VulnWatch by ve1ve2
critical 9.6 EPSS 0.40%

GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793 / CVE-2026-77369: Daptin: Broken Access Control (IDOR) in the generic YJS collaboration endpoint

Source:
GitHub Security Advisories
Published:
Fetched:
Updated:
Affects:
github.com/daptin/daptin

https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793 ↗

ghsagoCWE-639CWE-862CWE-863

Daptin: Broken Access Control (IDOR) in the generic YJS collaboration endpoint ### Summary Daptin registers a generic WebSocket endpoint, `GET /yjs/:documentName`, for real-time collaborative document editing (YJS/CRDT). Unlike its purpose-built sibling route, this generic endpoint performs no per-resource authorization check - it only verifies that *some* user session exists. Because the document store parses `:documentName` as `typename.referenceId.columnName` and fetches that row's real column content unconditionally, any authenticated user (including a brand-new, zero-privilege, self-registered account) can read - and, since YJS sync is bidirectional, also write - the content of any `file.*`-typed column on any row of any table, including tables that are admin-only by default. ### Details `InitializeYjsResources` (`server/endpoint_yjs.go`) registers two routes. The purpose-built, correctly-secured route, registered once per `file.*`-typed column on every table: ```go // server/endpoint_yjs.go:47-113 (abridged) path := fmt.Sprintf("/live/%v/:referenceId/%v/yjs", typename, columnInfo.ColumnName) ... return func(ginContext *gin.Context) { sessionUser := ... if sessionUser == nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(403); return } ... object, _, getErr := cruds[typename].GetSingleRowByReferenceIdWithTransaction(typename, parsedId, nil, tx) if getErr != nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(404); return } ... objectPermission := cruds[typename].GetRowPermission(object, tx2) if !objectPermission.CanUpdate(user.UserReferenceId, user.Groups, cruds[typename].AdministratorGroupId) { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(401) return } roomName := fmt.Sprintf("%v%v%v%v%v", typename, ".", referenceId, ".", columnInfo.ColumnName) ... yjsConnectionHandler(ginContext.Writer, ginContext.Request) } ``` This route correctly requires a session, loads the actual row, and checks `objectPermission.CanUpdate(...)` for the specific requesting user before allowing the WebSocket upgrade. A second, generic route is registered right above it, with none of those checks: ```go // server/endpoint_yjs.go:27-38 defaultRouter.GET("/yjs/:documentName", func(ginContext *gin.Context) { sessionUser := ginContext.Request.Context().Value("user") if sessionUser == nil { ginContext.AbortWithStatus(403) return } yjsConnectionHandler(ginContext.Writer, ginContext.Request) }) ``` The only gate here is "is some session present" - there is no lookup of the referenced row, no `GetRowPermission`, no `CanUpdate`/`CanRead` check at all. `:documentName` is taken verbatim from the URL and handed straight to `yjsConnectionHandler`. The YJS document store's content provider parses `documentName` using exactly the `typename.referenceId.columnName` convention the secure route builds internally as `roomName`, and uses it to fetch the real row from the database with no authorization check of its own: ```go // server/yjs_doucment_provider.go:41-115 (abridged) ydb.WithInitialContentProvider(func(doc Affected packages: go:github.com/daptin/daptin Patched: github.com/daptin/daptin 0.12.30

Linked vulnerabilities (2)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Daptin: Broken Access Control (IDOR) in the generic YJS collaboration endpoint

CWE: CWE-639, CWE-862, CWE-863Aliases: CVE-2026-77369
CVE-2026-77369 critical 9.6 EPSS 0.40% (p35) NVDCVE.orgGHSA
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Daptin: Broken Access Control (IDOR) in the generic YJS collaboration endpoint

CWE: CWE-639, CWE-862, CWE-863Aliases: GHSA-wj7x-58c2-5793NVD: Deferred

Also reported by (1)