AI threats in the wild: The current state of prompt injections on the web
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- Google Online Security Blog
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http://security.googleblog.com/2026/04/ai-threats-in-wild-current-state-of.html ↗
Posted by Thomas Brunner, Yu-Han Liu, Moni Pande At Google, our Threat Intelligence teams are dedicated to staying ahead of real-world adversarial activity, proactively monitoring emerging threats before they can impact users. Right now, Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) is a top priority for the security community, anticipating it as a primary attack vector for adversaries to target and compromise AI agents. But while the danger of IPI is widely discussed, are threat actors actually exploiting this vector today – and if so, how? To answer these questions and to uncover real-world abuse, we initiated a broad sweep of the public web to monitor for known indirect prompt injection patterns. This is what we found. The threat of indirect prompt injection Unlike a direct injection where a user "jailbreaks" a chatbot, IPI occurs when an AI system processes content—like a website, email, or document—that contains malicious instructions. When the AI reads this poisoned content, it may silently follow the attacker's commands instead of the user's original intent. This is not a new area of concern for us and Google has been working tirelessly to combat these threats. Our efforts involve cross-functional collaboration between researchers at Google DeepMind (GDM) and defenders like the Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG). We have previously detailed our work in this area and researchers have further highlighted the evolving nature of these vulnerabilities. Despite this collective focus, a fundamental question remains: to what degree are real-world malicious actors currently operationalizing these attacks? Proactive monitoring at Google The landscape of IPI on the web There are many channels through which attackers might try to send prompt injections. However, one location is particularly easy to observe - the public web. Here, threat actors may simply seed prompt injections on websites in hope of corrupting AI systems that browse them. Public research confirms these attacks are possible; consequently, we should expect real-world adversaries to exploit these vulnerabilities to cause harm. Thus, we ask a basic question: What outcomes are real attackers trying to achieve today? For ease of access and reproducibility, we chose to use Common Crawl , which is a large repository of crawled websites from the English-speaking web. Common Crawl provides monthly snapshots of 2-3 billion pages each. These are mostly static websites, which includes self-published content such as blogs, forums and comments on these sites, but as a caveat it does not contain most social media content (e.g., LinkedIn, Facebook, X, …) as Common Crawl skips websites with login walls and anti-crawl directives. This means that, while prompt injections have been observed on social media, we reserve these for an upcoming separate study. For a first look, we can observe prompt injections even in standard HTML, for which Common Crawl conveniently provides not just the source, but also the parsed plaintext. The challenge of false positives The task of scanning large amounts of documents for prompt injections may sound simple, but in reality is hindered by an overwhelming number of false positive detections. Early experiments revealed a significant volume of "benign" prompt injection text, which illustrates the complexity of distinguishing between functional threats and harmless content. Many prompt injections were found in research papers, educational blog posts, or security articles discussing this very topic. False positives: Most prompt injections in web content tend to be education material for researchers. (Source: GitHub/swisskyrepo) When searching for prompt injections naively, the majority of detections are benign content – false positives in our case. Therefore, we opted for a coarse-to-fine filtering approach: Pattern Matching : We initially identified candidate pages by searching for a range of popular prompt injection signatures, like “ignore … instructions” , “if y…