GHSA-66q9-mxf2-xqw6 / CVE-2026-103035: TeamPass folder re-parenting authorization bypass
- Source:
- GitHub Security Advisories
- Published:
- Fetched:
- Updated:
- Affects:
- nilsteampassnet/TeamPass
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-66q9-mxf2-xqw6 ↗
TeamPass folder re-parenting authorization bypass ## Summary Missing authorization in the update_folder action: any authenticated non-read-only user can rename, re-parent and convert to personal any folder in the instance, moving another team's credential subtree into their own personal space and removing it from the organization. Confirmed at HEAD 2f271cdd (3.2.1.1), and present at 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.7.6. ## The defect The folder-management endpoint dispatches an update_folder action that renames and re-parents a folder. Unlike its sibling actions in the same file, it never checks the edited folder id or the submitted parent id against the caller's accessible-folder set, and the file itself performs no session/authorization gate at all. By pointing the new parent at their own personal folder, an authenticated low-privilege user takes ownership of any folder in the instance. app/sources/folders.queries.php: - The file never calls the session/authorization helpers: a grep for checkSession and userAccessPage across the whole file returns zero hits. - case 'update_folder' (lines 294-662) contains no reference to the caller's user-accessible_folders set. The only access-related logic is the personal-folder computation at lines 428-468 and the guard at line 503, which short-circuits on `(int) $isPersonal === 1`. - The sibling actions do carry the check: case 'add_folder' validates against user-accessible_folders at line 743, case 'delete_folders' at line 904, and case 'copy_folder' applies the equivalent parent check. So update_folder is the one folder-mutating action in the file without an authorization predicate on either the target folder id or the new parent id. ## Attacker model and trace An authenticated TeamPass user who is not read-only (no administrative role required). The attacker submits update_folder with the victim folder's id and a parentId pointing at their own personal folder. Because the new parent is personal, the personal-folder computation sets $isPersonal = 1, which satisfies the line 503 guard, and the update writes the new parent and personal_folder = 1 for the target folder. Consequences: the stolen subtree is added to the attacker's accessible set on their next login, so the item list renders for them, and do_items_list_in_folder exposes the plaintext label, login, url, email and description of every credential in that subtree (item passwords stay sharekey-protected, hence C:L). Because the folder is now flagged personal, it disappears from the organization view for everyone else including administrators (the admin listing selects only personal_folder = 0), so this is also a denial of access to the real owners. ## Verification Source-verified at HEAD: no session/authorization helper anywhere in the file; the update_folder case contains no accessible-folders predicate while add_folder, delete_folders and copy_folder do; the personal-folder short-circuit at line 503. A live TeamPass instance was not stood up. Secondary (needs a live confirmation before filing): there a Affected packages: composer:nilsteampassnet/TeamPass Patched: nilsteampassnet/TeamPass 3.2.2.0