect and post-resolution filters are asymmetric. `should_block_host()` (src/http_client.rs:135) applies **both** checks to an IP host — `should_block_ip()` and `should_block_address_regex()`. But `post_resolve()` (src/http_client.rs:273) applies **only** `should_block_ip()`: // src/http_client.rs:273 @ tag 1.36.0 fn post_resolve(name: &str, ip: IpAddr) -> Result<(), CustomHttpClientError> { if should_block_ip(ip) { Err(CustomHttpClientError::NonGlobalIp { domain: Some(name.to_string()), ip }) } else { Ok(()) } } `should_block_ip()` (src/http_client.rs:61) short-circuits to `false` for every IP when the non-global-IP block is disabled: fn should_block_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> bool { if !CONFIG.http_request_block_non_global_ips() { // default: true return false; } !is_global(ip) } So with `http_request_block_non_global_ips=false`, the regex (`http_request_block_regex`, src/config.rs:703) is the *only* protection for internal ranges — yet `resolve_domain()` (src/http_client.rs:241) only runs it against the domain string in `pre_resolve()` (src/http_client.rs:257), never against the resolved IP in `post_resolve()`. For a URL whose host is a domain name, the flow is: 1. pre_resolve() -> should_block_host(Host::Domain(name)) -> regex tested against the **domain string** only. A hostname that does not textually contain the target IP does not match an IP-pattern regex -> pass. 2. DNS resolves the name to an internal IP. 3. post_resolve(name, ip) -> should_block_ip(ip) -> false (flag disabled) -> regex is never applied to the IP -> allowed. The request then proceeds to the internal IP. In contrast, the same IP supplied as a literal is caught, because should_block_host() (used for IP-literal hosts at src/api/icons.rs:123) does apply the regex. Entry point: Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-vh5m-fc9v-m84g","published_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:31Z","updated_at":"2026-10-03T20:04:31Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224718Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.8,"epss":0.00291,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47160","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47160","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G","GHSA-VH5M-FC9V-M84G"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-918","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11362,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12048","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12048"}},{"id":12055,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g / CVE-2026-47160: Server-side request forgery (SSRF) via Icon Endpoint Decimal/Hex/Octal IP Bypass","summary":"Server-side request forgery (SSRF) via Icon Endpoint Decimal/Hex/Octal IP Bypass ### Summary The IP validation for the icon fetching endpoint `/icons/{domain}/icon.png` can be bypassed, resulting in a basic Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The `http_request_block_non_global_ips` protection checks IPs using Rust's `IpAddr::from_str()`, which does not parse decimal, hex, or octal IP representations. However, the underlying DNS/HTTP resolver (glibc/Hickory) resolves them. This SSRF allows an attacker to perform HTTP/HTTPS requests from the Vaultwarden server to arbitrary (internal) IPs, but only responds with parsed favicon images (not raw response bodies), limiting this to a blind internal network/port discovery via timing and response-size differences. ### Details Vaultwarden runs as two Docker containers: - vaultwarden, port 80 (internal only), using SQLite for storage - nginx reverse proxy TLS port 8443 externally, proxies to the vaultwarden container Root cause (two-stage bypass): 1. Pre-connect filter bypass (`src/http_client.rs:62-69`): `should_block_address()` uses Rust's `IpAddr::from_str()` which only recognizes dotted-decimal notation. Decimal/hex/octal representations are not parsed as IPs and pass through unchecked. 2. Post-resolve check bypass (`src/http_client.rs:229`): The `post_resolve()` function checks resolved IPs, but it is only called from the custom DNS resolver (`CustomDnsResolver::resolve_domain`). When the URL host is a numeric literal, the Rust `url` crate (WHATWG URL Standard compliant) parses it directly as an IPv4 address. Reqwest then connects to the IP without invoking the custom DNS resolver at all, `post_resolve()` is never called. Bypass payloads that successfully fetched from internal IPs: - `2130706433` → `127.0.0.1` (decimal integer) - `0x7f000001` → `127.0.0.1` (hexadecimal) - `0177.0.0.1` → `127.0.0.1` (octal-dotted) ### PoC Basic PoC: - https://localhost:8443/icons/127.0.0.1/icon.png -> Response is generic icon.png (Blocked IP) - https://localhost:8443/icons/2130706433/icon.png -> Response is vaulwarden favicon, bypassing the IP filter From the logs: ``` [2026-04-02 09:28:04.648][request][INFO] GET /icons/2130706433/icon.png [2026-04-02 09:28:04.651][response][INFO] (icon_internal) GET /icons//icon.png => 200 OK [2026-04-02 09:28:08.371][request][INFO] GET /icons/127.0.0.1/icon.png [2026-04-02 09:28:08.371][vaultwarden::api::icons][WARN] Blocked address: 127.0.0.1 [2026-04-02 09:28:08.371][response][INFO] (icon_internal) GET /icons//icon.png => 200 OK ``` The same applies to other resources, that are only internally available. An exemplary, additional nginx container on a Docker internal: true network, serving a favicon with no published ports, only reachable from the vaultwarden container, not from nginx or the outside, yet the decimal IP bypass (2886991875 for 172.20.0.3) successfully fetches the favicon through the Affected packages: :vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.36.0","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g","published_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:25Z","updated_at":"2026-05-19T21:27:25Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224732Z","severity":"medium","cvss_score":5.8,"epss":0.00291,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47160","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47160","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G"],"tags":["repo-advisory","","CWE-918","CWE-1389","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11353,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12055","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12055"}},{"id":12711,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.36.0","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-pfp2-jhgq-6hg5, GHSA-hxqh-ff5p-wfr3, GHSA-6x5c-84vm-5j56, GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g\n\nSecurity keywords: security, csrf, GHSA-PFP2-JHGQ-6HG5, GHSA-W6H6-8R66-HCV7, GHSA-HXQH-FF5P-WFR3, GHSA-J4J8-GPVJ-7FQR, GHSA-6X5C-84VM-5J56, ssrf, GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G\n\n## Security Fixes\r\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advice to update as soon as possible.\r\n- SSO Login CSRF\r\n  [GHSA-pfp2-jhgq-6hg5](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-pfp2-jhgq-6hg5)\r\n  [GHSA-w6h6-8r66-hcv7](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-w6h6-8r66-hcv7)\r\n- User/Organization Enumeration\r\n  [GHSA-hxqh-ff5p-wfr3](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-hxqh-ff5p-wfr3)\r\n- SSO existing-user binding\r\n  [GHSA-j4j8-gpvj-7fqr](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-j4j8-gpvj-7fqr)\r\n  [GHSA-6x5c-84vm-5j56](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-6x5c-84vm-5j56)\r\n- SSRF via Icon Endpoint\r\n  [GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-72vh-x5jq-m82g)\r\n- Some crate's updated and other minor security enhancements\r\n\r\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment.\r\n\r\n\r\n## Notes\r\n- Archiving of items is available\r\n  https://bitwarden.com/blog/keep-your-vault-tidy-with-item-archiving/\r\n  https://bitwarden.com/nl-nl/help/managing-items/#archive\r\n- Web Vault updated to v2026.4.1\r\n\r\n\r\n## What's Changed\r\n* SSO fallback to UserInfo preferred_username by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7128\r\n* Dummy identifier need to pass for a guid by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7154\r\n* add new /identity/accounts/prelogin/password by @stefan0xC in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7156\r\n* Add DuckDuckGo browser device type by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7147\r\n* Apply `duration_suboptimal_units` lint findings by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7144\r\n* Apply `ref_option` lint findings by @dfunkt in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7143\r\n* Fix hardcoded sso identifier by @Timshel in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7157\r\n* Update crates and fix a nightly lint by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7161\r\n* Fix Host/IP resolving by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7162\r\n* Several SSO Fixes by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7163\r\n* Add support for archiving items by @matt-aaron in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6916\r\n* Fix favicon fetching to check all icon links instead of just the first one by @Shocker in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6880\r\n* Fix merge conflict by @dani-garcia in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7164\r\n* Replace organization_uuid unwrap with proper error handling by @xjohnyknox in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6936\r\n* fix: return Err instead of panic on unknown cipher atype in to_json() by @mango766 in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7068\r\n* Allow SQLite to be linked against dynamically by @ISSOtm in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7057\r\n* Update crates and web-vault by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7171\r\n* Update hickory by @BlackDex in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7175\r\n\r\n## New Contributors\r\n* @matt-aaron made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6916\r\n* @Shocker made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6880\r\n* @xjohnyknox made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/6936\r\n* @mango766 made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7068\r\n* @ISSOtm made their first contribution in https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/pull/7057\r\n\r\n\r\n**Full Changelog**: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/compare/1.35.8...1.36.0\r\n\r\nYou can discuss this release here https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/discussions/7177","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.36.0","published_at":"2026-05-03T12:54:52Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T14:05:38.135282Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.3,"epss":0.00468,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"CVE-2026-47158","vuln_ids":["CVE-2026-47158","CVE-2026-47159","CVE-2026-47160","CVE-2026-47164","GHSA-6X5C-84VM-5J56","GHSA-72VH-X5JQ-M82G","GHSA-HXQH-FF5P-WFR3","GHSA-J4J8-GPVJ-7FQR","GHSA-PFP2-JHGQ-6HG5","GHSA-W6H6-8R66-HCV7"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security","stack","vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11366,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12711","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12711"}}]}