VulnWatch by ve1ve2
critical 10.0 EPSS 4.95%

GHSA-4hrh-34w3-5ww8 / CVE-2026-104099: Fabio: Access-control bypass through unnormalized request paths

Source:
GitHub Security Advisories
Published:
Fetched:
Updated:
Affects:
github.com/fabiolb/fabio

https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4hrh-34w3-5ww8 ↗

ghsagoCWE-41CWE-289CWE-863

Fabio: Access-control bypass through unnormalized request paths ## Summary Route selection uses the raw un-normalized request path, and the per-route ACL and basic-auth gates hang off that selection, so a dot-segment, encoded-dot, or double-slash variant of a protected path selects a different route, skips both gates, and is forwarded to the backend which normalizes and serves the protected resource. Unauthenticated; complete bypass of the access control the operator configured. Confirmed at HEAD b841544. Direct peers: Traefik CVE-2023-47106, Envoy CVE-2019-9901. ## The defect fabio never normalizes the request path. A repository-wide search for path.Clean returns zero results. Route selection uses the raw path (route/table.go line 487: `if target = t.lookup(h, req.URL.Path, pick, match); target != nil {`). Both access-control gates are properties of the target that lookup returned: ```go // proxy/http_proxy.go if t.AccessDeniedHTTP(r) { // line 111, per-route allow / deny:ip ACL http.Error(w, "access denied", http.StatusForbidden) return } if !t.Authorized(r, w, p.AuthSchemes) { // line 116, per-route auth= basic auth http.Error(w, "authorization failed", http.StatusUnauthorized) return } ``` and the same raw path is forwarded verbatim (`Path: r.URL.Path` at line 142). So /./admin/, /%2e/admin/, //admin/ and /x/../admin/ do not match the protected /admin route. They fall through to the catch-all / route, which carries no ACL and no auth, and fabio forwards the un-normalized path to the origin, which normalizes it and serves the protected resource. ## Verification Verified end to end against the real binary at HEAD, not a synthetic unit test. fabio was built and run with static routes against a `python3 -m http.server` origin, driven with curl --path-as-is: on a basic-auth route, /admin/ returned 401 without credentials and 200 with valid credentials (controls correct), while all four crafted paths returned 200 with the protected page and NO credentials; on an ACL route, /admin/ returned 403 and all four crafted variants returned 200. Precondition, stated honestly: a less restrictive route must reach the same backend so the crafted path has somewhere to fall through to. That is exactly the two-tag urlprefix- shape fabio's own access-control documentation instructs operators to configure. Where no fallback route exists the request 404s instead. ## Suggested fix Normalize the path before route lookup: decode percent-encoded dot segments and apply path.Clean, then match. Whether the normalized or original path is forwarded upstream is a separate decision, but the LOOKUP must run on the normalized form, because the ACL and auth decisions are derived from it. Also lowercase and strip the port and any trailing dot from the request host before host matching. Secondary observations: X-Forwarded-Prefix is passed through from the client on non-strip routes; the gRPC proxy path never calls either authorization gate, so allow=/auth= on a proto=grpc route are silentl Affected packages: go:github.com/fabiolb/fabio Patched: github.com/fabiolb/fabio 1.7.3

Linked vulnerabilities (4)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Fabio: Access-control bypass through unnormalized request paths

CWE: CWE-41, CWE-289, CWE-863Aliases: CVE-2026-104099, CVE-2023-47106, CVE-2019-9901
CVE-2026-104099 critical 9.1 EPSS 0.57% (p48) NVDCVE.orgGHSA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Fabio: Access-control bypass through unnormalized request paths

CWE: CWE-41, CWE-289, CWE-863Aliases: GHSA-4hrh-34w3-5ww8, CVE-2023-47106, CVE-2019-9901NVD: Deferred
CVE-2023-47106 medium 6.5 EPSS 0.62% (p51) NVDCVE.org
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Traefik is an open source HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. When a request is sent to Traefik with a URL fragment, Traefik automatically URL encodes and forwards the fragment to the backend server. This violates RFC 7230 because in the origin-form the URL should only contain the absolute path and the query. When this is combined with another frontend proxy like Nginx, it can be used to bypass frontend proxy URI-based access control restrictions. This vulnerability has been addressed in versions 2.10.6 and 3.0.0-beta5. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for...

CWE: CWE-20NVD: Modified
CVE-2019-9901 critical 10.0 EPSS 4.95% (p92) NVDCVE.org
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Envoy 1.9.0 and before does not normalize HTTP URL paths. A remote attacker may craft a relative path, e.g., something/../admin, to bypass access control, e.g., a block on /admin. A backend server could then interpret the non-normalized path and provide an attacker access beyond the scope provided for by the access control policy.

CWE: CWE-706NVD: Modified

Also reported by (1)