GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5: js-toml allows uncontrolled recursion in `load()` leading `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested input
- Source:
- OSV.dev
- Published:
- Fetched:
- Updated:
- Affects:
- js-toml
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5 ↗
js-toml allows uncontrolled recursion in `load()` leading `RangeError` (stack exhaustion) on deeply nested input ## Summary `load()` parses untrusted TOML using a recursive-descent parser (Chevrotain) and a recursive tree-walking interpreter. Neither the parser nor the interpreter enforces a maximum nesting / key depth. A small, attacker-controlled document with deep nesting (arrays, inline tables) or a long dotted key drives recursion past the V8 call-stack limit, and `load()` throws an **uncaught `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded`**. This is a problem for two reasons: 1. **Denial of Service.** A tiny payload (≈2 KB) reliably aborts parsing. In any service that parses user-supplied TOML, an unhandled `RangeError` can crash the worker/process (500 / restart loop). 2. **Error-contract violation.** The library signals invalid input via `SyntaxParseError` (see `src/load/exception.ts`; the entire test suite asserts `SyntaxParseError`). Consumers that follow this contract — ```js try { load(input); } catch (e) { if (e instanceof SyntaxParseError) return badRequest(); throw e; // unexpected -> propagates } ``` — will **re-throw** the `RangeError` instead of treating the input as malformed, turning malformed input into an unexpected fatal error. ## Impact - Unauthenticated attacker who can supply a TOML string to an application using `js-toml` can force `load()` to throw a non-`SyntaxParseError` error. - If the error is not caught by a generic handler, the Node.js process terminates (availability impact). - Even when caught generically, the documented/expected error type contract is broken, which can bypass input-validation branches that key off `SyntaxParseError`. No confidentiality or integrity impact. The error is thrown synchronously and is catchable, so a consumer that catches *all* exceptions is not crashed — this is why the severity is assessed Low–Medium rather than High. ## Affected code / root cause There is no depth bound anywhere in the parse pipeline. Recursion occurs in (at least) two independent places: 1. **Parser (recursive descent).** `src/load/parser.ts` — `array` / `inlineTable` rules recurse through `value` for each nesting level. 2. **Interpreter (tree walk).** `src/load/interpreter.ts` — `assignValue`, `createTable`, `getOrCreateArray` recurse per dotted-key segment, and `cleanInternalProperties` recurses per object depth. Because there is no configurable or hard limit, the recursion depth is bounded only by the V8 stack, and overflow surfaces as a raw `RangeError`. ## Steps to reproduce (PoC) Environment used: Node.js v20, `js-toml@1.1.2`. ```js import { load, SyntaxParseError } from 'js-toml'; function probe(label, toml) { try { load(toml); console.log(`[OK] ${label}`); } catch (e) { const expected = e instanceof SyntaxParseError; console.log(`[${e.constructor.name}${expected ? '' : ' (UNEXPECTED)'}] ${label}: ${String(e.message).split('\n')[0]}`); } } // 1) Deeply nested arrays (~2 KB payload) probe('nested array depth Affected: npm:js-toml Fixed in: 1.1.3 References: https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-3g82-77xr-68x5 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63386 https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/commit/4e10acf1f99ff3cb443c58b8f0a57664e41e87c6 https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/releases/tag/v1.1.3