GHSA-gfwj-45pc-w6r5 / CVE-2026-103033: ALTCHA: Nil-map panic (pre-verification DoS) in v1 parseServerSignature on malformed VerificationData
- Source:
- GitHub Security Advisories
- Published:
- Fetched:
- Updated:
- Affects:
- github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfwj-45pc-w6r5 ↗
ALTCHA: Nil-map panic (pre-verification DoS) in v1 parseServerSignature on malformed VerificationData ### Summary `parseServerSignature` in the v1 module only initializes `ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra` inside the `if err == nil` branch after `url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData)`. Go's `url.ParseQuery` returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into `Extra`, regardless of `err`, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a `VerificationData` string with a bad %-escape (e.g. `x=1&%zz=2`). This is reachable pre-authentication: `parseServerSignature` is called by the exported `VerifyServerSignature` / `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` before any HMAC/signature check, and `VerificationData` is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload. ### Impact Any application calling `VerifyServerSignature` or `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework. ### Proof Of Concept ```go payload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{ Algorithm: SHA256, VerificationData: "x=1&%zz=2", Signature: "irrelevant", Verified: true, }) encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(payload) VerifyServerSignature(encoded, "some-secret") // panics: assignment to entry in nil map ``` ### Patch `Extra` is now initialized unconditionally before the `url.ParseQuery` error check, so it's always safe to write into regardless of parse errors. ### Workarounds Recover from panics around calls to `VerifyServerSignature`/`VerifyServerSignatureSafe`, or reject/sanitize `VerificationData` before calling them, until upgrading. ### Patch Patch commit: 2c4fc27 ### Credit Reported by Arpit Jain (@arpitjain099) via private disclosure. Affected packages: go:github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2 Patched: github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2 2.1.0