Supporting Rowhammer research to protect the DRAM ecosystem
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- Google Online Security Blog
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http://security.googleblog.com/2025/09/supporting-rowhammer-research-to.html ↗
Posted by Daniel Moghimi Rowhammer is a complex class of vulnerabilities across the industry. It is a hardware vulnerability in DRAM where repeatedly accessing a row of memory can cause bit flips in adjacent rows, leading to data corruption. This can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access to data, escalate privileges, or cause denial of service. Hardware vendors have deployed various mitigations, such as ECC and Target Row Refresh (TRR) for DDR5 memory, to mitigate Rowhammer and enhance DRAM reliability. However, the resilience of those mitigations against sophisticated attackers remains an open question. To address this gap and help the ecosystem with deploying robust defenses, Google has supported academic research and developed test platforms to analyze DDR5 memory. Our effort has led to the discovery of new attacks and a deeper understanding of Rowhammer on the current DRAM modules, helping to forge the way for further, stronger mitigations. What is Rowhammer? Rowhammer exploits a vulnerability in DRAM. DRAM cells store data as electrical charges, but these electric charges leak over time, causing data corruption. To prevent data loss, the memory controller periodically refreshes the cells. However, if a cell discharges before the refresh cycle, its stored bit may corrupt. Initially considered a reliability issue, it has been leveraged by security researchers to demonstrate privilege escalation attacks. By repeatedly accessing a memory row, an attacker can cause bit flips in neighboring rows. An adversary can exploit Rowhammer via: Reliably cause bit flips by repeatedly accessing adjacent DRAM rows. Coerce other applications or the OS into using these vulnerable memory pages. Target security-sensitive code or data to achieve privilege escalation. Or simply corrupt system’s memory to cause denial of service . Previous work has repeatedly demonstrated the possibility of such attacks from software [ Revisiting rowhammer , Are we susceptible to rowhammer? , Drammer , Flip feng shui , Jolt ]. As a result, defending against Rowhammer is required for secure isolation in multi-tenant environments like the cloud. Rowhammer Mitigations The primary approach to mitigate Rowhammer is to detect which memory rows are being aggressively accessed and refreshing nearby rows before a bit flip occurs. TRR is a common example, which uses a number of counters to track accesses to a small number of rows adjacent to a potential victim row. If the access count for these aggressor rows reaches a certain threshold, the system issues a refresh to the victim row. TRR can be incorporated within the DRAM or in the host CPU. However, this mitigation is not foolproof. For example, the TRRespass attack showed that by simultaneously hammering multiple, non-adjacent rows, TRR can be bypassed. Over the past couple of years, more sophisticated attacks [ Half-Double , Blacksmith ] have emerged, introducing more efficient attack patterns. In response, one of our efforts was to collaborate with JEDEC , external researchers, and experts to define the PRAC as a new mitigation that deterministically detects Rowhammer by tracking all memory rows. However, current systems equipped with DDR5 lack support for PRAC or other robust mitigations. As a result, they rely on probabilistic approaches such as ECC and enhanced TRR to reduce the risk. While these measures have mitigated older attacks, their overall effectiveness against new techniques was not fully understood until our recent findings . Challenges with Rowhammer Assessment Mitigating Rowhammer attacks involves making it difficult for an attacker to reliably cause bit flips from software. Therefore, for an effective mitigation, we have to understand how a determined adversary introduces memory accesses that bypass existing mitigations. Three key information components can help with such an analysis: How the improved TRR and in-DRAM ECC work. How memory access patterns from software translate into…