{"vuln_id":"GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv","aliases":[],"description":"Organization Admin can revoke and delete Owners through an Admin-mintable organization API key","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:28Z","modified_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:28Z","first_seen_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.266019Z","severity":"low","severity_source":"ghsa","cvss_score":3.8,"cvss_vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","cwe":["CWE-863"],"vendor":null,"product":null,"kev":{"is_kev":false,"date_added":null,"due_date":null,"ransomware":false},"epss":null,"epss_percentile":null,"nvd_status":null,"enriched_at":null,"links":{"nvd":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv"},"matched_alias":null,"items":[{"id":12039,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv: Organization Admin can revoke and delete Owners through an Admin-mintable organization API key","summary":"Organization Admin can revoke and delete Owners through an Admin-mintable organization API key ### Summary A confirmed organization Admin can revoke and permanently delete Owners and fellow Admins. The ordinary member removal route refuses exactly this, by name, with \"Only Owners can delete Admins or Owners\". The Admin instead creates the organization API key, which is guarded at Admin level where upstream requires Owner, and drives the public import endpoint, which applies no caller role check and does not exclude Owners. ### Details Two independent divergences from upstream combine. Either one alone is defensible design. `api_key()` in `src/api/core/organizations.rs` is guarded by `AdminHeaders`. Upstream gates the equivalent default key type on Owner in `HasApiKeyAccessAsync`, and `OrganizationClientProvider` accepts only that key type for the `client_credentials` grant. `ldap_import` in `src/api/core/public.rs` protects only the last confirmed Owner, via `count_confirmed_by_org_and_type(&org_id, MembershipType::Owner, &conn) <= 1`. Upstream excludes Owners from removal entirely, in both removal branches of `ImportOrganizationUsersAndGroupsCommand.cs`. The minted token carries scope `api.organization` and no user identity, so the import endpoint cannot tell which member created the key. ### PoC Organization with confirmed Owners A and C, and confirmed Admins B and D. Step 1. As Admin B, `POST /api/organizations//api-key` with B's master password. Returns 200 with the key. A plain User and a Manager both receive 401. Step 2. As Admin B, remove Owner C through the ordinary member route. Returns 400, \"Only Owners can delete Admins or Owners\". Step 3. Exchange the key at `POST /identity/connect/token` with `grant_type=client_credentials` and `scope=api.organization`. Step 4. `POST /api/public/organization/import` marking C deleted. Returns 200 and C is revoked. Step 5. The same call with `overwriteExisting` set true, omitting C and D from the member list, deletes both from the organization. Reproduced against a local instance on 1.37.3. The affected code is byte identical on current `main`. ### Impact CWE-863. A confirmed organization Admin gains destructive control over Owners and fellow Admins. The credential is scoped to the organization rather than to the member, so it keeps working after the Admin who created it is removed, and the creation route writes no event log entry. There is no confidentiality impact, because an Admin already exports every organization cipher through a route at the same guard level. The last confirmed Owner is protected, so an organization cannot be fully decapitated. The Admin cannot elevate their own role, and the import creates only ordinary members. A surviving Owner can reverse the removals by re-inviting, and can rotate the key. Affected packages: rust:vaultwarden Patched: vaultwarden 1.37.4","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv","published_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:28Z","updated_at":"2026-10-28T18:00:28Z","fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224702Z","severity":"low","cvss_score":3.8,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv","vuln_ids":["GHSA-QWX4-WCV4-MPCV"],"tags":["repo-advisory","rust","CWE-863","security","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden"],"cluster_id":11348,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12039","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12039"}},{"id":12065,"source":{"id":"gh-vaultwarden","name":"Vaultwarden releases + advisories (GitHub dani-garcia/vaultwarden)"},"title":"[SECURITY RELEASE] dani-garcia/vaultwarden 1.37.4","summary":"Fixes advisories: GHSA-7ccc-c43j-4p36, GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3, GHSA-q5x6-grh5-fqgc, GHSA-v576-3wvq-xh3c, GHSA-64mc-4p6f-r7x9, GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv, GHSA-7jg8-8m5x-6j9r\n\nSecurity keywords: security, GHSA-69Q9-V8P6-XVX3, GHSA-7JG8-8M5X-6J9R, GHSA-V576-3WVQ-XH3C, GHSA-Q5X6-GRH5-FQGC, GHSA-64MC-4P6F-R7X9, GHSA-7CCC-C43J-4P36, GHSA-QWX4-WCV4-MPCV\n\nSecurity Fixes\n\nThis release contains security fixes for the following advisories. We strongly advise updating as soon as possible.