GHSA-2wrx-84qj-4pcg: anacrolix torrent has unbounded recursion in the bencode decoder that causes stack-overflow crash and CPU-exhaustion DoS
- Source:
- OSV.dev
- Published:
- Fetched:
- Updated:
- Affects:
- github.com/anacrolix/torrent
https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-2wrx-84qj-4pcg ↗
anacrolix torrent has unbounded recursion in the bencode decoder that causes stack-overflow crash and CPU-exhaustion DoS ## Summary anacrolix/torrent's bencode decoder (`bencode/`) applies **no limit on the nesting depth** of nested dictionaries and lists. Two distinct denial-of-service mechanisms follow from that single root cause, both reachable from a single crafted `.torrent` file or from metadata obtained from a peer on a magnet-link/v2 download: 1. **Stack-overflow process crash.** `Decoder.readOneValue` recurses once per nesting level with no depth bound. A `.torrent` whose `info` value is a list nested a few million levels deep (≈8 MB file) drives the recursion past the 1 GiB goroutine-stack limit and the process dies with an unrecoverable `fatal error: stack overflow`. 2. **Quadratic CPU exhaustion.** `metainfo.FileTree.UnmarshalBencode` (BitTorrent v2) re-parses each subtree at every level, making parse time grow ~O(n²). A v2 info dict with a ~30,000-level file tree (≈0.2 MB) takes ~66 s to decode; 60,000 levels exceeds 90 s of decode time. Affected: every application embedding `github.com/anacrolix/torrent` that ingests attacker-supplied metainfo - the CLI tools (`cmd/torrent`, `cmd/torrent2`), any server that opens `.torrent` files, or any client that accepts metadata from a peer for a magnet/v2 download. No depth limit has ever existed in the decoder. ## Vulnerability Details All file:line references are against the pinned commit `4ad31c5170787215c51c6ddaa54abc06b623c11c`. ### Root cause - no recursion/depth limit in the bencode decoder `bencode/decode.go` implements three independently unbounded recursive parsers. There is no depth counter and no `MaxDepth`/nesting guard anywhere in `bencode/` or `metainfo/`. **Defect 1 - `readOneValue` recursion (`bencode/decode.go:546-549`)** ```go case 'd', 'l': // read until there is nothing to read for d.readOneValue() { } // <- recurses once per nested dict/list level, unbounded ``` `readOneValue` is invoked by `Decoder.parseUnmarshaler` (`bencode/decode.go:591`) whenever a decoded field implements `bencode.Unmarshaler`, which includes `bencode.Bytes` - the type of `MetaInfo.InfoBytes` (`metainfo/metainfo.go:17`). So decoding a normal `.torrent` routes the entire `info` value through this recursion. Stack usage is ~256 bytes per level (consistent with the observed ~4M-level crash at the 1 GiB goroutine-stack limit), so nesting `l` a few million levels deep exhausts the 1 GiB default goroutine-stack limit. Go's stack overflow is a `fatal error` - it is not a recoverable panic, so the `recover()` in `Decoder.Decode` (`bencode/decode.go:35-55`) cannot intercept it, and the whole process terminates. Entry points that reach `readOneValue` with attacker-controlled bytes: - `metainfo.Load` (`metainfo/metainfo.go:35`) / `metainfo.LoadFromFile` (`metainfo.go:50`) - decoding a `.torrent` file; the `info` value becomes a `bencode.Bytes` unmarshaler field. - `Client.AddTorrent` / `Client.AddTorrentFromFile` -> `metainfo.LoadFromFile` (`client.go:1776` inside `AddTorrentFromFile`) Affected: Go:github.com/anacrolix/torrent Fixed in: 1.61.1-0.20260911233437-76452a2c8a2f References: https://github.com/anacrolix/torrent/security/advisories/GHSA-2wrx-84qj-4pcg https://github.com/anacrolix/torrent/commit/76452a2c8a2fd9c59d4d4f10fc3495723d538c7b https://github.com/anacrolix/torrent