\n\nOrganization member revocation [GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3] (High, 8.1)\n\nTwo-factor authentication [GHSA-7jg8-8m5x-6j9r] (Medium, 6.8)\n\nOrganization invitations [GHSA-v576-3wvq-xh3c] (Medium, 6.8)\n\nAttachments [GHSA-q5x6-grh5-fqgc] (Medium, 6.5)\n\nOrganization event logs [GHSA-64mc-4p6f-r7x9] (Medium, 4.3)\n\nCipher sharing [GHSA-7ccc-c43j-4p36] (Medium, 4.3)\n\nOrganization API key [GHSA-qwx4-wcv4-mpcv] (Low, 3.8)\n\nAdditional dependency updates and minor security enhancements\n\nThese are private for now, pending CVE assignment and publishing at a later date.\n\nNote\n\nIf an organization has Admins you don't fully trust, consider rotating its API key after updating (Admin Console → Settings → Rotate API key). Before this release, Admins could also view the key.\n\nUpgrade notes\n\nReverse proxies: with IP_HEADER=X-Forwarded-For, the client IP is now the rightmost address that isn't in IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES (it used to be the leftmost). If you have several proxies in a row, for example a CDN in front of nginx, add all of them to IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES. Otherwise the address of the proxy in front is used for rate limiting and logs.\n\nSends: bw send receive on CLI 2026.4.2 and older no longer works, the same as against Bitwarden's own servers since v2026.8.0. Creating and managing Sends works on all clients.\n\nFeature flags: these flags were removed because no client reads them anymore: ssh-agent, ssh-key-vault-item, mutual-tls, anon-addy-self-host-alias, simple-login-self-host-alias, pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2, pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2, desktop-ui-migration-milestone-1 to -4, cxp-import-mobile and cxp-export-mobile. If EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS still lists one of them, startup logs a warning and saving settings in the admin panel fails until it's removed.\n\nDuo: DUO_USE_IFRAME (the deprecated Traditional Prompt) is removed and ignored if set.\n\nCustom templates: there's a new email template, email/recover_twofactor, sent after a login with a two-step recovery code.\n\nThe legacy POST /identity/accounts/register and POST /api/accounts/prelogin endpoints are removed. No current client uses them.\n\nWhen using a MariaDB or MySQL server which does not support native TLS/SSL encrypted connections, using the Alpine image of Vaultwarden might fail to connect. Add MARIADB_TLS_DISABLE_PEER_VERIFICATION=1 as an environment variable to your Vaultwarden server environment, and it will start running again.\n\nWhat's Changed\n\n[Web 2026.9.0] Support the vault banner policy by @tom27052006 in #7748\n\nAdd support for basic auth response client feature flag by @tom27052006 in #7745\n\n[web-v2026.8.1] store the user key ID by @Timshel in #7693\n\nAdd organizationsNew and policiesNew to sync response by @tom27052006 in #7666\n\nAdd pm-32009-new-item-types feature flag by @bdd in #7478\n\nUpdate Crates, GHA and JS by @BlackDex in #7751\n\nAdd pm-34171-card-scanner feature flag by @bdd in #7477\n\nset user_created bool for each separate invitation by @stefan0xC in #7753\n\nFix revoked org members retaining access to org ciphers by @abhiShandy in #7554\n\nEnsure all user checked routes are confirmed by @dani-garcia in #7763\n\nFix cortex-a53 build issues when using xx-cargo by @BlackDex in #7774\n\nAdd undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic feature flag (closes #7801) by @cad0p in #7802\n\nAdd Windows native credential sync to supported feature flags by @KingIronMan2011 in #7798\n\nHide the whole change-email section when EMAIL_CHANGE_ALLOWED is false by @tom27052006 in #7759\n\nFix Clippy warnings across all targets by @tom27052006 in #7782\n\nAdmin reset: 2fa email fallback need a verified email by @Timshel in #7770\n\nSends cleanup: remove legacy endpoints and align with upstream by @dani-garcia in #7806\n\nRemove legacy API endpoints and compatibility code by @dani-garcia in #7809\n\nAlign API with upstream and remove unwraps by @dani-garcia in #7810\n\nUpdate cra","url":"https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/tag/1.37.4","published_at":"2026-10-06T11:30:54Z","updated_at":null,"fetched_at":"2026-11-22T13:40:16.224741Z","severity":"high","cvss_score":8.1,"epss":null,"is_kev":false,"has_exploit":false,"kev_due_date":null,"vendor":"dani-garcia","product":"vaultwarden","vuln_id":"GHSA-69q9-v8p6-xvx3","vuln_ids":["GHSA-64MC-4P6F-R7X9","GHSA-69Q9-V8P6-XVX3","GHSA-7CCC-C43J-4P36","GHSA-7JG8-8M5X-6J9R","GHSA-Q5X6-GRH5-FQGC","GHSA-QWX4-WCV4-MPCV","GHSA-V576-3WVQ-XH3C"],"tags":["release","repo:dani-garcia/vaultwarden","security"],"cluster_id":11344,"links":{"self":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/api/v1/items/12065","html":"https://vulnwatch.ve1ve2.com/item/12065"}}]}